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PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

IT IS the object of this article to examine that clause of the Constitution which provides for the devolution of the president's authority upon the office of the vice president in the event of the president's being unable to exercise it himself. It reads as follows:

> In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or *Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office,* the Same shall devolve on the Vice President. . . .

Four cases are distinguished; we shall be directly concerned with only one—inability. Death, deposition, and resignation bring about, in practice at least, a demise of the presidency; they have never occasioned difficulty. But what of inability? Can there be a demise of the presidency when the president is still alive, unremoved, and, if the word be permitted, unresigned? To what organ of government does it appertain to decide at what time the vice president shall lay down the only substantive duty assigned to him by the Constitution—the presidency of the Senate—and enter upon " the higher and more important functions which the Constitution eventually devolves upon his office "? [1] Who are to decide when, if ever, he shall step down?

These are important questions. To the Founding Fathers, as we shall presently see, their answers were clear as crystal; today they are clear as mud. Time and nonuser have drawn a veil over the inability clause. Confusion has been worse confounded by the varying constructions put upon it by those who have advocated or resisted devolution in particu-

[1] The phrase is Jefferson's. 6 *Annals of Congress,* 1581-1582.

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lar cases—notably in the cases of Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower. In each of these cases many proposals for change—either statutory or constitutional—have been put before the country by persons disturbed by the failure of action. Some of these proposals have, perhaps, a certain merit; others would do little or no harm; still others speak the language of high prerogative in tones that Sir Robert Sawyer might have envied.

It is my purpose to examine these proposals under a few general heads, but one point I should make perfectly clear at the start. All or most of them are grounded on a conception of the difficulty to be overcome which I conceive to be mistaken. They seem to assume that the inability clause of the Constitution has never been put into operation because of "gaps" in that instrument, or because of constitutional scruples or fears on the part of the persons involved, or because of the absence of specific and positive machinery. If only the gap could be bridged, the scruples silenced and the fears removed, permanent machinery set up for the ascertainment of fact, all would be well. But the true difficulty, I shall suggest, is not legal, psychological, or mechanical, but political. In the particular cases that have arisen, the difficulty has been, not that no one knows how, but that no one wants, to put the disability clause into effect. This difficulty is not likely to be removed by any legislation, constitutional or statutory, of the kind now being proposed.

We must not, however, take this remark as a counsel of despair. In cases of this kind necessity works its own cure. If an occasion should ever arise when the high interests of the nation are palpably and adversely affected by an interruption in the exercise of the presidential office, we shall find the gaps of the Constitution suddenly closed, its pretended omissions supplied, and the vice president wielding the full authority of the president's office. By what mode the devolution might be accomplished we shall point out below.

The Definition of Inability

Perhaps the easiest way to enter into our subject is to consider the meaning of "inability". "What is the extent of the term disability?" asked John Dickinson in the Federal Convention and got no recorded answer. For this presumed

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silence the Founding Fathers have been much berated, and politicians and publicists have labored long and hard to speak on their behalf. But, in all honesty, what answer could Dickinson have got to so silly a question? The meaning of the word was abundantly plain from the context in which it was used. Disability or inability (for the words are used interchangeably in the Constitution) meant an incompetence, an incapacity, an impotence to exercise the office of president arising from any cause other than removal, death, or resignation. In the Twelfth Amendment it included even these casualties, for there reference was made to the "death or *other* constitutional disability of the President."

How, by the way, would one go about defining so plain a term? One might separate inability from removal, death, and resignation, by saying that the former may be temporary while the latter must be permanent; the definition, though useless, would fit the inability clause of the Constitution; it would not fit the Twelfth Amendment. One might list the possible causes of inability—insanity, illness, absence—but to what purpose? A consequence cannot be defined in terms of its causes. It makes precious little difference to the Constitution or the country whether executive inability is caused by madness (as in the case of George III), capture by the enemy (as in the case of Richard I), or mysterious disappearance (as in the case of Judge Crater). All that matters is the fact of inability. Besides, there is no end to definition. If we say that sickness is a cause of inability, we shall be asked to define sickness; and so on and on and on. We shall wind up in the position of a parent harassed by the endless questions of a tiresome child.

If it were true, as Theodore W. Dwight, head of the Columbia Law School, maintained in Garfield's time, that the word "inability" is to be taken in a technical rather than a popular sense, that it means insanity and nothing else, then indeed it would be time to take notice.[2] But Dwight's article is a wretched performance, full of error, an example of special pleading plainly intended to throw obstacles in the path of a contemplated devolution of power from the sick Garfield to the well Arthur. No one today has attempted to

[2] *North American Review*, CXXXIII, 436-446. See also Ruth Silva, *Presidential Succession* (Ann Arbor, 1951), pp. 88-89.

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construe the Constitution in a manner that would clearly prevent its full operation.

If it were desirable to give a technical meaning to the term rather than a general meaning, then too the case would be different. One could properly debate what to put into the definition and what to leave out. If the definition were to be made by statute, one would also have to debate the authority of Congress to alter restrictively a definition intended by the Constitution to be all-embracing. But no one today has any idea of *creating* constitutional gaps.

In summary, then, it would seem the part of wisdom to leave the definition of inability alone. Nothing is to be gained by amending it, and something might be lost.

President or Acting President

We come now to a more interesting question. Is a vice president, exercising the office of president during the inability of his chief, the president of the United States or merely the acting president? He must be one or the other. If president, he ousts his chief and serves out the remainder of his term. If acting president he serves during, and only during, the president's inability.

To the framers of the Constitution the mere raising of such a question would have seemed nonsensical, the sure mark of a disordered mind. Nor, indeed, is it much more intelligible today. In case of death, removal, and resignation, it is easy, and not unreasonable, to assimilate the succession of the vice president to the presidency to the succession of an heir apparent to the throne. In cases of inability there is no comparison. *Nemo est haeres viventis*: no man may inherit from a living person. To argue in derogation of this well-known rule of law is to suggest that the heir-at-law is entitled to enter into possession of the estate of a sick man or a lunatic. As we shall presently see, the framers did, in fact, draw a clear line between cases of vacancy in the executive office and cases of disability. And even in respect of the former they regarded the vice president more in the character of potential regent than in that of heir apparent.

Nevertheless, for more than a century, fears have been expressed that, if a vice president is once let into the office of a disabled president, he can never be got out again.

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I hear a lion in the lobby roar—
Say, Mr. Speaker, shall we shut the door
And keep him there, or shall we let him in
To try if we can turn him out again?

Such is the burden of the song.

In justification of these fears an appeal is made to history. Everything, we are told, began in 1841, when Harrison died and Tyler succeeded to the presidency. The case, to be sure, had nothing to do with disability; but, by analogy, it controls it. How, we shall see in a moment; first let us look at the facts.

Harrison's death occurred during the recess of Congress, and Tyler had to decide whether to assume the reins of government as "president of the United States" or as "vice president now exercising the office of president". He chose the higher title, took the oath of office as president, and made it known "that he was by the Constitution, by election, and by act of God, President of the United States."[3] When Congress convened, a feeble effort was made to reverse his decision. But in neither House was there any inclination to enter into a lengthy constitutional debate on a point of so little practical importance. There was no question of the right of Tyler to succeed: he was the officer named by the Constitution as the man in whom the presidential authority was to be vested; no man could be put over him. There was no question of the nature and extent of the powers and duties to which he had succeeded: he was to exercise the whole, not merely a portion, of the presidential authority—to discharge all, not merely some, of the executive duties. There was no question of the resumption of power, for the president was dead. There was no question of the period of time during which he was to exercise the office of president, for it had always been recognized that a vice president in cases of death, removal, or resignation succeeded for the remainder of the term. There was nothing, therefore, to discuss but the questions of style, salary, and house, and no

[3] Such was the report of Senator Wise to his colleagues. 10 *Congressional Globe*, 4. Its accuracy cannot be questioned. In his message vetoing the bank bill, Tyler himself says: "By the occurrence of a contingency provided for by the Constitution, and arising under an impressive dispensation of Providence, I succeeded to the Presidential office." *Ibid.*, p. 337.

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one proposed to deny Tyler the regular salary attached to the presidency or the use of the president's house. In these circumstances Tyler found little difficulty in enforcing his claim.

It is unnecessary now to debate the merits of this old controversy. The precedent established by Tyler has become the rule. Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Coolidge, and Truman succeeded to the presidency by death, and each of them was recognized as president; one of them, indeed, was impeached as president. Furthermore, Tyler's construction of the Constitution has been recognized by the Twentieth Amendment and confirmed by the Twenty-second. The former provides that, if the president-elect dies before the beginning of his term, the vice president-elect shall become president. The latter speaks of a person who has held the office of president for a portion of a term to which some other person was elected. But if a vice president may become president for the whole of a term, why not for a part? And who but the vice president is pointed at in the reference to a person filling out, as president, some one else's term?

But what, it may be asked, has all this to do with disability? Is there not an essential difference between a man who succeeds to a vacant office and a man who, in certain contingencies, exercises the office of a living president? Those who feel, or pretend to feel, the apprehensions referred to above say that there is not—or that *maybe* there is not. Their argument is easier to state than to follow; but for what it is worth, I give it here. The Constitution, it is said, in providing for the devolution of power upon the vice president makes no distinction between cases of vacancy and cases of inability; whatever devolves upon the vice president in one instance devolves upon him in every other; if the office of president devolves upon him when the president dies it devolves upon him when the president is disabled. And what is meant by the devolution of an office? Its absolute transfer from one person to another. A vice president upon whom the office of president has devolved becomes president and must continue in that capacity until the end of the former president's term, except in case of his own removal, death, resignation, or disability. *Quod erat demonstrandum.*

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This argument is reinforced by another. The Constitution, it is quite properly said, must be read as a whole, not merely in parts; every clause must be taken in its context. In considering the position of the vice president we must not avoid reading the whole of the disability clause. It is in two parts: the first presupposes the existence of a vice president capable of exercising the president's office; the second reads as follows:

> . . . and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

Here it is plain that Congress has distinguished disability from vacancy and made it clear that the secondary substitute for the president is to step down when the disability of the president or vice president, as the case may be, shall come to an end. If the Constitution had meant the same rule to apply to the vice president, it would have said so.

This, I think, is a fair statement of the line of reasoning by which the action of President Tyler in 1841 has been related to the problem of presidential inability. The first, and indeed the last, thing that we need notice about it is that it is founded on a grammatical quibble. This quibble has to do with the antecedent of the pronoun "Same" in the first part of the disability clause:

> In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the *Same* shall devolve on the Vice President. . . .

To what phrase does the word "Same" refer? To "the said Office"? Or to "the Powers and Duties of the said Office"? The importance of the quibble lies in this: if the office of the president devolves upon the vice president, then the vice president becomes president; a disabled president cannot regain his office when the disability is removed; but if only the powers and duties of the presidency devolve upon the vice president, then a disabled president, upon the removal of the disability, may resume the exercise of his office.

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Such, at least, is the importance attached to the quibble by most modern commentators. Whether the framers of the Constitution would have recognized a distinction between an office and the powers and duties that make it up is open to question. When George III in 1811 signed the measure which, in his own words, " put him out of office ", neither he nor anyone else supposed that he had ceased being " King ", or that, upon the recovery of his reason, he would not personally resume the administration and exercise of the royal power and authority belonging to the Crown. But let us accept the distinction and examine the quibble itself.

If attention be paid only to grammar, then it must be admitted that an ambiguity exists: the word "Same " may refer either to the office of the president or to the powers and duties thereof. But if common sense be admitted as an aid to constitutional construction, or if any attention at all be paid to the known intent of the framers of the Constitution or to the interpretation placed upon that instrument by the men who first put it into operation, the ambiguity vanishes.

As between two constructions of the Constitution, the one absurd, the other rational, the latter is always to be preferred. Let us put a case, naming names only to make our ideas more precise. Let it be assumed that a disabled president must forfeit his office to the vice president. Eisenhower becomes disabled and is succeeded by Nixon. A few days later Nixon also becomes disabled; Speaker Rayburn, as the deputy substitute declared by law, becomes acting president. Presently Eisenhower's disability is removed, but, having forfeited his office to Nixon, he cannot regain it. Now Nixon's disability is removed; he resumes the exercise of the presidential office; for that office is incapable of forfeiture to the deputy substitute. The result, I submit, is contrary to common sense. A reasonable construction would leave the office to Eisenhower and permit him to resume its exercise when he was able to do so; disability would not involve forfeiture.

There is no need, however, to labor this point. The framers of the Constitution spelled out their intent in the resolution which they adopted September 8 and referred to the Committee of Style for incorporation in the final draft of the Constitution. This read as follows:

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> . . . and in case of his [the President's] removal as aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or inability to discharge the powers or duties of his office, the Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties until another President be chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.[4]

The Committee of Style, let it be remembered, had no authority to change the substance of the resolutions submitted to them—only the language. We are therefore entitled to, indeed we must, take this resolution as an explanatory equivalent of the final text. That the Committee did change the language is obvious, and so is their reason for doing it. They were putting into one paragraph two separate resolutions almost identically phrased. The first has just been quoted. The second dealt with the case of vacancy or disability in both executive offices at the same time:

> The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the United States shall act as President in case of the death, resignation, or disability of the President and Vice President; and such Officer shall act accordingly, until such disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.[5]

Language and style were cherished by the framers of the Constitution as the coat and apparel of matter; they regarded tautology and tautophony as faults of style; and so, here as elsewhere, they used different words to explain the same thought. The result of their labor appears in the two parts of the disability clause which we have quoted separately above. By all means let us read them together, as demanded by those who fear the consequences of devolution; for, in so far as the duration of regency action is concerned, the second is a gloss upon the first.

That the men who put the Constitution into effect understood all this seems perfectly plain. Said Jefferson, addressing the Senate on his induction as vice president in 1797: "No one more sincerely prays that no accident may call me

[4] Max Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention* (New Haven, 1937), II, 495, 499, 551-552. The language was in the section providing for impeachment.

[5] Farrand, *op. cit.*, II, 532, 535. The language was in the section constituting the Executive.

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to the higher and more important functions which the Constitution eventually devolves on this office." [6] There is no suggestion here that the vice president could, in any circumstances, become president—only that he might sometimes be called to exercise the office of president. The members of the Eighth Congress collectively took the same view, for in the Twelfth Amendment, adopted in 1804, they declared that, in a certain contingency, the vice president was "to act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President."

The fact that the action taken by President Tyler in 1841 has been drawn into precedent as a rule to govern subsequent cases that are exactly similar has no bearing on the question of disability. A dead president cannot be assimilated to a living one. The Constitution has distinguished vacancy in the executive office from disability in the president. In cases that involve the latter its mandate is clear: when the disability of the president is removed, the vice president must step down.

We come at last to the question that is immediately before the country. Should the supposed ambiguities of the Constitution be cleared from that instrument by constitutional amendment? The answer that we give to this question must depend in part upon the answer that we give to an antecedent one. Are the doubts and fears that have bedeviled all discussions of presidential disability real or pretended? If real they should be removed, even though unfounded. If pretended, they may safely be left unresolved.

What is the truth? In 1841 it is clear that there was neither doubt nor fear. Senator Allen accepted, for purposes of argument, the grammatical quibble explained above, and then set about to prove its error by demonstrating the absurdity of the conclusion to which it would allegedly lead. But the Senate refused to be drawn into an abstract discussion of constitutional law when none of the circumstances existed which had been supposed. At the suggestion of Calhoun they conceded Tyler his title and passed on to other business. In the House the story was the same. In Garfield's time, and again in Wilson's, the case was somewhat different. Senator Allen's argument was taken up, treated

[6] 6 *Annals of Congress*, 1581-1582.

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as solid or nearly solid, and used as a weapon to prevent the devolution of power upon Arthur or Marshall. As to the present situation, one need only ask whether any one at all really believes that, if Nixon had been called upon to exercise the office of president when Eisenhower fell ill, he would have continued in that office after Eisenhower got well. Indeed, it is safe to say that, if any vice president were to be so foolish as to resist the return to power of a recovered president, the very politicians who had most strongly maintained the doctrine that disability works forfeiture would be the first to denounce him as a usurper. As for the people at large, they would see in his action, not an orderly operation of the Constitution, but an act of unprincipled violence.

In this view of the matter no amendment of the Constitution is needed, and none is desirable. It is an accepted maxim that the Constitution should not be changed for slight and transient causes. There is no danger; no one truly believes that there is any danger, that a vice president will attempt to exercise the office of a disabled president for a single moment after the disability is removed. Consequently, there is no need to provide against it.

If Congress moves at all in this matter, it should move by statute. Should it decide to pass an act to facilitate the devolution of power on a vice president in cases of presidential inability, it might properly include a section to facilitate the resumption of power upon the president's recovery. The inclusion of such a provision would amount to a legislative construction of the Constitution, analogous in all respects to that made in 1789 by the First Congress in the matter of the president's removal power. It would serve every purpose, and have none of the inconvenience, of a constitutional amendment.

If Congress does nothing, we can safely wait until a case of disability occurs so serious as to compel a devolution of power. Then let the vice president act as president under his oath as vice president; let him sign and veto bills, appoint and remove officers, pardon offenders, exercise every branch of the presidential prerogative, in the capacity of vice president acting as president. Even if the president were never to recover, an executive-legislative construction would have been placed upon the disability clause. And this, I submit, would be the strongest kind of construction.

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The Mode of Devolution

It has seemed desirable to discuss the questions that have been raised with regard to the termination of devolution in advance of those that appertain to its inception. For the doubts that have been pretended in respect of the former have been used in argument as reasons or excuses for doing nothing about the latter. Now let us turn to the mode in which the inability clauses of the Constitution might actually be put into effect.

On the question of mode the Constitution is silent, but this silence cannot be pleaded in justification of nonaction when action is called for. The Constitution has not fixed the mode of electing representatives or appointing electors, but the states for that reason have not neglected to choose them. All we can say is that the Constitution left the determination of the mode to the discretion of those charged with putting its provisions into operation.

There are no precedents to serve as a rule in this matter, for no case of devolution has ever occurred. Various modes are possible. In defect of a general law fixing some uniform mode or some limited choice of modes, we may suppose that the machinery used in particular cases would be adapted to the circumstances surrounding them.

We may begin with a simple example. Let it be supposed that the president becomes ill—so ill that he finds himself unable to exercise his office; let it further be supposed that he is physically competent to notify his awareness of incapacity to whomsoever it may concern. It would be the simplest thing in the world for him to write a formal letter to the vice president instructing him to exercise the office of president until further notice. It would also be the simplest thing in the world for him to resume the exercise of his own office by the despatch of a countermanding letter. Such letters would, I conceive, automatically cause the powers and duties of the presidency to devolve upon the office of the vice president and then to redevolve upon the office of the president.

Such a mode has the advantage of simplicity. It requires no elaborate machinery. And it accords with common sense. Why should the president have to ask permission of anybody to do what he himself, the man best qualified to judge, knows

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ought to be done? After all, the president at any time can effect a permanent devolution of his powers and duties, and indeed of the office and title itself, by resigning.

We may put another simple case. Let it be supposed that the president is captured by the enemy. Can anyone doubt but that the vice president would immediately step into the presidential shoes? It is of little moment what means of notification are employed—a letter from the Cabinet, a declaration of the two Houses, or merely the news columns of public newspapers. The undisputed fact of capture would automatically bring into action the contingent powers of the vice presidency. Congress might, if it wished, declare what shall be the evidence of capture, as it has done in the case of resignation, or it might do nothing, as in the case of death. As Lyman Trumbull pointed out in 1881:

> Four Presidents have died in office, and it required no statute to define in advance what should constitute the evidence of their death, nor any jury of inquest or other tribunal to determine when they died. To have required such proof would have been unreasonable and absurd. The whole people and all their officials took notice of the sad events, and the Vice-President in each case proceeded to exercise the powers and duties of the Presidential office without question from a human being. There are some things of which everybody takes notice, and which it is never necessary to prove.[7]

Difficulty can arise only in cases where the president is unable or unwilling to recognize and declare his own incapacity. Who then is to decide? Before entering upon this question, we must note the complicated factors upon which a decision must be based. It is too commonly assumed that nothing is needed but to determine a medical fact: let the doctors be called in and examined; let them testify that the president is incapable of exercising his office; and there is an end of the matter; all else is form. Such a view is, however, ingenuous. It is grounded on the idea that the moment an incapacity of fulfilling the presidential functions is discovered, that moment the controlling organs of the government are bound to supply the deficiency. But responsible statesmen never reason in this way. If the temporary sus-

[7] *North American Review*, CXXXIII, 421.

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pension of the functions of the president will not in fact cause a dissolution of the government; if the business of the government is capable of being carried on for a certain time by its own momentum; if there is hope of a speedy recovery; if there is no act that immediately requires the personal exercise of the president's power; then it will be said—and justly said—that the occasion contemplated by the Constitution for supplying the executive power has not arisen. In short, there are questions of political as well as medical fact to be decided.

And who is to decide them? Who is to say, with authority and finality, that the time has come for the vice president to enter upon his higher duties? Are the two Houses of Congress, as the organs of the nation, alone qualified to pronounce when the vice president ought to take possession of and exercise his right? Or does the decision rest elsewhere—to wit, with the vice president himself? Is this officer, no doubt after taking proper advice, to substitute himself for the president whenever he himself thinks it is proper to do so? These are grave constitutional questions, for they pit the prerogative of the vice president against what in former times would have been called the privileges of Congress and liberties of the nation. How these questions come to be raised in a country whose institutions are essentially popular need not concern us. But once started, they must be answered.

Those who look to the vice president's prerogative, among them the present Attorney General of the United States, argue somewhat as follows: The vice president is pointed out in the Constitution as the only man in the country upon whom the presidential authority can be devolved in certain contingencies; the powers and duties of the president are therefore contingent powers of the vice president; in contingent grants of power it is a well-established rule of law that the one to whom the power is granted is to decide when the contingency has arisen; the vice president has, consequently, not merely the right but the duty to assume the reins of government whenever he himself is, in good conscience, satisfied that they have dropped from the hands of the president; he is not to be controlled by the deliberations of the Congress, nor need he wait their decision, for his right is derived from a source higher than Congress, namely,

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the Constitution. Some advocates of this view go so far as to suggest that certain vice presidents (Arthur and Marshall, it may be presumed) were overscrupulous, indeed derelict in their duty, when they did not boldly assert their right in cases of manifest inability.

According to the press, when the Attorney General went before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, expounded the doctrine of vice presidential prerogative, defended it as a true construction of the Constitution, and proposed an amendment to that instrument to guard against usurpations, no member of the subcommittee challenged his fundamental thesis. But sooner or later the challenge will come. It may be expected to take the following form.

The vice president, it will be said, has, indeed, a right to act as president during the president's inability; the right may even be called indefeasible, for it cannot be taken away by Congress nor subordinated to the right of any other man. But it is not a right in possession. Before it may be exercised an adjudication must be made by the court competent to decide whether the occasion contemplated by the Constitution has or has not arisen; and that court is Congress. Only on the judgment of Congress as to the true state of the facts may the vice president take his right. Ours, it will be added, is a democratic not a prerogative government. The people are the ultimate source of all political power. If there is a failure of executive power, it is the people who must put in motion the measures prescribed by the Constitution for supplying it. The Senate and the House of Representatives are their organs of speech; these remain entire, and it is through them that the sense of the people must be taken.

What would the Founding Fathers have thought of this debate? One thing is certain. It would have vastly surprised them. In 1790 Washington fell ill; the progress of the malady was alarming; and presently his life was despaired of. Even the doctor immediately attending him said frankly that he had every reason to expect the death of his patient.[8] The inability was notorious, known to every man with a certainty that has never since been equaled. Yet not a voice was heard to suggest that Adams had a right or duty to proclaim himself acting president.

[8] D. S. Freeman, *George Washington* (New York, 1954), VI, 259-260.

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For this silence there were, I submit, two very good reasons. First, no one believed that a vice president had a right to sit in judgment on his own claim—a claim which, when allowed, would become an absolute title to the exercise of all the powers of the presidency, without any limitation. Second, no one, in 1790, even believing it, would have ventured to maintain a doctrine of such high Tory principle. Only two years before, an incident had occurred in England that had astonished the men of all parties on both sides of the Atlantic, and that stood as a warning to all those in America who might have been inclined to make themselves the special advocates of vice presidential prerogative. In the debates on the regency bill, occasioned by the King's derangement, Fox had asserted the not unreasonable doctrine that the heir apparent, the Prince of Wales, being of full age and capacity to exercise the royal power, had an inherent right to the regency and that no portion of the royal power could constitutionally be withheld from him. In short he inferred by analogy that, if by the law of England the Crown was hereditary, the exercise of the sovereign power was hereditary also. So far Fox was stating the rule which, *mutatis mutandis,* applies in our own government. The vice president, if alive and well, is the only person who can exercise the presidential power in cases of presidential inability, and Congress can impose no restrictions upon that power. Fox went further. He asserted, or was understood to assert, that the Prince had a right, without waiting for a declaration of either House, to assume what the Constitution had given him a right to take, namely, the regency. A few days later Sheridan compounded the blunder by reminding the Commons of the danger of provoking the Prince to assert his right. The reaction of the country was immediate. The threat of an assertion was treated as an "indecent menace thrown out to awe and influence" the proceedings of Parliament. The Prince disclaimed the right which had been claimed on his behalf. And Fox was driven to explain his words as meaning only that the Prince, when called upon by a joint address of both Houses to exercise the prerogatives of the Crown, should do so. He had intended only to suggest that the function of Parliament in the matter was not election but adjudication. Their vote must precede the ex-

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ercise of the powers of the regency, and it was therefore wholly untrue that his doctrine superseded or annulled their authority.[9] What American statesman, it may be asked, in the light of these events, would have ventured to repeat Fox's performance? And what would have been the outcome if he had?

It is best in these matters to speak plainly. The construction placed upon the Constitution by the defenders of vice presidential prerogative has no merit at all. It can derive no sanction from the Founding Fathers. The vice presidents themselves have never adopted it; their failure to act in cases where some color of necessity might have been pleaded in excuse of action may more properly be attributed to a true understanding of their constitutional rights, than to over-scrupulosity, the fear of political reprisal, or the dereliction of duty. Congress, I submit, should notice this construction now that it has been raised; but only to destroy it in debate. By no means should it seek to accomplish this purpose by proposing an amendment to the states, even if it could now be made clear that such an amendment was declaratory of old law rather than introductive of new. Again we repeat: the Constitution should not be changed for frivolous causes. A statute passed by Congress to regulate the devolution of authority would dispose of the matter by legislative construction of the Constitution; for, on the hypothesis of prerogative, Congress would have no power to pass such a statute. But if nothing were done, there would be no cause for alarm. The averment that the vice president may determine the time of his own entry into presidential power is scarcely to be taken seriously; it is a bugbear to frighten children.

So much for an unpleasant subject. Let us resume our examination of mode. Is there anything that Congress might do to facilitate the making of the decision which in the last analysis none but itself can make? We may dismiss without comment the elaborate schemes for subjecting the president to periodic physical and mental examinations by or

[9] The debates on the regency bill are in volume 27 of the *Parliamentary History of England*. They are well summarized in Lecky's *History of England*, V, 103 *et seq*. It was during one of Fox's speeches that Pitt is said to have smiled triumphantly, slapped his thigh, and exclaimed, "I'll *unwhig* the gentleman for the rest of his life."

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under the authority of a disability commission. The Attorney General has wisely said that such machinery would expose the president to constant harassment and would invite irresponsible demands for commission action. There is more to be said for proposals modeled on the British Regency Act of 1937. These proposals are grounded on the assumption that, when presidential inability actually occurs, some investigation of the fact must necessarily be made on behalf of Congress. It may be convenient to have that investigation made by a body distinct from the committees of Congress itself. If so, it may be well to identify the members by a general law passed now rather than to leave them to be chosen from among a range of persons when the time comes. Such a body, competent to act only by a majority of its members, would be authorized, in cases of apparent disability, to proceed by taking evidence, including medical evidence; it would then declare in writing that it was satisfied by such evidence that the president was by reason of infirmity of mind or body incapable for the time being of exercising his office.

Such a body, if constituted of the highest persons in the government acting *ex officio,* would not be open to the objections raised by the Attorney General to disability commissions of another kind. For, quite plainly, it would never act when there was no apparent occasion for action.

In creating such a body Congress would have to ask itself one important question. Should the certificate of disability or recovery, as the case might be—for surely the body would have jurisdiction over both cases—should the certificate, signed by these high officers, of itself be sufficient to devolve the powers and duties of the presidency on the vice president, or to redevolve them from the vice president to the president? Or should it merely constitute the conclusive evidence upon which Congress might found any ulterior proceeding? This is a question that only Congress can answer: under the "sweeping clause" of the Constitution it surely has power to adopt either course.

But let it be supposed that Congress does nothing. How then would it proceed to supply a defect in the executive power? One can only speculate. Doubtless it would in each case adapt the manner to the circumstance. It might, for example, send a deputation to wait upon the president;

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if this deputation upon its return reported that his mental derangement was such that it "could get no answer nor sign" from him, an appropriate notice might be sent to the vice president. Or Congress might appoint a committee to take evidence under oath from the doctors attending the president and from other witnesses. If the evidence were clear that the president was certainly incapable of attending to public business, the two Houses might attest the fact by a declaratory resolution.

In all this the point to be understood is that there is no "gap" in the Constitution. Its provisions covering presidential inability are entire; they cover every possible contingency. All that is needed, all that ever has been needed, is the will and the occasion to put them into effect.

Conclusion

Throughout this article I have hinted, suggested, averred that those who now press forward with suggestions for solving the problem of presidential inability have not seen to the bottom of it. The trouble is not caused by the absence of machinery, for machinery could be created in a moment if Congress were disposed to use it. Nor is it caused by the fear that a disabled president may become an ousted president; that fear is more pretended than real, and it can easily be shown to be ill-founded. The embarrassment that obstructs the operation of the inability clause is purely political. In relation to the exercise of the president's office, the great overriding question is not how to get the vice president out but whether to let him in.

A change of administration means a change of men. The president and the vice president may be on the best of terms. But even Damon and Pythias had different friends. Those who are faced with the loss of office naturally require a degree of proof of inability considerably higher than those who may hope to gain. Then, too, every important politician is, in a certain sense, the natural enemy of the vice president for the time being; for every important politician is his potential rival for the presidency at the next election. If a vice president were to exercise the office of president even for a very short period, his pretensions to the presidency might be greatly strengthened. The consequences that may be expected to follow from such a division of interest are plain.

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The devolution of power is difficult because the devolution of power is unwanted. I speak in general terms, leaving it to those who are familiar with the undercurrents of political life to make the application of the broad principle to particular cases.

In this view of the matter it would seem that little if any improvement would result from the adoption by Congress of any of the plans now before it. It may confidently be predicted that, whatever laws Congress may now pass, when a case arises similar to those of Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower, the result will be the same. Different arguments may be employed, but in the end the optimists and the pessimists will stand apart. *Currit iter tutum non secius aequore classis*: Though the master be no longer at the helm, we are not in immediate danger of shipwreck. So we shall be told by the friends of the disabled president. Others will reply that the sea is far from calm; the ship of state (they will say) is assailed by tempests and nobody at the helm; she is driven in a storm that threatens awful and imminent dangers.

Is there then no solution to the problem? The practical answer, I think, is no. The best chance would be to change the regent, to let the government be carried on during a president's illness by some member of his own administration, say the secretary of state. Such a solution would have commended itself to the many members of the Federal Convention who favored the creation of a Council of State to assist the president. But the reform would be unconstitutional, for no man can be put over the vice president. In 1947, it is true, Congressman Celler, now chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced a constitutional amendment to abolish the office of vice president, but he did not press or explain it at the time, and nothing has been heard of it since. There is nothing, of course, to prevent Congress from changing the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 to conform with these ideas, and most students of the problem, I believe, think it should be done.[10] But that act

[10] The Act of 1947 makes the speaker of the house the provisional, or second-string, substitute for the president. It requires him to resign as speaker and as representative in Congress, before beginning to act as president. Those who enjoy quibbles may ask themselves this: only an officer of the United States can act as president; what office does a resigned speaker occupy?

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can reach cases only in which the vice president, at the time of presidential disability, is himself dead or incapacitated; no such case has ever happened.

Too gloomy a view of the present arrangements ought not, however, to be taken. It is idle, of course, to deny the difficulties that arose in the cases of Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower. Our government is based on the idea that in the executive branch responsibility must be undivided. But, in the cases mentioned, the responsibility was more than divided; it was nil; for no one, least of all the public, had any idea who was actually wielding executive power or whom to call to account. One thing alone was certain: it was neither the president nor the vice president, the only two officers authorized by the Constitution to act. Yet it will not do to prophesy disaster—to pretend that because the disability clauses of the Constitution have never yet been put into operation they never will be. Talk of the atomic age is beside the point. If some situations are too trivial to set in motion the machinery of devolution, others are too momentous; if the legislative as well as the executive power is in defect, only martial law will supply it. But put the case of notorious inability coupled with urgent necessity. There is a point at which all men subordinate their private interests to the public welfare. In the example that we have cited from English history, Pitt, the prime minister, and all his supporters would have lost their offices upon a transfer of power from George III to the Prince of Wales, but, upon the occasion of the King's illness, they did not hesitate to drive a regency bill through Parliament; that they did not in fact suffer the penalty was due solely to the King's sudden recovery. It would be a libel on our own politicians to suggest that they would act otherwise in similar circumstances. And, even if they were inclined to do so, they would be forced to action, in the conditions supposed, by a great wave of popular indignation.

LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR.

PRINCETON, N. J.

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CARL BECKER'S HEAVENLY CITY *

"This certainly isn't history. I hope it's philosophy, because if it's not it's probably moonshine:—or would you say the distinction is over subtle?"—Carl Becker, on the flyleaf of *The Heavenly City*, presented to T. V. Smith.[1]

CARL BECKER'S *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* was published twenty-five years ago.[2] Its urbane and acidulous dissection of the *philosophes* has had great and lasting influence; few recent books on European intellectual history have been as widely read and as generously received. It is that rare work of scholarship that is also a work of literature—a masterpiece of persuasion that has done more to shape the current image of the Enlightenment than any other book. Despite the skepticism of some professional historians, its witty formulations have been accepted by a generation of students and borrowed in textbook after textbook.[3]

When Becker delivered his lectures at Yale Law School in 1931, and when he slightly revised them for publication, he seems to have thought of them as a *jeu d'esprit*, a collection of aphorisms and paradoxes meant to stimulate and (I suspect) to shock his audience.[4] But, as the Latin tag warns, the fate of books depends upon the capacities of the reader. And

* This paper was delivered, in slightly different form, at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the New York State Association of European Historians on 13 October 1956 at Colgate University.

1 Quoted by Charlotte Watkins Smith, *Carl Becker: On History and the Climate of Opinion* (Ithaca, 1956), p. 212.

2 New Haven, 1932.

3 The reviews of the *Heavenly City* were almost unanimous in their praise. One notable exception was the perceptive review by Ira O. Wade in the *Journal of Modern History*, vol. V, No. 2, June 1933, pp. 233-235. One amusing exception was "J.A.L." in *America*, who complained that "There is a great deal about atmosphere and climate in this little book. After reading it, one feels that the professor is living in a fog." *America*, vol. XLVIII, No. 15, 14 January 1933, p. 365.

4 I have heard the *Heavenly City* defended on the ground that Becker had only wanted to stimulate his auditors, to make them think and to reëxamine their presuppositions. This defense amounts to the view that because the contents did not matter, the book could not have been misleading.

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the worldly fate of the *Heavenly City* has been success—unexcelled, uninterrupted, and, I believe, unwarranted success. When it was first published, Charles Beard greeted it as a classic; [5] today, the *Heavenly City* is in its tenth printing; it appears prominently in bibliographies on the eighteenth century, and many a student reads no other book on the *philosophes*. It is indeed time that the book be subjected to a careful analysis.

I

"Before estimating a book it is well to read its title with care," Becker suggests, and the title of this book briefly states its central theme: the *philosophes* destroyed less well than they knew.[6] They were believers in their most skeptical moods, Christians in their most anti-Christian diatribes:

> In spite of their rationalism and their humane sympathies, in spite of their aversion to hocus-pocus and enthusiasm and dim perspectives, in spite of their eager skepticism, their engaging cynicism, their brave youthful blasphemies and talk of hanging the last king in the entrails of the last priest—in spite of all of it, there is more of Christian philosophy in the writings of the *Philosophes* than has yet been dreamt of in our histories . . . . I shall attempt to show that the *Philo-*

5 In the *American Historical Review*, vol. XXXVIII, No. 3, April 1933, p. 591. In estimating the influence of the *Heavenly City*, we must remember: first, the abundance of favorable reviews; secondly, the almost complete absence of published criticism (the tributes to Carl Becker by George H. Sabine, Leo Gershoy, and Mrs. Smith do not criticize the *Heavenly City*, and, in addition to Mr. Wade's review, the only severe remarks I have discovered are in Walter L. Dorn, *Competition for Empire* [New York and London, 1940], pp. 180, 402); thirdly, the favorable comments on the book in such distinguished and popular textbooks as Leo Gershoy's *From Despotism to Revolution* (New York and London, 1944), in which the *Heavenly City* is recommended as "penetrating and subtle" (p. 329), and Mr. Gershoy's *French Revolution and Napoleon* (New York, 1941), in which he calls Becker's book "four brilliant essays on the *philosophes;* a penetrating analysis of their ideas and ideals" (p. 539). In the widely used text by Crane Brinton, John B. Christopher, and Robert Lee Wolff, *A History of Civilization* (2 vols., New York, 1955), the *Heavenly City* is described as "A charming series of essays, stressing the similarities between the eighteenth-century Age of Reason and the medieval Age of Faith" (II, 92). There are many other examples.

6 For Becker's remark, see the *Heavenly City*, p. 115. It has been said (and Becker himself said it jokingly) that the *Heavenly City* is not history at all, but a moral tract. If it is not history at all, it should certainly not be recommended as good history.

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sophes demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials.[7]

Before launching upon this theme, Becker expounds a general assumption about the relation of change to permanence in history. There is change in history: Thomas Aquinas and David Hume both used the word "reason" but meant very different things by it, so that to compare their philosophies by investigating simply what they said about "reason" would do injustice to both. Words persist, but their meanings change. But, also, there is permanence in history: no era wholly liberates itself from its antecedents, although its spokesmen may proudly (or perhaps anxiously) proclaim that they have made a complete break. Rhetoric may change while ideas persist. Becker suggests that intellectual historians must reckon with this dialectic of permanence and change, and must be misled neither by spurious novelty nor by spurious persistence.[8]

This historiographical warning is the most valuable idea in the *Heavenly City;* unfortunately, Becker fails to heed it when he elaborates his thesis. He argues that, despite the great change in the climate of opinion between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries, the two centuries were far more closely related than would immediately appear or would be admitted by the *philosophes.* The *philosophes'* claim to be modern must therefore be discounted:

> I know it is the custom to call the thirteenth century an age of faith, and to contrast it with the eighteenth century, which is thought to be preëminently the age of reason . . . . In a very real sense it may be said of the eighteenth century that it was an age of faith as well as of reason, and of the thirteenth century that it was an age of reason as well as of faith.[9]

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 31.

[8] I hope to expand my remarks on what I have here called "spurious persistence" in a forthcoming article dealing with periodization.

[9] *Heavenly City,* p. 8. Becker's use of the term "Climates of Opinion" as the heading to his first chapter suggests, correctly, that he relied heavily on Alfred North Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World.* Becker frequently quotes or paraphrases Whitehead's book without indicating his source—a sign not of unwillingness to give credit, of course, but of Becker's conviction that

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The overriding fault of the *philosophes* was their naïveté: they "exhibited a naïve faith in the authority of nature and reason."[10]

This is to fall into the trap of what I have called spurious persistence. It is true that the medieval Catholic rationalists, of whom Thomas Aquinas was the most prominent, assigned to reason an important place in their epistemologies. It is also true—and Becker's reminders are valuable—that the *philosophes* depended upon some unexamined premises which, to the extent that they were unexamined, may be called "faith".

But Becker infers far too much from this. Aquinas' rationalism was by no means as characteristic of the thirteenth century as Voltaire's empiricism was of the eighteenth century. Moreover, Becker forgets his own caution that words may be used in many different ways when he argues that "there were, certainly, many differences between Voltaire and St. Thomas, but the two men had much in common for all that. What they had in common was the profound conviction that their beliefs could be reasonably demonstrated."[11] But the point is precisely that the two philosophers differed over what constitutes reasonable demonstration. For Aquinas, reasonable demonstration was deductive and definitional;[12] Voltaire derided such demonstrations as "metaphysics", as examples of the despised *esprit de système.*

Aquinas and Voltaire both believed that the powers of reason are limited, but they drew sharply different conclusions from this. For Aquinas, that which is inaccessible to human

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Whitehead's views are generally known and accepted. Whitehead describes the eighteenth century as "the age of reason, based upon faith" (p. 83), and asserts that "*les philosophes* were not philosophers" (p. 86). They were men who hated "dim perspectives" (*ibid.*). Whitehead, like Becker, appreciated the *philosophes:* he admired their humaneness, their hatred of cant and cruelty. But like Becker he did not think they were quite first-rate: "if men cannot live on bread alone," he remarks with reference to Voltaire, "still less can they do so on disinfectants" (p. 87). All these formulations reappear in the *Heavenly City.*

10 *Heavenly City,* p. 30. Becker does say that "Voltaire was an optimist, although not a naïve one." *Ibid.,* p. 37.

11 *Heavenly City,* p. 8.

12 Becker himself quotes a characteristic specimen of Aquinas' deductive method of arguing, *ibid.,* p. 3. Here and in many other places in the book, Becker provides material for the refutation of his case.

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reason concerns the foundations of Christian theology. Where the light of reason does not shine, the lamp of faith supplies illumination. For Voltaire, on the contrary, that which is inaccessible to reason is chimerical. What can never be found ought not to be sought; it is the realm, not of the most sacred, but of the most nonsensical—that is, of "metaphysical"—speculation. Where the light of reason does not shine, man must console himself with that philosophical modesty so characteristic of Voltaire's heroes Newton and Locke. While Aquinas could make categorical statements about the nature of the soul, Voltaire proudly proclaimed his ignorance in such matters. In seeking to show that "the underlying preconceptions of eighteenth-century thought were still, allowance made for certain important alterations in the bias, essentially the same as those of the thirteenth century,"[13] Becker thus unjustifiably plays with the word "reason".

Becker plays the same verbal game in his assertion that both centuries were centuries of faith. The word "faith" usually serves to describe two rather different psychological processes. Thirteenth-century faith (if I may simplify a complex matter) was submission, not necessarily to what was absurd, but to what was beyond proof and, after a certain point, beyond argument. Failure to have faith (as Voltaire put it facetiously) led to burning in this world and in the next. Eighteenth-century faith in reason, while perhaps often naïve, should be designated by the more neutral term "confidence". Its affirmations were public, open to examination and refutation. "Faith in reason" meant simply that for the *philosophes* the method of reason (strictly speaking the scientific method of such natural philosophers as Newton) was superior to other methods of gaining knowledge; it was superior to revelation, authority, tradition, because it was more reliable.[14] In Diderot's pornographic novel, *Les bijoux*

[13] *Heavenly City*, p. 31.

[14] I do not wish to assert that the *philosophes* were always consistent or thoroughgoing empiricists. Rousseau, who showed his respect for empirical knowledge in books III and IV of the *Contrat social* and in the other late political works, could write in the *Discours sur l'inégalité*, "let us begin by laying facts aside, since they do not affect the question." But he was seeking to elucidate the foundations of morality, and if he did not ask a factual question he was not, after all, seeking a factual answer.

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indiscrets, there is a charming dream: the dreamer sees himself transported into a building that has no foundations, and whose columns rise into the mists. The crowds walking in and around the building are crippled and deformed old men. It is the land of hypothesis, and the cripples are the makers of systems. But there is a vigorous small child, growing into a giant as the dream progresses, who draws near the fantastic building and destroys it with one blow. That giant is Experiment—no dweller of the heavenly city. Did not the *philosophes,* in their reveries, see themselves as that giant? And did they not include thinkers like Aquinas among the lame makers of systems? To denounce the *philosophes* for having faith in reason may be witty, but the paradox solves no problems in intellectual history.

Near the end of his first chapter, Becker adduces evidence to buttress his thesis. But the evidence is unsatisfactory. It is embodied in a dozen-odd generalizations designed to contrast the anti-Christian ideology of the *philosophes* with their real beliefs and premises which were Christian or at least greatly indebted to Christianity: "If we examine the foundations of their faith, we find that at every turn the *Philosophes* betray their debt to medieval thought without being aware of it." Becker's generalizations are indefensible, not because they are too general—most generalizations are—but because some of them are inadequately explored, some are misleading, and others are simply wrong.

"They denounced Christian philosophy," Becker begins, "but rather too much, after the manner of those who are but half emancipated from the 'superstitions' they scorn." This sentence contains an important truth: the *philosophes* were venturing into territory that was largely unexplored, or had not been explored for many centuries, and they were often appalled at their own daring. However, the recurring discussions of the need for a social religion for the masses suggests not that the *philosophes* were "but half emancipated from the 'superstitions' they scorn" but, rather, that they were sometimes afraid of the social consequences of their emancipation. It is the substance of their opposition to Christianity, not the shrillness of their attacks upon it, that matters: much of the *philosophes'* vehemence can be explained by what they considered to be their mission. They

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were determined to expose *l'infâme* loudly, repeatedly, insistently, unsparingly, until that large public which was tepidly Christian had been won over to the new ideas.

"They ridiculed the idea that the universe had been created in six days, but still believed it to be a beautifully articulated machine designed by the Supreme Being according to a rational plan as an abiding place for mankind." True, but why "but"? There is nothing essentially Christian about this idea of "cosmos"—it had been the foundation of Stoic philosophy. There is nothing essentially Christian about this idea of God as architect—the watchmaker argument for the existence of God, a favorite with the *philosophes,* appears prominently in the discourses of Epictetus. The beautifully articulated machine of the *philosophes* is not a Christian but a pagan machine. What is remarkable is not the supposed resemblance of this machine to Christianity, but its always implicit and often explicit repudiation of miracles: God acts through general and uniform laws alone. Here as elsewhere Becker exploits parallels or similarities or correspondences between Christian and *philosophe* thought to claim that the two are identical or that, at the least, the latter is the direct descendant of the former. This has as much logical merit as the assertion that since Calvin was a determinist and Holbach was a determinist, Holbach was a Calvinist.

"The Garden of Eden was for them a myth, no doubt, but they looked enviously back to the golden age of Roman virtue, or across the waters to the unspoiled innocence of an Arcadian civilization that flourished in Pennsylvania." Becker is doubtless right—a mood of nostalgia for the past or for an unspoiled civilization pervaded Enlightenment thought. But this nostalgia is not merely a substitute for the Christian state of innocence: Roman virtue, Tahitian simplicity, Chinese wisdom and Quaker pacifism provide worldly standards. They are standards, moreover, which helped the *philosophes* to evade the censorship in the *ancien régime.* Voltaire's England, Diderot's Tahiti, Montesquieu's Persia are not simply utopias; they are indirect indictments of France.

"They scorned metaphysics, but were proud to be called philosophers." True again, but it is hard to see what this sentence proves. A philosopher is a man who loves knowledge, and when he rejects authority, revelation, system-mak-

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ing, he may argue that in his empiricism he is the only *true* philosopher, while his forerunners had been idle dreamers. This may be a justified or an unjustified claim, but it does not make the *philosophes* Christians.

"They dismantled heaven, somewhat prematurely it seems, since they retained their faith in the immortality of the soul." Damaging if true, but it is largely false. Montesquieu did not believe in the immortality of the soul, nor did Diderot, nor Hume, nor Helvétius, nor Holbach. Voltaire was far from unequivocal about immortality.[15] Rousseau "retained his faith" or rather claimed that he must believe in order to survive: his was a desperate personal need, by no means representative of the *philosophes*.

"They discussed atheism, but not before the servants."[16] This remark is patently derived from an anecdote told about Voltaire: one evening at supper (runs this story of doubtful authenticity) Voltaire interrupted his guests Condorcet and d'Alembert, who were voicing doubts of the existence of God, and sent the servants out of the room. "Continue your attack, gentlemen," Voltaire said after the three *philosophes* were alone. "I do not want my throat cut or my money stolen tonight." Two comments may be made on this anecdote: most of the *philosophes* of the early generation were not atheists, never claimed to be atheists, and only "discussed atheism" in order to refute it. This did not make them Christians, since their deism was a philosophical doctrine more than once removed from Christianity. Moreover, this anecdote does not concern religion as religion but religion as a social policeman. Whether the uneducated masses needed a supernatural religion to keep them under control was much debated in the Enlightenment, but surely this was a most utilitarian, a most un-Christian debate.

II

In the second chapter of the *Heavenly City*, "The Laws of Nature and of Nature's God", Becker seeks to show that the *philosophes* belonged to the natural law tradition, that

[15] He said more than once that while the case for immortality had not been proved, the contrary had not been proved either. I think that Voltaire did not believe that the soul survived the body.

[16] Becker's statements about the *philosophes* in this and the six preceding paragraphs are in the *Heavenly City*, pp. 30-31.

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natural law is a significant link between the Christian and Enlightenment climates of opinion, but that the *philosophes* failed to recognize this link.

Becker rightly reminds us that the *philosophes* were not cynics; that their negations were far less important than their affirmations; that they were enthusiastic projectors, reformers, moralists; that their confidence in their ability to penetrate into the mysteries of the universe, and to prescribe effective remedies for social ills, was often exaggerated and sometimes naïve. The *philosophes* might not admit it, but their "childlike faith" was fundamentally Christian: the *philosophes* were the "secular bearers of the Protestant and Jansenist tradition"; their programs for peace and brotherhood were inspired by "the Christian ideal of service"; the words they coined—*bienfaisance, humanité*—were meant to "express in secular terms the Christian ideal of service." And this "childlike faith" was shared by nearly all the *philosophes:* "In the eighteenth century the words without which no enlightened person could reach a restful conclusion were nature, natural law, first cause, reason. . . ." And again: "Nature and natural law—what magic these words held for the philosophical century!" This was the *philosophes'* true faith in reason: that they could read God's purposes in the book of nature, and that natural law expressed those purposes. "This is the new revelation, and thus at last we enter the secret door to knowledge." [17]

It is difficult to sort out what is true and what is false in this plausible account. I have suggested that the *philosophes* were not free from naïveté, but that is all, I think, that should be conceded. Historians and political theorists know that the natural law tradition is infinitely complex; to draw a map of its growth, its multiple ingredients, its changing modes and varied influence would be like drawing a map of the Nile Delta. Becker does nothing to clarify, and a great deal to confuse, the matter by lumping together, in the same paragraph and sometimes even in the same ironic exclamation, natural law and the appeal to nature. The appeal to nature, as Becker himself tells us with engaging candor, has been employed by most schools of thought. He mentions a most miscellaneous crew of thinkers, from Aristotle and

[17] *Heavenly City*, pp. 46, 42, 41, 39, 47, 51.

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Marcus Aurelius to Calvin, Montaigne, and Pascal. He might have added Burke, the great adversary of the *philosophes*. To say, then, that the *philosophes* appealed to nature is to say that they used this word to embody the standard by which they could judge existing institutions, morals, and forms of government. They were doing what most of their predecessors had done, and what most of their successors would do. What is notable about the Enlightenment, as Ernst Cassirer reminds us, is that "it returns again and again to the persistent problems of philosophy." [18]

The natural law tradition is much narrower than this appeal to nature. Becker's rather superficial discussion of natural law is based on two assumptions, neither of which is tenable. He suggests that natural law is essentially Christian. But natural law had originated with the Stoics and, in a less systematic form, with the Greeks. With the writings of Justus Lipsius and Grotius in the early seventeenth century, natural law was beginning to strip off its Christian associations—witness Grotius' celebrated assertion that nature would be orderly even if God did not exist. Christian natural law, even at its most rationalist in Aquinas' systematic theology, is part of a complex of laws (eternal, divine, natural, and human) all of which depend upon the wisdom of God. Modern natural law is secular, "profane", autonomous.

Moreover, Becker neglects the fact that many *philosophes* were reaching beyond even this secular natural law. Diderot still employed the conception of *droit naturel,* Vattel still carried on the seventeenth-century tradition of the natural lawyers, but other *philosophes,* following out the implica-

18 *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Princeton, 1951), p. 234. Even if we admit for the sake of argument that the *philosophes* had taken the materials of their philosophy from Christianity alone, what matters for the history of ideas is that they transformed these Christian ideas. "Grace was translated into virtue", writes Becker in the *Heavenly City,* p. 49. Is that not a significant translation? The *philosophes* "had only given another form and a new name to the object of worship: having denatured God, they deified nature" (*ibid.,* p. 63). Only? But the fact is that the sources of Enlightenment thought must not be sought in Christianity alone. When Becker writes, "A distinction between good and bad! Not a novel idea, certainly; on the contrary, a very old, a most Christian idea" (*ibid.,* p. 86), he might well have substituted the word "Stoic" for "Christian". The relation of Stoicism to Enlightenment thought needs further elucidation: Stoicism entered modern philosophy not only directly, through the works of Marcus Aurelius and others, but indirectly, through the Stoic elements in Christian philosophy.

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tions of British empiricism, were rejecting the natural law arguments in favor of utilitarianism. Inevitably there was much ambivalence and uncertainty concerning natural law in this time of transition.[19] But far from being uniform disciples of any natural law doctrine, the *philosophes* were providing a bridge to nineteenth-century utilitarianism and historicism. Bentham and Hegel are the philosophical heirs of Hume and Turgot: it is this real continuity between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that Becker neglects in favor of a fancied continuity between the Enlightenment and Christianity.[20]

Finally, Becker fails to distinguish between natural law as rhetoric and natural law as conviction: while most of the time he does not take the *philosophes* seriously enough, he takes their rhapsodic paeans to natural law too seriously. The *philosophes* were, above all, practical social reformers, and through their rhetoric we can sense their impatience to get to work. When Voltaire affirms that some moral rules are universally accepted, and that this proves the existence of natural law, and when Voltaire says briskly that "a day suffices for a sage to know the duties of man," he seems to be saying to his reader: "You and I know what is wrong in this society; you and I know what evils must be rooted out and what institutions must be changed; to split hairs about the fundamentals of morals is to escape responsibility, to substitute talk for action."[21] Social reform in the first half of the eighteenth century rested on philosophic positions no longer

19 Voltaire is perhaps the best example of this ambivalence. He continues to affirm the existence of natural law, but is uneasy with it. As an empiricist, as a disciple of Locke's philosophic "modesty", as a caricaturist of the *esprit de système*, he is driven to doubt the existence of a law in which he would like to believe. He solves the dilemma (unsatisfactorily) by arguing that there is empirical proof for the existence of a universal, uniform law of nature.

20 Once again Becker can be quoted on the other side of his own argument. He describes eighteenth-century natural law: "instead of being a construction of deductive logic, [it] is the observed harmonious behavior of material objects." "This", he says truly, "was a new kind of 'law of nature.'" *Heavenly City*, p. 57. But he fails to draw the necessary inferences from these observations.

21 I do not have sufficient space to justify in detail my contention that Voltaire's advocacy of natural law was chiefly rhetorical. I refer the reader to my forthcoming study of Voltaire's political ideas.

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fully convincing even to its most fiery proponents. In overlooking this gap between talk and action, in taking the rhetoric of the *philosophes* as a literal transcription of their deepest convictions, Becker, while claiming to penetrate to fundamentals, only too often confines his analysis to the surface.

What then has become of Becker's thesis that the *philosophes* did not know what they were doing, and were rebuilding the old heavenly city, only with new materials? Without wishing to be paradoxical for the sake of paradox, let me suggest that Becker's formulation turns the truth upside down: the *philosophes* knew exactly what they were doing; they were building a new, earthly city. And in building it they used, along with much new material, some of the old Christian bricks. Far from being less modern than they knew, they were even more modern than they claimed.

III

Becker's analysis of natural law is unphilosophical; his analysis of the relation of the *philosophes* to history is unhistorical. That does not make it any the less delightful: in the last two chapters Becker catches, with superb wit, a certain mood of the *philosophes*. His deft characterization of Mme. Roland weeping that she was not born a Roman, of Robespierre apostrophizing posterity; his apt quotation from Diderot, "*La postérité pour le philosophe, c'est l'autre monde de l'homme religieux*"—these almost convince us that this anti-enthusiastic century was crowded with enthusiasts. As Becker says, the *philosophes'* aversion to enthusiasm was itself an enthusiasm. [22]

But—like Voltaire's Zadig (and, for that matter, like Becker himself) we are compelled to say "but" once again—while Becker's insights into the character of the *philosophes* are valuable, they are marginal rather than central, and Becker places too heavy a load upon his evidence.

Let me summarize his case: the sensationalism of the *philosophes*, first explored by Locke and extended by his disciples, was at first a heady and later a frightening prospect for them. If Locke was right, there was no total depravity. But

[22] *Heavenly City*, p. 37.

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if nature was good, whence evil? "How then could Philosophers say that all was somehow good in God's sight unless they could also say that there was no evil to be observed in the world of nature and man?" Pure reason confronted the *philosophes* with an "ugly dilemma, emerging from the beautiful premises of the new philosophy", and in order to escape this dilemma they turned from reason to history. "They found . . . that reason is amenable to treatment. They therefore tempered reason with sentiment, reasons of the heart that reason knows not of; or held in leash by experience, the universal judgment of mankind . . . ." Becker professes to observe a change of temper and ascribes it to fear. "The Philosophers *began to* cold-shoulder abstract reason. . . ." "The age of reason had scarcely run half its course before the Philosophers *were admitting* the feebleness of reason, *putting the ban on* flippancy, and *turning to* the study of useful, that is to say, factual, subjects." And Becker claims to see this historical development in the works of some of the leading *philosophes,* above all in Hume: "Hume's *turning away from* speculation to the study of history, economics, and politics was symptomatic of a certain change in the climate of opinion. . . ." [23]

It is doubtless fruitful to divide the Enlightenment into two periods. In the first half of the century, the *philosophes* were an embattled and socially inferior group; in the second half of the century, they were confident that they were winning the contest for public opinion and social prestige. In the first half of the century, the rhetoric of natural law had still been prevalent; in the second half, it was largely supplanted by utilitarianism. But for Becker's division—the shift from pure reason to reason softened by sentiment, from nonhistorical reason to historical reason—there is little convincing evidence. Diderot, in many respects the most representative of the *philosophes,* celebrated the passions in his

[23] *Heavenly City,* pp. 67, 69, 69-70, 83, 84, my italics. Becker qualifies his case at one point: "I would not leave the impression that the Philosophers began to cold-shoulder abstract reason merely, or chiefly, because they found a logical dilemma in the path; still less that they embraced the cause of virtue with greater emotional warmth because they could find no ultimate reason for embracing it at all. There may be something in all that—I am inclined to think there is; but I do not wish to make too much of it." *Ibid.,* p. 83. But, having said that he does not wish to make too much of it, he proceeds to make too much of it.

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earliest writings; Vauvenargues, one of Voltaire's favorite writers, warned against separating the intellect from the sentiments; Hume, developing his epistemology in the 1730s, gave the sentiments the precedence over reason.

Similarly, it cannot be shown that the *philosophes* "turned to" history because they were afraid of the implications of their godless rationalism. They wrote history as they wrote everything else: as men of letters they thought of history as a branch of literature. Voltaire wrote history—and very good history—as early as 1727-1728, when he began his *Histoire de Charles XII,* and his other historical masterpieces were conceived and partly written in the 1730s. Nor is there the slightest evidence that the *philosophes* became more, rather than less, cautious: indeed, their daring grew with their successes. Deism was characteristic of the first half of the eighteenth century; a far bolder atheism was, if not characteristic, prevalent in the second half.[24]

Why should Becker have discovered a shift in the Enlightenment that did not exist? I suspect that he needed the shift to account for the *philosophes'* solution of their moral dilemma—how to explain evil in the face of an all-good nature. But the dilemma is as imaginary as its solution. Becker does well to remind us that the *philosophes'* contribution to theodicy was unimpressive. Perhaps, if God becomes unimportant it becomes equally unimportant to justify him. The *philosophes* viewed nature as good, but not as omnipotent:

[24] Becker's sketch of the *philosophe*-frightened-by-his-own-temerity-and-afraid-to-undermine-morality is incorrect in many details. Becker makes much of Hume's refusal to publish his masterly and radical *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,* and attributes this refusal chiefly to the fact that Hume "took no pleasure in being regarded as the cold and finished skeptic, a destroyer of illusions. He was much more ambitious 'to be esteemed a man of virtue than a writer of taste'; and the fact that his history won for him the popularity he craved naturally confirmed him in the belief that it was useless to search into 'those corners of nature that spread a nuisance all around.'" *Heavenly City,* pp. 77-78. But the fact is that Hume was extremely eager to publish the *Dialogues* and had to be strongly dissuaded by his friends, notably Adam Smith. And Adam Smith was not afraid that Hume would destroy morality but that he would get into trouble. In the last year of his life, Hume revised the *Dialogues* once again, and changed his will several times to make sure that they would be published after his death (since he was too ill to see them through the press himself) and published without being emasculated. See Norman Kemp Smith, "Introduction", Appendix C, *Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (Edinburgh, 2d ed., 1947), pp. 87-96. Becker's account of the development of Voltaire's philosophy is equally unconvincing.

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Rousseau was not the only one who held that human institutions could deprave man, that goodness could be thwarted, and that the original intentions of God could be perverted.[25] The *philosophes'* affirmation that man is by nature good does not mean that they could not account for the existence of evil, and Becker's case (that to the Enlightenment writers history provided a standard which philosophy had destroyed) falls to the ground.

While Becker rightly rejects the nineteenth-century charge that the Enlightenment was unhistorical, he accepts the charge that Enlightenment history was not "real" history but ideology. The Enlightenment historians

> start out, under the banner of objectivity and with a flourish of scholarly trumpets, as if on a voyage of discovery in unknown lands. They start out; but in a very real sense they never pass the frontiers of the eighteenth century, never really enter the country of the past or of distant lands. They cannot afford to leave the battlefield of the present where they are so fully engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Christian philosophy and the infamous things that support it—superstition, intolerance, tyranny.[26]

Becker is equally harsh on nineteenth-century historians. The *philosophes,* he argues, wrote history in order to change society; the nineteenth-century historians wrote history in order to keep society as it was.[27] His criticism of historians is therefore not one-sided. But it implies either that "objective" history is impossible, or that the *philosophes* fell short of writing good history. It was surely the first of these implications that Becker intended to stress, but it is the sec-

[25] See Voltaire's little-known story, *Songe de Platon,* in which he portrays the world as created by a minor angel who made it as good as he could—which is far from perfect. In their moral and religious writings, the *philosophes* sought to discredit the Christian doctrine of the fall of man, and their use of nature did not deprive them of a standard by which actions and institutions could be judged. It is only in the Marquis de Sade's perverted version of naturalism that we find the notion that nature speaks only in one voice, and that everything possible or even imaginable is "natural". This is an interpretation of "natural" that the *philosophes* would never have accepted nor even understood.

[26] *Heavenly City,* p. 105.

[27] *Ibid.,* pp. 95-97.

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ond that others have stressed in their disparagement of the *philosophes.*

I do not want to enter into the debate on the possibility of objective history here. I only want to point out that the criticism of Enlightenment historians can be overdone. Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume, Robertson, Gibbon wrote better histories than their present-day reputations would indicate. Becker quotes two juicy morsels: "Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature." Thus David Hume. "History is only a pack of tricks we play on the dead." Thus Voltaire, and it is easy to see why this should have been one of Carl Becker's favorite quotations. But if we look at Hume's history of England instead of this pronouncement on history, and if we look at Voltaire's masterpieces instead of this *bon mot* about history, we are impressed by their scrupulous concern for truth, their careful sifting of evidence, their intelligent selection of what is important, their keen sense of drama, their grasp of the fact that a whole civilization is a unit of study. What if Becker had quoted from the opening pages of the *Siècle de Louis XIV,* or from some of Voltaire's and Hume's correspondence about their historical works? These quotations might not have been as amusing or as telling as the words Becker actually quoted, but they might have been far more revealing about eighteenth-century histories.

It is perhaps a reflection of how intent Becker was to debunk Enlightenment historians that he makes a significant mistake. "The Philosophers felt that Montesquieu was too much enamored of facts as such to treat certain facts as harshly as they deserved, and it shocked them to see him dallying lightly with episodes that were no better than they should be. Voltaire (Voltaire of all people!) criticized Montesquieu for his *levity*. . . ." The *Esprit des lois* "left a bad taste in the mouths of the Philosophers because Montesquieu insisted that the 'constant and universal principles of human nature' were after all 'relative'. . . ." [28] The opposite is true: Voltaire and other *philosophes* admired Montesquieu, but criticized him because he was a proponent of the *thèse nobiliaire,*

[28] *Heavenly City,* pp. 100-101.

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a defender of the privileged *parlements.* They criticized him, in a word, because he was a conservative, and not because he was a relativist. Voltaire criticized Montesquieu, too, for being slipshod in his research, for accepting improbable travelers' tales; not for being "too much enamored of facts as such" but for being too little enamored of facts as such. When Voltaire (and why not Voltaire of all people?) accused Montesquieu of levity, he was referring to Montesquieu's gullibility.[29]

IV

But it is not mistakes such as these that really disappoint the reader in this charming book; the disappointment is, I think, more profound. The *Heavenly City,* as I have said, begins with a significant truth: history is concerned with the dialectical struggle between persistence and change. The eighteenth century is a century in which this struggle becomes peculiarly dramatic and complex, and the opportunities for fruitful research are great. Becker rightly urges the reader to ask searching questions, but continually suggests the wrong answers. He argues for persistence where there was change, and he argues for one kind of persistence when there was really another.

The *philosophes* lived in an epoch in which the vitality of Christianity was waning, and in which natural science, the centralized state, the development of industrial capitalism imposed the need for a new world view. In building their earthly city, the *philosophes* fashioned their materials from the most varied sources: Christianity, a revived Stoicism and Epicureanism, a pragmatic recognition of the needs of the new state and the new economy. In their battle for liberation from the old standards and in their search for new standards they experienced the difficulties that any individual struggling for autonomy must face. They contradicted themselves, they failed to see all the implications of their ideas, they sometimes used old words to describe new things, they sometimes used rhetoric that was inappropriate to their ideas. All these questions the *Heavenly City* resolves—wrongly, I believe—with the too simple formula of its title.

[29] For Voltaire's appreciation (inadequate) and criticisms (excessive) of Montesquieu, see *Commentaire sur l'Esprit des lois; Questions sur l'Encyclopédie,* article "Lois, esprit des"; *Pensées sur le gouvernement;* and *L'A,B,C.*

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The failure of the book is all the more paradoxical in view of Becker's own position. His criticisms of the *philosophes* were from the inside; as Leo Gershoy has said, Carl Becker "had always remained a believer at heart. . . . He had rejoined Voltaire and Condorcet and Wells and all the goodly company who wished humanity well." [30] But in his impatience with his intellectual forebears—an impatience which is always so much greater with those whom you admire than with those you detest—he portrayed the *philosophes* as naïve, and as a little fraudulent. Becker was no conservative, but the conservative implications of the *Heavenly City* are plain.

The *Heavenly City* failed in another, and even more paradoxical, way—through its success. Carl Becker dedicated *Everyman His Own Historian* to those who had assisted him in clarifying his ideas, "chiefly by avoiding the error of Hway, a pupil of Confucius. Hway, said Confucius, is of no assistance to me; there is nothing that I say in which he does not delight." In the twenty-five years that the book has been before the public, the error of Hway has not been avoided. It is time we admitted that Carl Becker's critique of the *philosophes,* like Samuel Johnson's critique of Shakespeare, had every virtue save one, the virtue of being right.

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30 "Introduction", Carl Becker, *Progress and Power* (New York, 1949), p. xxxvii.

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THE VARYING SEASONS OF ITALIAN POLITICS, 1956-57

EVEN before the world-shaking events of the winter of 1956-57, Italian politics had been moving so rapidly as to indicate that the next general election in Italy might take place sooner than 1958, when it would normally be held. Four trends influencing the situation had become apparent in the local elections of May 1956, and loomed even larger as the various parties held their Congresses during the following winter and the early spring of 1957. First, there was the stabilized position of the parties of the Centre, separately if not collectively. Second was the great strengthening of the Socialists in the May elections, followed by indications of possible reunification of the party ranks, divided into two bitterly hostile groups now hunting for a common meeting-ground and disappointed that the Socialist Party Congress of mid-February 1957 failed to provide it. Third was the loss of numbers and morale by the Italian Communists, initially because of the rising standard of living of many Italian workers and later because of events outside the country—the XX Party Congress of the U.S.S.R., then the days of Warsaw and the bitter disillusionment of Budapest. Fourth was the victory of the moderates over the extremes within the mass Catholic party, the Christian Democrats, clearly apparent in the party Congress of October 1956.

STABILIZATION OF THE CENTRE PARTIES

The balance of political forces in Italy had been precariously poised since the general or "political" elections of 1953. In that year, ground had been lost by the Centre coalition, composed of the Christian Democrats and their three supporting allies: the Social Democrats or Right-wing Socialists; the Liberals, the economic conservatves of the coalition; and the Republicans, a small but important party supporting, but not a member of, the government today.[1] In 1953, these four parties together had failed of a majority by

[1] The parties are frequently referred to by their initials. Christian Democrats (*Partito Democratico Cristiano*) (DC); Social Democrats (*Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano*) (PSDI); Liberals (*Partito Liberale Italiano*) (PLI); Republicans (*Partito Repubblicano Italiano*) (PRI).

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only a hair's breadth, for when the votes were counted after the election, the Centre had received just under half—49.85 per cent—of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies.[2] Although the Centre retained control of the government, the three minor parties of the coalition were all but decimated. Victory that year belonged to the extremes. The Left, composed of the Communists and Left-wing Socialists, and the Right, consisting of the Monarchists and neo-Fascists or "Missini",[3] both shot ahead.

Much of this picture has now changed and for a variety of reasons. Conditions in Italy and the world at large that favored the extremes have shifted greatly since the 1953 elections. Within Italy, the standard of living has risen, especially for the industrial workers of the North; the land reform and public works programs of the government, notably in the South, have begun to show positive political and economic effects; and the Trieste arrangements, coupled with the withdrawal of occupying troops from that city, have lessened the appeal of the more strident nationalists everywhere except in the Alto Adige. The votes for shop stewards in the factory elections commencing in 1954-55 and continuing into 1957 began to show a clear decline in Communist influence in the trade unions and a rise in strength of the unions of the moderate Left and the Centre.[4] Even before the Khrushchev announcement tearing down the Stalin idol in the spring of 1956, many straws had shown that the wind of dissension was blowing within the Italian Communist party ranks. At intervals since the 1953 elections,

[2] There were over 1½ million spoiled votes. After the election there were indications that these votes contained far more than enough to bring the Centre over half the votes, but the government believed it would be politically unwise to try to do anything about them. *Cf.* Muriel Grindrod, *The Rebuilding of Italy* (London and New York, 1955), p. 90.

[3] Communists (*Partito Comunista Italiano*) (PCI); Left-wing Socialists (*Partito Socialista Italiano*) (PSI). Monarchists (*Partito Nazionale Monarchico*) (PNM) in 1954 split into two parties, one keeping the same name and the other becoming the *Partito Monarchico Popolare* (PMP). The *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI), advocating a return to many Fascist principles, has come to be referred to as the "Missini" from the initials MSI.

[4] The *Confederazione Generale Italiano del Lavoro* (CGIL), the largest trade union in Italy, has been heavily dominated by the Communists. The *Confederazione Italiana dei Sindicati Lavoratori* (CISL) is chiefly made up of Christian Democrats. The *Unione Italiana del Lavoro* (UIL) is composed primarily of Social Democrats and Republicans.

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the Left-wing Socialists had indicated their interest in the possiblity of returning to the government of which they had once been members, and the events of 1956 stimulated a more active hope in their breasts.

While these changes have been affecting the Centre's rivals to the Left and Right, the years since 1953 have brought new faces and new forces to the Centre parties themselves. Little over a month before the death of the great leader and former Prime Minister de Gasperi in August 1954, the Left of the Christian Democratic party, the *Iniziativa Democratica,* had secured control of the party organization and program. The mantle of De Gasperi as Political Secretary of the party fell on the leader of the *Iniziativa,* Amintore Fanfani, together with a letter urging him not to forsake the former Prime Minister's chosen path of coöperation with the lay parties of the Centre. Under Fanfani's influence, the Christian Democrats have taken a leaf from the Communist book and have developed a mass program and tightly knit organization that are beginning to penetrate into the tiniest hamlet and most crowded city block. In the spring of 1955, another leader of the Christian Democratic Left, Giovanni Gronchi, was elected President of Italy because of differences within the party and because of support by the Socialists and Communists. In contrast to this trend of the Christian Democrats, the Liberal party has emerged as a coherent and logical conservative party. The Republicans, who have continued to exercise a function of constructive criticism and support of the government, have also taken on a new strength.

Dissension, however, is still the order of the day in Italian political parties of all shades. Within the Centre coalition, divergencies are both bitter and deep, for the Liberals and Social Democrats are frequently at swords' points. The *chiarificazione,* or clarification of issues between the Centre parties, is little closer than after the 1953 elections, though again a subject for discussion in the spring of 1957. The possible reunification of the Left-wing Socialists and Social Democrats would contain within itself the danger of blowing the Centre apart or forcing them into a new line-up leaning on the Left or Right. Meanwhile, the various parties in the Centre coalition continue their disparate ways.

The international situation has also changed in ways which

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have affected the line-up of Italian political parties and the conflicting currents within them. As early as 1954, Italians had been given new hope of *distensione,* or relaxation from tension in the world, by the uneasy cessation of Korean hostilities and the Geneva "summit" conference. The expectation was assiduously promoted by the extreme Left in the face of storm clouds already gathering in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. When the Suez crisis found the United States and the U.S.S.R. voting together against Britain and France in the United Nations just before the American elections of 1956, Italian hopes of peace between the two great opponents were strengthened. These hopes were dashed for many by the presence of Russian tanks in the streets of Budapest and later by increasing Middle Eastern tension.

The vote for local governments in Italy in 1956 did not bring to the Centre either the catastrophe which the prophets of doom had foretold or the great success which its optimistic friends had foreseen. The extent to which those elections varied from the earlier local vote of 1951-52 and the general elections of 1953 was slight, numerically speaking, but enough to cause optimism if the Centre is viewed as a unit, a supposition not entirely warranted by its inner divergencies. The four Centre parties together received over half—53.4 per cent—of the vote for municipal councils in 1956, compared to 51.5 per cent in the local elections of 1951-52 and 49.85 per cent in the political elections of 1953. The Communists and Left-wing Socialists retained just over a third—34.1 per cent—of the vote, which favored them slightly less than in the earlier elections. The Right lost precipitously in 1956, attaining a vote of any real size only in the lovely little Southern city of Lecce and in Naples, where the popularity of the Mayor, Achille Lauro, swelled the Monarchist vote to unprecedented proportions. In Sicily, where the Christian Democrats and Communists both tried to play trump cards the same year, the contest resulted in gains for both but more for the former.

At first glance, the slight change in the political landscape of the country in 1956 compared to that after the two preceding elections might seem to belie the deeper view of significant shifts among all the parties, and of profound changes within the Centre coalition, within the Socialist-Communist alliance, and within the parties themselves. The 1956 elec-

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tions, however, were inevitably influenced more by local situations than would have been the case in a nation-wide contest. Personalities were important, such as Mayor La Pira in Florence, Mayor Dozza in Bologna and Mayor Lauro in Naples—the first a Christian Democrat, the second a Communist and the third a Monarchist—though in each of those cases historical and other factors were at work to cause the reelection of all three.[4a] Some of the voters, believing themselves safe in local elections from the national aspects of extremist parties, were willing to turn to these parties because of special local situations. For example, in Bologna in 1956, many non-Communists voted the Communist ticket and in Naples many voters with no interest in the return of a monarchy supported the Monarchist slate.

SOCIALIST GROWTH AND THE REUNIFICATION MOVEMENT

The rise of the Socialist star was the most notable feature on the Italian political horizon in 1956, though the repercussions of the Hungarian crisis on the Italian Communists the latter part of that year and the early part of 1957 threatened to eclipse it in drama if not in importance. Both Socialist parties, the moderate Social Democrats under Deputy Prime Minister Giuseppe Saragat and the Left-wing Socialists under Pietro Nenni, gained so notably in the 1956 elections as to make their future, united or separate, of prime importance to all Italian political parties.

The new developments in Italian socialism must be viewed in the light of the past. In the old Socialist party, not only Social Democrats and Left-wing Socialists but also Communists were members of the same big, but not happy, political family. The party was unable to navigate between the Scylla of its members who believed in reform of the existing social order and the Charybdis of those of its adherents, called Maximalists, who believed that only revolution could bring the change they regarded as necessary for the regeneration of society. Socialism had all but split apart on these two rocks before the First World War, and the Russian Revolution completed the division. The Italian Communists separated from the other Socialists in 1921 and then formed their own

[4a] The lack of a working majority or of any agreement among the parties in the Florence City Council caused Mayor La Pira to offer his resignation on April 26, 1957.

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party. The Socialists nevertheless remained strong until Mussolini disbanded them and sent their leaders to prison or exile. Among these were Nenni and Saragat who escaped over the Alps together—prophetically enough, as events in 1956 were to show.

When the Socialists entered two unity of action pacts with the Communists in 1934 and 1945, the move split the Socialists again. In 1947 the intellectuals and many of the party leaders joined with Saragat to form a new moderate Socialist party, now called the Social Democrats. The more numerous rank and file of the old Socialists remained with Nenni in the Italian Socialist party, supported by the Communists.

In the elections of 1951-52, the Socialists ran jointly with the Communists in a "popular front". By the time of the elections of 1953, however, the Socialists had come to have enough belief in their own strength to run separately. Although they were not disappointed in the results, only in the Sicilian regional elections of 1955 did they begin to show notable strength. By 1956 they had really gone forward in the race throughout Italy, securing over 15 per cent of the votes in all Italian cities with over 10,000 inhabitants, where the voting was by proportional representation. This was a gain of over 300,000 supporters since the last elections, even if allowance is made for increases in population, and was a proportionately larger change than the Communist loss of 62,000 in those same cities. The followers of Nenni had begun to appear as friends worth cultivating.

The Social Democrats also emerged from the elections of 1956 in a position of some power. Three years earlier they had fallen into a slough of despond when, after vacillation, they had decided to support the government on the law for elections to the Chamber of Deputies which had offered a bonus of seats to the party or bloc securing just over half the votes. Appearing to many voters as adjuncts of the Centre with no distinguishing Socialist characteristics, the Social Democrats that year lost much of their strength. By 1956, however, they had come back so markedly—though not all the way—that they surprised even themselves.

Social Democratic membership has always lain among the intellectuals and upper middle class and the party has had little strength among the workers. As the mid-decade of the 1950s brought a somewhat better standard of living to many

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workers, they began to drift into the middle class from the oppressed industrial proletariat. Many turned toward a middle-of-the-road kind of socialism, first apparent in the growth of the Social Democratic trade union, the UIL, in the shop-steward elections in the factories beginning in 1954. In the 1956 local elections, the Social Democrats picked up 80,000 votes over their 1953 total. In Milan and Bari, at the extreme ends of the Italian peninsula, the Social Democrats and the Left-wing Socialists both came in on a veritable landslide of votes.

Neither Socialist party has ever forgotten that, before the 1947 split, they had been stronger than the Communists. In the elections held in the early days of the Italian Republic, the Socialists had received slightly more and the Communists slightly less than a fifth of the whole vote.[5] In the years immediately following the split, the votes of the Left-wing Socialists and Social Democrats if added together would have exceeded those of the Communists. However, in the 1953 elections, as a result of the Centre losses and the large protest vote rolled up by the Communists, the combined votes of the Socialists and Social Democrats would have fallen far below those of the Communists.[6] The changed political atmosphere of 1956 redressed the balance and brought the Socialists' joint strength nearly up to that of the Communists. By the beginning of 1957, the Communists' loss of support was estimated at 10 to 15 per cent, though such estimates are necessarily very general.

One of the greatest unrevealed mysteries in Italian politics has long been what Pietro Nenni is going to do. He has carried water on both shoulders and, although for some time his Communist pail was much the heavier of the two, he is balancing the two carefully and today the non-Communist pail appears the weightier. A native of Romagna, often the

[5] In the 1946 general elections, the Socialist vote of 4,758,129 amounted to 20.7 per cent and the Communist 4,356,086 votes equaled 19 per cent.

[6] In 1951-52, the Nenni Socialists, though receiving fewer votes than their Communist allies in the "popular front", secured 13.1 per cent of the total, while the Social Democrats reached 7.7 per cent. The combined strength of the two Socialist parties would have amounted to 20.8 per cent of the total, .7 of a per cent over the Communists, with 20.1. In 1951, the Left-wing Socialists, though losing a fraction of a per cent to the Communists, continued to have 13 per cent (3,444,222 votes); the Social Democrats secured 4.5 per cent (1,283,870 votes); the Communists got 22.7 per cent (6,120,000).

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home of political extremes, Nenni was originally a Republican, and has long been torn between conflicting desires and conflicting memories. He has not forgotten that he took refuge in France and came to love it during his years of exile from Fascist Italy and he was saddened by the French part in the Suez crisis.

In the 1953 campaign, he had urged the "Socialist alternative" but failed to specify whether it was an alternative to communism or the Centre coalition or both; by 1956-57, he had begun to emphasize the *politica delle cose* as the necessary Socialist path—a kind of concrete case-by-case approach to his party's relations with communism, but without specifying what. His ambivalence continues. The Khrushchev report and the downgrading of Stalin were a blow below the belt to him, but the Warsaw and Budapest days of the fall hit him even more profoundly. In the spring of 1956, he declared that "the Soviet crisis concerns not only the 'errors' of Stalin but the whole Soviet system" and indicated that the present leaders of the U.S.S.R., "though placed by the Khrushchev report in a very difficult position, were in their posts of responsibility precisely for this, to face difficult situations." [7] By the autumn, he found bitter in his mouth the taste of the Stalin peace award which he had been given in 1952 and renounced it at the end of the year, giving the money to charity.

Nenni does not forget that he had been Minister of Foreign Affairs for Italy at the conclusion of the peace treaty in 1944 and a Deputy Prime Minster of the first Italian postwar government the following year. He has not been a member of the government since De Gasperi forced out the Communists and Left-wing Socialists in 1947, but he also remembers that less than a month after the 1953 elections, De Gasperi, urged by the Social Democrats of his Cabinet, had talked over with Nenni the possibility of entering the government again. The idea of participation has simmered in his mind since then, but in 1953 events in the Communist world and in Italy had not yet progressed far enough for him to consider loosening his Communist bonds. The Social Democrats were then a weak alternative reed on which to

[7] Pietro Nenni, "Problemi del socialismo, il rapporto di Krusciov e la polemica sul comunismo", *Mondo Operaio* (Socialist workers' monthly), June 1956, pp. 338-345, esp. p. 341.

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lean. At the Socialist Party Congress in Turin in late March and early April 1955, Nenni broached the subject of collaboration with the government by his allusion to the need for an "opening to the Left". By this time the Socialists had already taken a few faltering steps away from the Communists. Simultaneously, Nenni was turning his attention to wooing organized Catholic workers by talking of the possiblity of "conversation with the Catholics"—an idea he has continued to promote.

Three days after the 1956 elections, with the final results still not definite but the gains of both Social Democrats and Socialists already clear, Nenni approached the Social Democrats to discuss ways of ending their long strife. For the first time in nine years, the political secretaries of the two parties met. Soon thereafter, at the instigation of the Socialist International, Nenni invited Deputy Prime Minister Saragat to visit him at the vacation resort of Pralognon in Southern France. Various factors pushed Saragat into acceptance: pressure from the Left of his own Social Democratic party, which had for some time been urging Socialist reunfication; activity by the Socialist International to which the Social Democrats but not the Left-wing Socialists belong; and personal desire to form part of a great Socialist party. In addition, despite orders from party headquarters in Rome, various local branches of the Social Democrats had begun negotiations with local Socialist organizations to try to form municipal governments in cities where no party or group had secured a majority in the May elections, just past. So Saragat went to see Nenni at the end of August 1956, doubtless recalling as he went the flight he and Nenni had taken together over these same Alps many years before.

The entering wedge for unification had been driven but had barely penetrated the surface. The differences between the two parties remained fundamental and deep, above all in regard to relations between Socialists and Communists. Hardly had attempts to iron out the difficulties got under way when the Socialists pulled the rug out from under the ironing board by entering into an "agreement for consultation" with the Communists. Several months previously, Nenni had tried to reassure doubters of his democratic faith by referring to the unity of action pacts as "mere facts of his-

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tory " [8] but had given no inkling that another kind of understanding would take their place. Perhaps he had not known it, for there are other leaders of his party who are closely bound to the Communists and who view with alarm Nenni's weakening Communist bond. The Socialists hoped that such an " understanding " would assure their retention of Communist ties, support and reputed financial aid, without foreclosing negotiatons with the Social Democrats. Whatever the reasons, the immediate effect of the " understanding " was disastrous to the progress of negotiations for Socialist reunification. The hope remained that the XXXII Party Congress would do something to break the stalemate.

The hope did not come to fruition. Nenni opened the Congress, held February 5-9, 1957, in a three-hour speech again denouncing the misdeeds of the Stalinists in the U.S.S.R. and the satellite countries, and the Soviet intervention in Hungary, but also indicating that he would have no rupture with the Communists. He was again carrying water on both shoulders and again showing himself to be a consummate politician by his recognition of the strength of the pro-Communist elements in his party without losing the followers of its Right. His eloquence and the wish of most of the party for reunification with the Social Democrats, bolstered by desire to enter the government again, led to an agreement between Nenni and even those who opposed him. That agreement emphasized that the Socialist party, now autonomous from the Communists and pursuing an Italian path to socialism, was nevertheless not anti-Communist; it would cautiously accept the foreign policy of Italy, but would work for the establishment of a neutral zone in Europe; it would continue today as a party of opposition both in Parliament and the country at large; it recognized the desire of the mass of Socialists to unite with the Social Democrats, not as a fusion of the two parties but as the creation of a new party. With their firm belief in the unity of the working class in Italy, the Socialists followed Nenni's lead in leaving aside the thorny question of the trade unions, and so the Communists and Socialists remain in the CGIL in the same position as before.

[8] " Problemi del socialismo ", *loc. cit.*, p. 341.

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The form or forms of unification still remain in the dark. As the spring of 1957 wore on, the rift between the two parties turned into an apparent stalemate. The Social Democrats flatly refused continued consideration of unification in the absence of complete severance of relations between Socialists and Communists, which the Socialists equally flatly refused. Many in both parties were unhappy about the continued stalemate, and in April the Social Democratic party secretary, Matteotti, son of the martyred Socialist Matteotti, resigned because of the failure of his party to push unification at almost any cost.

DIFFICULT DAYS FOR THE COMMUNISTS

The Communists are the political descendants of the old revolutionary or Maximalist wing of the original Italian Socialist party before its 1921 division into Socialists and Communists. There can be no doubt that the Communists lost members throughout 1956 and especially after the Hungarian crisis, but these losses must not lead one to minimize the continuing strength of the party. It still constitutes the largest Communist party in Western Europe and the second largest of all the political parties in Italy, exceeded in numbers only by the Christian Democrats.

In all past elections, the Communists have consistently received around a fifth of all the votes cast in Italy.[9] Their vote rose to 22.6 per cent of the total in 1953, but dropped down to 19 per cent in 1956. The strength shown by the party in elections is double or treble the membership claimed by the Communists themselves. The exact size of the party and the numbers of those who have deserted can only be estimated. Official Communist figures, never stooping to deal in round numbers, gave the party membership at the time of the VIII National Party Congress in December 1956 as 2,035,353, plus 358,126 " young Communists ". Even this claim represents a loss of 98,647 as against earlier Communist figures. Other estimates of party losses run from 200,000 to 800,000, but the truth is apparently nearer the lower figure.

[9] In the elections for the Constituent Assembly in 1946, the Communists secured 19 per cent of the votes (4,342,722); in the 1951-52 local elections, their vote was 20.2 per cent (4,495,681); in the political elections of 1953, 22.6 per cent (6,120,709); in the provincial elections of 1956, 19 per cent (4,336,686).

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The party today probably has well under two million card-bearing members. Its losses have come primarily from the industrial workers in the cities and from the intellectuals.

What are the reasons for the rise of communism in Italy and for its somewhat lessening influence today? Aside from the party's hard core of poverty-stricken agricultural workers, poor industrial laborers, and intellectuals, the Communists have attracted many non-Communist votes of protest against unfavorable economic conditions—especially unemployment, poor housing, low wages and rising costs of living, bad conditions of work, backbreaking toil on the land, and unrewarding contracts for farm labor. Some Italians favoring extreme solutions have cynically voted Communist to protest against existing political alignments and especially against the 1953 "bonus" law for the elections to the Chamber of Deputies. In 1956, the Communist party lost the votes of those whose living and working conditions had sufficiently improved to drive them to the right. Recent developments in Poland and Hungary led to a noticeable defection of sympathetic intellectuals but probably had little effect on such party members as the abysmally poor and ignorant Southern peasants, to whom little could be worse than their degradation—from which they are beginning slowly to emerge, thanks to the great government-sponsored program for the South. All in all, the Communists have probably lost more of those who voted Communist in protest than of convinced card-bearing members.

An important reason for Italian Communist strength is found in the personality and life experience of Palmiro Togliatti, the party leader since 1926. An intellectual, a man of culture as well as education, he is not revolutionary by temperament and has that capacity for infinite political change which is the result of Italian *trasformismo,* so he has led the party in nonviolent channels which have recently narrowed and solidified into a tightrope. His connections with Soviet Russia and Stalin in particular have given him an orientation which persists despite world events and efforts at change within his party. Exiled from Mussolini's Italy in 1926, Togliatti went to the U.S.S.R. He left there to take part in the Spanish revolution, then returned to broadcast under the name of Mario Correnti. For ten years, he served as a member of the Praesidium of the Communist

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International, working closely with Stalin. On his return to Italy in 1944, Togliatti symptomatically advocated Communist collaboration with the Badoglio government. He has continued to follow the line of activity within the framework of parliamentary government. From April 1944 until the end of May 1947, when Prime Minister de Gasperi decided to bar the Left from the government, Togliatti participated in all Cabinets except one. Since then the Communists have tried to make a virtue of necessity by insisting that they preferred to remain outside the government, but when the possibility of participation by a unified Socialist party came to the forefront of discussion in 1956, the Communists soon changed their tune and indicated a desire for a part.

Under Togliatti's leadership, the Communists have more and more projected themselves as defenders of the Constitution and the Republic. Building on their record in the Resistance, the Communists have insisted that the letter of the Constitution prohibiting discrimination for political belief be applied to them—especially after the Scelba government in 1954-55 initiated its policy of severity toward Communists. On the party membership card is written the motto "Constitution, Right to Work, Peace".[10] The Communists have embarrassed the government frequently by their support, such as their work for the establishment of the Constitutional Court, delayed until the end of 1955 by imbroglios within the Centre; and by voting for the election of Gronchi as President of Italy.

The Khrushchev announcement at the XX Party Congress in the U.S.S.R. placed a severe strain on Togliatti, for he had been too close to Stalin to accept with equanimity the new picture of a dictator-tyrant as presented in the spring of 1956. Togliatti's press statement to the Communist daily, *l'Unità*, in the middle of June 1956 [11] indicated deeply troubled questionings as to how a despot like Stalin could have come into power and remained there under a Communist system. Togliatti, however, could find no more satisfactory answer than

[10] Taken from "Sotto le bandiere del PCI e della FGCI per la pace, la libertà, l'apertura a sinistra", Nov. 10, 1955, issued by the Press and Propaganda Office of the Communist Executive, Rome, p. 14.

[11] The Italian review, *Nuovi Argomenti*, had asked a series of questions about the results of the XX Congress. Togliatti's reply appeared in *l'Unità*, June 17, 1956.

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" the perils of bureaucratic degeneration ". His statement that, with the end of the " personality cult ", the Communist system " becomes polycentric " appeared prophetic of more independence for the Communist parties of various countries. Rebuked by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party for his " incorrect " interpretation, Togliatti accepted the situation and has not since left the Soviet leading strings to which he has so long been attached. He has even kept his party with him. With the approach of a return to the Stalin line, Togliatti has no doubt been so comforted inwardly as to try to justify the intervention of the U.S.S.R. in Hungary as " a necessity, if a hard one ". To Togliatti, the Russian Communist party and the Soviet state are still the finest exemplars of communism.

Togliatti's followers in the Italian Communist party were not all as ready as he to regard Russian tanks on Budapest streets as " necessities ". The struggle that broke out within the party after the Hungarian events was somewhat different from the previous skirmishes for power between Togliatti and the lieutenants with whom he had worked since they first started on the Communist path together many years ago in Piedmont. Political Secretary Luigi Longo and Senator Pietro Secchia, leaders of the party's so-called " tough element " and advocates of direct action instead of the Togliatti policies of moderation and of *distensione,* were worsted in the behind-the-scenes argument but only temporarily. For a while it looked as though Secchia were in the political doldrums but he came back with an important speech at the VIII Party Congress held in Rome December 8-15, 1956.

The disaffections and dissensions which came to light at the Congress went deeper than these personal struggles and concerned the relationship of the Italian Communist party to that of the U.S.S.R. The de-Stalinization policy of the spring and summer, followed by the Budapest cruelties, had caused a real rift among the intellectuals of the party, seriously threatening Togliatti's prestige and leadership. Although the Suez crisis allowed him to catch his breath for the next round at the Party Congress, criticisms continued. Despite an electoral method that gave membership in the Congress only to those conforming to the Togliatti line, some delegates, for the first time in any such Congress, ventured to criticize both the leader and the party policy. Forty-year-

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old Antonio Giolitti, grandson of the famous Giolitti, spoke out against the subservience of the Italian Communist party to the U.S.S.R.; and others followed suit: Onofri of Calabria, who was finally expelled from the party in early 1957; and Bertini of the Galileo laboratories, who took a cue from the name of the laboratories and insisted that the Communist party, like the world, *e pur si muove.*

Despite the opposition and the many *volte faces* he had had to accomplish in his 65 years, Togliatti showed himself still strongly in control of his party and still the leader of the young men of which the Directorate is largely composed. Once more, he successfully juggled the interests of the Italian Communists and those of the Soviet Union and secured the agreement of the Congress on the somewhat equivocal statement that "rather than talk of a guiding party and nation, one should consider the guide set by our principles. The Soviet Union and its party remain, however, the axis and the greatest force of the socialist world." [12]

The voices of opposition were not silenced, however. Within a few weeks, Senator Eugenio Reale, one of the leading Communist figures, was expelled from the party. A lifelong Neapolitan Communist, Reale had been Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs in various coalition governments and Italian Ambassador to Poland, but for several years has been critical of trends within his party. Excluded from the VIII Congress in December as a possible danger, Reale showed the truth of those fears by publishing a criticism of the party line in the "bourgeois" weekly *l'Espresso,* and subsequently his expulsion came. His argument was similar to that of many who objected to following the Russian line completely: the Communist party of Italy must be an expression of Italian communism, not a following of the Soviet bloc any more than of the Atlantic Powers; the CGIL must become a nonpolitical trade union; and the Communists must begin to practice democrarcy in their own ranks. Many eminent intellectuals followed Reale in resignation or expulsion from the party, including Professor Crisafulli of the Constitutional Law Faculty at Trieste and the Communist nominee to the Constitutional Court in 1955; Professor Trombatore, the literary critic of *l'Unità;* Professor Sapegno

[12] Est-Ovest, *Daily Report on Italian Home and Foreign Affairs,* No. 289, Dec. 17, 1956.

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of the Faculty of Literature at the University of Rome; the sculptor Leonardo Leoncilli; and others.

MODERATE CONTROL OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS

The Christian Democrats today, though still composed of many political strands held together by the cements of the Catholic Church and anti-communism, have changed much since Prime Minister de Gasperi guided their fate. The party still has, to be sure, "the destiny to govern for years and yet always be temporary. [They] have roots everywhere but are far from feeling secure." [13] They now wear this insecurity with a difference, however. The leadership of the party has undergone sweeping changes though the composition of the rank and file has altered only slightly. On the party Right are the conservative landowners and industrialists with few if any differences from the conservative Liberals and even the Monarchists. On the Left are those whose program of socialization goes as far as that of many Nenni Socialists and Communists except for the fact that the Christian Democrats offer a Christian and Catholic rather than a Marxist approach to reform. Within the party a clearly discernible trend just left of Centre has been manifest since the 1953 elections and the party Centre is trying to keep the party in this groove. The great Senator Don Sturzo, founder of the Popular party, which was the ancestor of the Christian Democrats, is now on the far Right of the party; sadly saying that his child has deserted him, he has moved nearer to the Liberal camp. As happens in any political group, the leaders of the Left or reforming wing of the Christian Democrats have actually moved toward the Centre and Right of the party.

The former Christian Democratic Left had several wings: first, a group around Giovanni Gronchi which then believed in collaboration with the forces of socialism; a second group led by Professors Amintore Fanfani, Giuseppe Dossetti and Giorgio La Pira, the so-called "academic Left"; and still a third consisting of trade unionists, led then as now by Deputy Giulio Pastore. Gronchi, as President of Italy, is now warier of an "opening to the Left" than he formerly appeared to be. Dossetti, who went into retirement and contemplation after his resignation as Vice-Secretary of the party in

[13] Paolo Pavolini, "Democristiani, 1955", *Il Mondo*, Feb. 14, 1956.

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1951, emerged five years later as candidate for mayor of Bologna, to wage a valiant but vain attempt to down the entrenched Communist government in that long anticlerical city. La Pira, elected Mayor of Florence in 1951 and again in 1956, continues his saintly and mystical approach to the problems of government but combines his actions with those of practical politics.

Fanfani, an astute administrator and politician, inherited the mantle of De Gasperi as Political Secretary of the Christian Democrats in 1954. Unlike De Gasperi, who believed the salvation of Italy to lie in government by Catholic and lay parties working together, Fanfani has been an exponent of integral Catholicism, a believer in a strongly Catholic Christian Democratic government capable of running the country without the support of a coalition. The theory was somewhat dampened by an attempt made in 1954 to have such a one-party government with Fanfani as Prime Minister, for it received little support and lasted a brief two weeks. The idea of such a single-party government is not forgotten and various Christian Democrats hope for the day when it may be possible. In the winter of 1956-57, the weakened position of the Communists in Italy revived this hope in some Christian Democratic breasts who thought they could gain the day if a general election were to be held immediately. Fanfani, however, is a practical politician who doubtless realizes that his party alone would hardly be able to get over half of the votes at present, despite its increased strength. Remembering the renewed number of votes cast for the lay Centre parties in the spring elections in 1956, he believes the path of Italian government must still be a coalition, Centre, Centre-Left, or Centre-Right after the next elections.

The *Iniziativa Democratica,* the young and dedicated group of Christian Democratic followers of Fanfani who took over the driver's seat at the party Congress in Naples in 1954, continues to be the strongest element among the Christian Democrats, though the group is more moderate than in the earlier days when it spearheaded the leftward trend within the party ranks. At the last party Congress held in Trent in October 1956, strenuous efforts were made to dislodge the *Iniziativa* by those within the party who had gone further left or right, but Fanfani and his followers won the day.

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The Fanfani group, standing for a strong well-organized party, advocates the pursuit of a straight and narrow path with no opening to either the Left or Right extremes. Unlike some other factions within the Christian Democrats, the *Iniziativa* showed little enthusiasm for possible Socialist unification as the negotiations dragged on. Above all, this group wishes to have further social reforms, more development of the South and the Vanoni plan against unemployment.

Second in importance to the *Iniziativa* among the Christian Democrats is the group of the *Forze Sociali,* dominated by the Catholic trade union, CISL, under Pastore. Third in importance within the party fold is the faction of the *Base,* followers of the tradition of Gronchi and of the late Minister of the Treasury Ezio Vanoni, who, knowing that he had a serious heart condition, worked so hard for his country and his party that he died delivering a speech on the floor of the Senate. The *Base,* now led, among others, by Enrico Mattei, head of the great state oil combine, is especially insistent against any opening to the Right, believing that the Christian Democratic party must broaden its base to include the largest possible numbers of the ordinary people of Italy.

Last among the Christian Democratic groups is one with the charming but startling name of *Primavera*—springtime —which is at work on the development of a conservative program for the party. Under the leadership of former Prime Minister Pella and Minister of Finance Andreotti, this faction calls attention to the dangers of losing the interest of financial and industrial leaders because of too much reform zeal within the party. Still further to the Right is former Prime Minister Scelba, who made it clear on the last day of the Trent Congress that he believed the Christian Democrats could not accept what he referred to as a *ménage à trois,* a household composed of Social Democrats married to Nenni Socialists who also have their Communist mistresses with them. This group has gone further in recent days and advocated legal prohibition of communism in Italy but has had little success with the plan because of the dangers involved in driving so large a number of voters underground and of making martyrs of them.

There are mavericks among the Christian Democrats, such as Guido Gonella, Minister without Portfolio in the Segni

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Cabinet. One of the older Christian Democrats who had been party Secretary in 1948, Gonella had not been averse to Christian Democratic alliances with Monarchists in various cities in the local elections of 1951-52. When he later became Minister of Education, he was regarded by many as an arch conservative. By 1956 he had veered left and was in favor not only of Socialist reunification but of an "opening to the Left", though agreeing as to its possibility if Nenni were not willing to break entirely with the Communists.

Since the brilliant organizer Fanfani became Political Secretary of the Christian Democrats, their watchwords have been "organization" and "centralized efficiency". Although there were rumors at the Trent Congress that "organization" had been overemphasized, it has apparently begun to pay off. Realizing that the Christian Democrats represent a congeries of different kinds of people, Fanfani has built up various organizations to bridge the gap between the party and the electorate. Since women outnumber men among the Christian Democrats as among the Italian electorate generally, since trade unions are at the heart of political life in the country, and above all since young people hold the key to the party future, there are Christian Democratic organizations for all of them. Youth has been substituted for the old guard. Fanfani has developed a canvassing technique worthy of a Gallup-poll investigator. As a consequence of the tremendous organizational effort made by the party, it was reported that by the beginning of 1957 there were a million more enrolled Christian Democrats than the year before.

The party organization began to show results in the Sicilian regional elections of 1955, when the Communists threw in a reputed thousand of their best organizers but trailed the Christian Democrats in votes. In the 1956 local elections, the Christian Democratic party machinery was not as complete throughout Italy as it had been in the Sicilian regional elections. Although the party did not secure the gains hoped for by optimists, it did not suffer the losses feared by pessimists. With 38.9 per cent of the total vote, the Christian Democratic party consolidated its position between the vote it had received in the 1951-52 country-wide local elections, amounting to 35.9 per cent of the total, and the 40.8 per cent it had achieved in the 1953 elections for the Chamber of Deputies. The chief cause of the slight decline from 1953

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was found in local issues and even local personalities. Although the various kinds of socialism had drawn off some of the Christian Democratic Left, and the Liberals some of its Right, the Christian Democrats as a whole gained more than they had lost.

THE LIBERALS AND REPUBLICANS

While the Social Democrats have had one foot in the Centre coalition and one in the Left, the Liberals have had one in the Centre and one in the Right but are now stepping further right. With a tradition going back to Cavour and with a revival since the end of World War II, they have long encompassed a diversity of viewpoint under the word "liberty". All Liberals are united in an anticlerical feeling shared by the Social Democrats and Republicans. The Liberals, however, have included two extremes: economic conservatives and reactionary landowners, business men and industrialists believing in complete laissez faire; and those who had endured Fascist prison or exile for their beliefs in individual liberty and freedom of thought. Between the two extremes have been many who have also been anti-Fascist but who are concerned about the large amount of Italian industrial life in government hands.

Liberal divergencies have been so great that in the 1953 elections they lost over half their following. They then proceeded to take stock of their losses and, under the energetic and capable leadership of Political Secretary Malagodi, went to work on a clear program of conservatism, involving primarily the defense of private enterprise against state interference and the continuation of constitutional tradition. Inevitably they came to disagree with their Social Democratic allies in the Centre coalition and finally warfare spread to the Liberals' own ranks. In December 1955, their Left flank withdrew to form the Radical party, leaving the Liberals untrammeled to develop their program of economic conservatism and international coöperation. They have begun to attract Monarchists and Right-wing Christian Democrats who disapprove the reforming tendencies of the latter party. With an important Liberal, Gaetano Martino, serving as Foreign Minister of the Segni Cabinet, the Liberals have made Italy a leader in the ideas of close coöperation among the Western Powers, including NATO, plans for a common European

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market, the EURATOM project and Western European Union.

The new spurt of life in the minor parties in 1956 helped even the Republicans, the small group of intellectuals who form the third unconfessional party of the Centre and who have contributed leadership rather than numbers to Italian post-war politics. Followers of the ideals of Mazzini and intransigeant opponents of both monarchy and communism, the Republicans are a kind of embattled liberals, with a small "l". Disagreeing with the government over agricultural contracts and other matters, the Republicans have not been members of the Centre coalition since the early spring of 1955. By the next year, after a period of reorganization under the leadership of the brilliant journalist and former Minister of Industry and Commerce, Ugo La Malfa, and former Defense Minister Pacciardi, the Republicans recuperated so that they gained perceptibly in the local elections of that year. In the early spring of 1957 the suggestion of La Malfa for the new post of Minister of State Participations combined with other factors to make the Republicans consider once more taking an active part in the government, but he failed to receive the post.

DECLINE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT

The strength of the "Missini" and the two Monarchist parties who make up the extreme Right has been ebbing away, for they have been held together by little more than a vague belief in return to the past. Immediately after the end of the Second World War, when memories of the House of Savoy were still fresh, some ten million votes had been cast for a return to a monarchy as opposed to twelve million for the Republic, but these votes included individuals of many political persuasions beside Monarchist. Fewer people look back today to what they consider the "good old days" of Fascism or even of the king. Nationalist passions on Trieste have subsided, if not over minority problems in the Alto Adige. During the years since the last political elections, the Right has not proved a "loyal opposition"; in their frequent desires to overthrow the government, they have engaged in parliamentary tactics which made them tools of the Communists they profess to despise. Violence against Communists outside Parliament on the part of some of the more hot-

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headed "Missini", and votes with the Communists inside, cost many adherents. Above all, the years have brought no clear program to either Monarchists or "Missini" as they have brought to the Liberals, and the Right has been divided within itself on the basis of personalities rather than political programs. The South, long the particular haven of the Right, has begun to make sufficient progress to lift its eyes above its own misery and feel other hopes than mere return to its past.

Early in 1944, the Monarchists had split on the reef of disagreement between the two leaders, Alfredo Covelli and Achille Lauro. The latter, a self-made wealthy shipowner of Naples and a member of Parliament who had been elected Mayor of Naples in 1952, was more willing to support the Centre in foreign affairs than his rival Covelli. The rift between them, however, was primarily personal. Mayor Lauro secured so strong a following in the city of Naples in the 1956 election that he rescued the Monarchists from near-extinction. At the end of the year, his Popular Monarchists signed an agreement with a large veterans' group favoring alliances with the Christian Democrats and Liberals to form a strong Right, if the Social Democrats should leave the government after any possible type of Socialist reunification. Neither the Christian Democrats nor the Liberals have indicated any interest in the suggestion. The other Monarchist group, the National Monarchist party, has been linked with the "Missini" by a similar pact, but both of those parties are so weakened by internal disputes that it is doubtful if they could play a significant rôle in any possible Right-wing alliance. The star of the Right is not rising at present.

OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

The extreme complexity of Italian politics makes it difficult to gratify the American passion for prediction of political events to come. Situations in the world and in Italy herself are such shifting sands today as to preclude the possibility of any valid prediction. For instance, even a question so apparently remote as that of the position of the Social Democrats in Germany in the elections of September 1957 might well affect the question of Socialist reunification in Italy. The British Labor party has already played an important part in the negotiations for unification by discussions be-

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tween their leaders and those of the Italian Social Democrats and Socialists.

That reunification remains a cardinal question in Italian politics, for it in turn may affect everything else. The handwriting appears to be on the wall that some sort of reunification will ultimately take place, though when, in what form, and for how long a duration are questions still in the dark. Too much was expected too soon after the first Socialist-Social Democrat meeting and many questions still remain unanswered even after the Socialist Congress of February 1957. What form could reunification take at some time in the future? Does the word mean a complete welding together of the two parties now or is the path to be followed to be taken in two stages—at least? Is the most that can be expected that of agreement on the most general of principles with both parties facing the next elections with a common general program but separate and distinct lists of candidates? The latter appears the more probable. If the two parties should be fused in a way that does not yet appear imminent, how would the new party be financed with the withdrawal of Communist funds? How many of the Social Democrats would prefer to retain their allegiance to the Centre and so turn to the Christian Democratic ranks rather than join those of the Socialists? How many of the latter would prefer to continue left with the Communists or to form a new fellow-traveling splinter political group? What would be the effect of reunification in the trade-union field? Would it be possible or even desirable to try to build up one nonpolitical union in a country with the political and trade-union history of Italy, and how far would such a nonpolitical union be able to live up to its name?

If and when Socialist reunification takes place, the next general election may have come and gone. Unless the Social Democrats should resign before the elections, the fall of the government, which has been predicted so frequently ever since Prime Minister Segni took office, appears otherwise less imminent than had been thought, for he has been a wise man and an able politician. But other factors might precipitate elections and, in any event, 1958 is not far off.

Even after the proposed elections, it would be possible to have a strengthened Centre continuing to hold together as it has in the past and on an equally slack and unsteady tight-

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rope; to have the Centre unite with the Right in the face of the strengthened forces of socialism and even to have the Socialists at the helm with the Centre and Right forming the opposition; to have the Christian Democrats, who are undeniably gaining in strength from within and without, form a one-party government. The Communist party, while undeniably still a strong force and one to be reckoned with, appears now to be more a party of the discontented peasants than of the industrial workers, and so is less powerful than formerly.

The new orientation of the Christian Democratic party may be as determining a factor in the situation as that of Socialist reunification. The very moderation of the *Iniziativa Democratica* may indicate the continuing lack of a sufficiently clear-cut and dynamic program to forge ahead, but the organizational skill of the party leaders and the lack of a political haven of size and importance for many middle-of-the roaders may prove positive factors, as indeed they are already beginning to be. On the other hand, the Christian Democrats have been in power so long that many Italians are tired of the same program if not maneuvers and long for a healthy loyal opposition. Some see this in a possible reunified Socialist party devoid of Communist entanglements. This might come in the long run, when Saragat and Nenni are no longer at the helms but not until then, for the spring of 1957 brought a renewed gulf between them.

World events will play an important part in determining the course of Italian politics. If Italy's newly burgeoning economy should receive a setback from the shortages entailed by the Suez or other crisis, the Italian brand of communism, based so largely on misery, want and hopeless protest, might receive a new lease on life. If, on the other hand, the new European organizations such as those for a common market, in the formation of which Italy has played so important a part, turn out to be successful, the Italian economy might receive another push forward. If ferment in the satellite countries continues to increase and is repressed with the brutality of a Hungary, the Italian political parties of the moderation would again receive new impetus at the expense of the Left.

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THE REVOLUTION IN THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING CONVENTION

I

DURING the past three decades, the presidential nominating convention has been undergoing a major transformation. Party methods of nominating presidential and vice-presidential candidates are yielding, without much formal or structural change, to twentieth-century mass democracy. Delegates to national conventions, even the biggest of the " big shots ", are in the process of being reduced to popular rubber stamps, very much as presidential electors were reduced to nullities during the first decade of our present federal Constitution. Increasingly a national nominating convention is merely choosing its nominee from among popular national favorites; increasingly it is being forced to pick *the* national favorite. The days of the favorite son, the dark horse, the stalking horse, the smoke-filled conference room, the senatorial and congressional cabal, and the decisive trading of votes by local bigwigs are numbered, if indeed they are not already finished. " Insiders " and members of the political " club " are being cut down to size and forced to accept the leadership of those who have made successful national pre-convention campaigns and of those who have become national " names " and mass celebrities.

More time will elapse before this trend is commonly recognized. Even when it is more firmly established than it is, the temptation of the journalists and magazine writers to play up the color and suspense of the old-fashioned convention, to anticipate the maneuvers of the behind-the-scenes manipulators and the alleged king-makers, of the Thurlow Weeds, the Mark Hannas and the Jim Farleys, will be strong. Undoubtedly the prospective strategic and " decisive " moves of the Lyndon Johnsons, the Frank Lausches, the Stuart Symingtons and the Carmine De Sapios of the day (which in fact will *not* materialize) will be widely trumpeted to the public.

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Especially will this be true of the next Democratic National Convention, for Democratic leadership during the next four years will be in Congress, and Democratic congressional leaders will be blown up to balloon size, only to be rudely deflated at the next convention.

The sooner we realize the altered nature of the nominating convention the better off we shall be, for some of the problems already produced by the trend of the past three decades demand thoughtful consideration now.

II

In 1956, the conventions of both parties again strongly verified the trend of the past thirty years. Eisenhower, of course, was the undeniable national favorite of the Republicans. By way of the long grueling primary route, Stevenson, by the time of the Democratic convention, had emerged as the undoubted national favorite of the Democrats. Moreover, the conventions of 1956 revealed that the trend is also becoming applicable to the vice-presidential nominees. Even had Harold Stassen begun his "Stop Nixon" campaign six months earlier and enlisted the support of many of the most powerful of the politicians of the international wing of the Republican party, it is doubtful that Nixon, who had become a national "name", could have been stopped, short of direct and vigorous intervention by President Eisenhower himself. But the most telling illustration of the trend to nominate only national "celebrities" is afforded by the dramatic convention conflict over the Democratic vice-presidential nomination.

There is no doubt that Estes Kefauver, by the time of the opening of the Democratic National Convention of 1956, had become a national "name". His television performances as senatorial "crime buster", his national run for the presidential nomination in 1952, and his arduous primary fights in all parts of the country in 1956 had made his name and personality well known to the country. At the Chicago convention of 1956 he was forced to organize a sudden and spontaneous drive for the vice-presidential nomination against the forces which in the past have been "king-makers" in national conventions. Kefauver faced the bitterest kind of opposition from these traditionally powerful forces. He was opposed by the big-city bosses, who remembered all too well his

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exposure of the alliance of the underworld and the city politicos. He was opposed by the Southern delegations, who usually follow local and personal leadership to a greater extent than do delegations outside the South and who regarded Kefauver as too liberal and as a renegade to white Southern sentiments on racial questions. He was overwhelmingly opposed by congressional Democrats, by congressional cronies and "insiders", who felt that Kefauver did not belong to their "club". Any acute observer who watched the convention proceedings soon became aware of a congressional cabal, more particularly of a senatorial cabal, bent on defeating Kefauver. The maneuverings of Senators Kennedy, Gore, Johnson, Smathers, Fulbright, Monroney, Symington, Long and even Humphrey, and of Speaker Rayburn, Representative McCormack and "Les" Biffle were quite obvious.

Now it is important to note that even powerful members of the Congress are not, by today's standards, national "names". They may head important committees, now and then get their names in the headlines of the inside pages of the *New York Times,* and occasionally "make" the national press associations; but today all of this is a far, far cry from becoming a national "celebrity", from becoming a familiar name and personality among the mass of people. To become a national celebrity, it takes more, too, than a human interest story in a national mass-circulation magazine, a story predicting how such and such a governor or senator is maneuvering himself into a position of "king-maker" in a forthcoming old-fashioned national convention. All of this seems to come as a surprise to congressional leaders, who are accustomed to being very big men in congressional chambers and lobbies, and who collectively, as the Congress, can on occasion still be very potent indeed. But increasingly presidential politics involve popular group and mass activities in the country at large. Presidential politics are being divorced from local and congressional politics. Hence the growing separation of presidential Republicans from congressional Republicans, of presidential Democrats from congressional Democrats. When congressional leaders at national conventions throw bouquets at one another, as they do so profusely, they do not seem to be aware that the country does not know and appreciate them in the way they know and appreciate one another.

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Powerful, then, as the city bosses, the Southern leaders, and the congressional bigwigs would have been in a Democratic national convention of the nineteenth century and of the early twentieth century, they were no match, even in a *vice-presidential* contest, when pitted against a national "name" with a grass-roots national following and the backing of national farm and labor organizations. Undoubtedly, too, Senator Kennedy, the convention runner-up against Kefauver, did better than otherwise he would have because of his Catholicism. Many a New Deal delegate (particularly from Massachusetts and New York), many a delegate who ordinarily looks at politics from the national or presidential angle, deserted his normal political allegiances to seize this unusual opportunity to vote for a fellow Catholic. However, the failure to nominate for vice-president Kefauver, the runner-up in the popular primaries, would have been followed by a keen sense of frustration by rank-and-file Democrats the country over.

What is most important about the results of the Democratic and Republican conventions of 1956 is that they confirmed a presidential nominating trend which has been well in evidence in all presidential nominating conventions following 1924. For after 1924 the convention of each party has picked a national favorite—usually *the* national favorite—as the presidential nominee. The last time a Republican nominating convention chose a favorite son (after national favorites had deadlocked the convention) was in 1920, when Harding was nominated. The last time a Democratic nominating convention chose a favorite son (after national favorites had deadlocked the convention) was in 1924, when John W. Davis was nominated.

III

The trend of the past thirty years is unmistakable. Let us trace it.

In 1928, Herbert Hoover, opposed for the Republican presidential nomination by a miscellany of unimpressive favorite sons, was the overwhelming choice of the rank-and-file Republicans of the nation. He was easily nominated. Likewise, for months prior to their Houston convention, the nomination of Al Smith by the Democrats was a foregone

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conclusion. Indeed, the choice of Houston, a Southern and Protestant city, as the place for holding the Democratic convention was a pre-calculated attempt to make Smith's almost certain nomination palatable to Southerners and Protestants. Smith was clearly the logical candidate. In a strongly Republican era, he had been elected Governor of New York four times, when other Northern Democrats had gone down like ninepins. Two of Smith's triumphant elections had taken place since the Madison Square Garden convention of 1924. Under these conditions, most Democrats throughout the country felt that to turn down Smith would be a rank injustice and a positive insult to the Irish-Catholics, who long had been a bulwark of Democratic strength, and to other "non-nativist" Americans of the large cities.

In 1932, Hoover was obviously the choice of the Republicans; and Franklin D. Roosevelt, the popular Governor of New York, was the outstanding national favorite among the Democrats, as evidenced by primaries, national opinion polls, local straw votes, and other barometers of public opinion.

In 1936, Roosevelt was the inevitable Democratic nominee. By the time the Republican convention opened, Governor Alf Landon, one of the few Republican survivors in high office, was far in the lead for the Republican nomination.

In 1940, mass pressures had been built up for Roosevelt's third nomination, and those parochial forces formerly so important in national conventions (in this case represented by old-fashioned politicos like "Jim" Farley and "Jack" Garner) were powerless to stay the mass trend. The Republican convention of 1940 revealed even more dramatically than the Democratic convention the enormous strength of the new mass forces over the old parochial ones.

Mass pressures were responsible for the nomination of Wendell Willkie. The average Republican delegate did not want Willkie. The average Republican politician, guided by the old rules of the game, had every reason to be suspicious of him. The old rules demanded a professional, a proved vote-getter, and Willkie was a rank outsider, an amateur who had never tested his mettle with the voters. Moreover, he was a big-business man, a Wall Street business man, a business man identified with the most unpopular of big businesses, public utilities. And, most unholy of unholies,

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Willkie was not even a good Republican, if indeed he was a Republican at all. He had been a life-long Democrat; only as late as 1938 had he formally renounced the Democrats and become a Republican. The nomination of Willkie defied all of the old rules; he was nominated solely because of mass pressures and the historical logic of the situation. (The historical logic of the situation is looming larger and larger in all of our political decisions as we attempt to wrestle with the increasingly remote, impersonal and global problems of our time, and it will bulk even larger in the future.) It so happened that Willkie's three chief contenders for the nomination—Taft, Dewey and Vandenberg—represented more or less isolationist records. Willkie had no isolationist record and he tended to be an "interventionist". Willkie's position, in contrast to that of his opponents, had by the time of the Republican convention become a decisive advantage, for France had fallen and the whole country was watching with breathless anxiety the battle of Britain. Americans were frightened, and American opinion with respect to the foreign situation was moving rapidly away from isolationism. Moreover, many of the nation's magazines of mass circulation, most conspicuously the Luce publications, had been beating a steady drumfire for Willkie for weeks before the convention opened. His nomination, then, represents a striking victory for mass historical forces, the techniques of Madison Avenue advertising experts, and the agencies of mass opinion—polls, radio and big-time journalism—over the traditional, leisurely paced rules of American politics.

In 1944, the logic of the historical situation made Roosevelt, America's wartime leader and world spokesman, the Democratic nominee. The national favorite among the Republicans was Thomas E. Dewey, who had progressively modified his old isolationism and who, because he was Governor of New York, the most populous state in the Union and a microcosm of the nation's racial, religious, national and economic groups which bulk so large in contemporary national welfare politics, was by all odds the most "available" Republican in high elective office.

In 1948, Truman, a sitting President and world leader in time of crisis, was in a position to dictate his own nomination. Dewey, in spite of his defeat in 1944, was the logical

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Republican choice. Since that time he had been reëlected Governor of New York, and in a series of hard-fought primary contests with Stassen and others, he had emerged as the undoubted national favorite among the Republicans.

In 1952, the victory of Eisenhower over Taft for the Republican nomination was a spectacular victory of an attractive national and world celebrity, supported, too, by the most effective advertising techniques afforded by Madison Avenue. Eisenhower, the biggest of "names", won over a lesser "name". Eisenhower represented all of the new mass forces in politics; Taft represented all of the old and orthodox methods of the traditional American political game, even to the rounding up of delegates from the rotten-borough Republicans of the South in the gamey way sanctioned by age. On the Democratic side, Stevenson appeared to be the reluctant candidate seeking to avoid becoming the national favorite, but actually by the time of the Democratic convention he had been the subject of such a terrific national publicity build-up that the polls showed him running ahead of those who had engaged in the primary contests.

In 1956, as we have seen, Eisenhower was still the same glamorous celebrity he had been for many years, and in addition he was backed by the enormous power and prestige of the presidency, and aided by the smooth television techniques of Robert Montgomery and the shrewd showmanship of James E. Hagerty. Stevenson, in many a slugging primary, had pushed his way into first place among the Democrats. And, most significant of all, the trend in both parties toward nominating for president *the* national favorite appeared for the first time to be extending itself to the vice-presidential candidates as well.

IV

The true significance of what has been happening to our nominating conventions beginning with 1928 can be seen only when contrasted with the situation before 1928. Throughout most of American history, the nomination of a "dark horse" was not infrequent, and the nomination of a favorite son (a politician prominent in his home state, but not nationally) or of a national favorite who was not *the* national favorite was the common practice. Indeed, it has been

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only in the past thirty years that we have developed the amorphous but none the less fairly accurate methods of determining *the* national favorite in each party and the mass pressures which are now applied to produce his nomination.

In the past, we could speak accurately of *the* national favorite only when a popular sitting president was seeking renomination; or when there arose a magnetic personality with a passionately devoted personal following among the rank and file—a Thomas Jefferson, an Andrew Jackson, a Henry Clay, a Stephen A. Douglas, a William Jennings Bryan, or a Theodore Roosevelt; or, more rarely, in the case of a genuinely popular military figure like Ulysses S. Grant. Most military heroes nominated for the presidency have been synthetic political figures manufactured for the occasion by behind-the-scenes professional politicians—as in the nominations of Wiliam Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, Winfield Scott, John C. Frémont and Winfield S. Hancock. At the time of their *first* nominations, Lincoln, Cleveland, Bryan and Wilson were only national favorites among many national favorites; none of these was *the* national favorite. Theodore Roosevelt did not become *the* national favorite among the rank and file of Republicans until after he had succeeded to the presidency. The traditional pattern was clear: most conventions had before them a number of national favorites and favorite sons, and by a process of attrition a national favorite (usually not *the* national favorite, for *the* national favorite rarely existed) finally emerged victorious, or the contest between national favorites became so bitter that the convention was deadlocked and out of stalemate a favorite son or, more rarely, a "dark horse" emerged. (I put the term "dark horse" in quotation marks because actually a "dark horse" was usually a favorite son primed for entry at the strategic moment.)

The traditional way of nominating presidential candidates very frequently led to a miscarriage of the hopes and expectations of the rank and file of party members. Clay's loss of the nomination to Harrison saddened most Whigs, and Scott's nomination in 1852 left most Whigs cold. Among Democrats for the same period, Polk in 1844 was a dark horse; Cass in 1848 was a lesser national favorite; and Pierce in 1852 was another dark horse. In 1856, the Republican

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Frémont was a more or less synthetic figure, and the Democrat Buchanan represented the triumph of the professional politicians over Stephen A. Douglas, the favorite of the rank and file.

In the decades following the Civil War, the situation was much the same. The Democratic nominee of 1868, Horatio Seymour, was a favorite son. In 1872, the Democrats reluctantly endorsed the Liberal Republican nominee, Horace Greeley, whose nomination by the Liberal Republicans had occasioned amazement bordering on consternation. The Democratic nominee in 1880, General Hancock, was a somewhat ridiculous figure without popular appeal. On the Republican side, the nomination of favorite-son Hayes in 1876 gravely disappointed the idolatrous followers of James G. Blaine, who was the national favorite with the rank and file. Garfield, the Republican nominee in 1880, was a dark horse; and Benjamin Harrison, the Republican nominee in 1888, was a favorite son.

During the first decades of the twentieth century, the nominating conventions began responding more to national and democratic forces outside the conventions, and these decades may be considered transition decades to the period which began in 1928. Nevertheless, many conventions of the first two decades of this century disappointed the democratic expectations of the country. The nomination of Alton B. Parker by the Democrats in 1904 was a "dud". The nomination of James M. Cox in 1920 represented the victory of a favorite son, or at best of a lesser national favorite. The nomination of favorite-son John W. Davis in 1924 was the result of the prolonged deadlock in the Democratic convention and was distinctly anti-climactic. It came after a locked convention had taken 103 ballots and could not produce a more satisfactory candidate. On the Republican side, the nomination of President Taft over Theodore Roosevelt in 1912 clearly represented a victory of maneuver-by-politicians over the newer democratic methods; and in 1920 the nomination of Harding over three national favorites represented the triumph of local politicians and congressional cabal over the verdict of the primaries, the triumph of the old methods at their very worst.

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V

Why have our nominating conventions been going through a process of revolutionary transformation during the past thirty years? Basically, the transformation is a response to the more integrated, mass society in which we live. Increasingly we are dealing with problems that are remote and beyond personal experience, that appear in the guise of historical necessity or inevitability or crisis. The professional politician steeped in localism (and this includes the average congressional politician) now is less sure of himself, often feels his inadequacy, and turns to celebrities on the national and world stage for leadership. Hoover, Willkie and Eisenhower became national celebrities outside politics before they became political leaders. Franklin Roosevelt's third and fourth nominations were made possible (indeed, "necessitated") by world crisis. (In the future, situations like these will increase, not decrease, and they likely will lead to an alteration of the constitutional amendment prohibiting more than two presidential terms.)

Increasingly, national leaders are being made in this way: the ambitious person seizes and exploits his "chance" on the national or international stage (as Kefauver did as Senate "crime buster"); the mass media of publicity make him a "name", and, having become a "name", he is made a bigger "name" by the same mass media of publicity. We are approaching a condition where celebrities outside of politics —Hollywood, television and radio stars, sports heroes, and fiction writers—or even the wives of celebrities (they bear the "name", do they not?) carry greater weight in political campaigns than do long-time congressional leaders or state governors.

The pre-convention primaries and campaigning have done much to alter the nature of the nominating convention. True, the number of states having presidential primaries of one kind or another (to elect delegates to the national convention, or show a popular preference, or both) has not increased in the past thirty years, but these primaries are coming to have a significance in the nominating process they did not have in 1912 or 1920 or 1924. Today, when a politician enters the primaries and makes good showings, he becomes

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the subject of concentrated national publicity. His activities are carried every day by the national press services, and his name regularly appears in all the daily papers of the country. Human interest stories about him are featured in the magazines of mass circulation. He appears on national radio and television programs. On a Sunday afternoon he " meets the press " for millions to see and hear. National public-opinion polls carry his name and periodically rate his popularity. He becomes a " name ", a celebrity. Even his wife or near relative becomes a " name "—Pat, Nancy, and " Buffie " become almost as well known as Nixon, Kefauver, and Stevenson. If put to the test, does anyone doubt that during the campaign of 1956 a Pat Nixon or a Nancy Kefauver could have drawn larger audiences than a Sam Rayburn or a Joe Martin?

The primaries allow the politician an opportunity to become a " name ". They allow the unknown and the semi-known to become really known. They allow him the chance to become a celebrity along with the celebrities in other fields of activity and achievement. The time is fast approaching, if indeed it has not already arrived, when a politician cannot hope to be President or even Vice President without first becoming a celebrity. The days when the political lightning in a nominating convention would strike an unknown or a comparative unknown are over. *If politicians do not find the ways to make themselves household names, real national celebrities, presidential nominations will go to celebrities in other fields.* The art of being an effective national political leader is compounded of many ingredients, but today the first ingredient is to know how to become a national celebrity, for without this the other ingredients cannot be put to use. For this reason, even if all the state presidential primaries were abolished, the skillful politician in search of the presidency, the politician not yet a national " name ", would still have to go to the country, line up the mass pressure groups, beat the bushes, and corral delegates in a popular way. Only by these methods could he get the concentrated national publicity that makes him a celebrity. Without the primaries, his road to national fame would be still harder, but he would have to find it. That day is now passed when an astute politician can reach the presidency merely by the quiet search for delegates and the lining up of congressmen,

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local leaders and bosses; merely by using the methods of closet conference, maneuver, manipulation and bargaining.

Another reason for the transformation of the nominating convention is the increasing importance of mass pressure groups. Today, the candidate must not only deal with the leaders of the mass pressure groups, but he must also go to the members of these groups and convince them of his sincerity and ability to perform. Truman got the Democratic vice-presidential nomination in 1944 when he was found to be satisfactory to the big labor organizations. That year, Byrnes failed in his quest for the same nomination when national labor, Catholic and Negro groups turned him down. Barkley's 1952 "boom" for the presidential nomination collapsed when it was punctured by the national labor leaders. Kefauver owed his 1956 vice-presidential nomination in no small part to the support of national farm and labor organizations.

It is curious that the transformation of the nominating conventions has not been more generally recognized. After all, the nomination of presidential candidates is as important as the election itself. The effects of an increasingly integrated and mass society have been recognized in almost all other areas of our life. We even recognize these in our presidential *elections*. It is pretty well understood that presidential elections are no longer won by patching together local and state disaffections and interests and thereby eking out a national victory, as Garfield did in 1880, Cleveland in 1884, Harrison in 1888, and Cleveland again in 1892. (There is increasing group politics—and our parties are federations of many group interests—but it is more and more *national* group politics, and less and less local, state and sectional politics.) There have been fourteen presidential elections during the twentieth century, and all of these, except those of 1916 and 1948, have been national landslides, expressions of national waves of opinion. However, we still persist in thinking of the presidential nominating machinery in terms of local bosses and king-makers, in terms of the parochial and provincial politics of the nineteenth century. Such thinking, while picturesque, is no longer realistic.

The activities that surround a nominating convention are deceptive. The proceedings and ritual on the floor of the

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convention itself are very much as they were in 1868 or 1880 or 1900. Outside, in the lobbies and hotel rooms, there are still the button-holing of delegates, the anxious bargaining, the exciting secret conferences. But all of this is now subordinate in decision-making to the group and mass pressures, developed or enormously expanded and intensified during the past thirty years, which now beat upon the delegates and conferees from all sides.

Most Americans, even American political scientists, think in terms of form and structure. It is the heritage of our living under a written constitution. Because the forms and structure of the national nominating convention are little changed, we have been slow to recognize the revolution that has already been worked in our national nominating machinery. The vast changes in the nominating machinery of the localities and states are recognized because those changes were accompanied by changes in the machinery, in the abolition or drastic alteration of the old convention system and the adoption of complete or mixed primary systems. It was thought that similar changes in machinery would be applied to the national nominating conventions, that more states would adopt presidential primaries or that a national presidential primary would be adopted. However, few structural and formal changes have taken place on the national level. There has been no increase in the number of presidential primary states in the past thirty years. The national primary has not been adopted and it is not likely to be adopted. A few states have clarified their presidential primary laws. One of these is Florida, which now requires party voters to select from slates of delegates pledged to particular candidates, just as presidential electors are now pledged to vote for the national nominees of their party. Hidden from national view, but significant, is the fact that in many of the states the delegates to the state conventions, which in turn select the delegates to the national conventions, are now chosen in local primaries.

The trend to nominating *the* leading national favorite, then, is the result of many factors: the crisis world in which we live; the rapidity with which events that affect the increasingly interrelated lives of all of us occur; the phenomenal growth of the mass media of communications; the increasing

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activities of mass pressure groups; the pervasiveness, accuracy and notoriety of the public-opinion polls; the democratization of the methods of selecting delegates to the national conventions; and the ways all of these in turn intensify the importance of the presidential primaries. However, today, the democratic process is coming to depend less and less upon the formal and periodic nominating and electoral machinery and more and more upon the ever-multiplying means for informally and pervasively ascertaining public opinion from day to day. In short, the revolution has been wrought not so much by changes in machinery and structure as by the vast changes in social forces outside of machinery and structure, new and altered forces which operate on and permeate machinery and structure.

It is probable that by 1976 or 1980 all that a nominating convention will do will be to meet to ratify the nomination for president of *the* national favorite already determined by the agencies, formal and informal, of mass democracy; to ratify the nomination for vice-president of the second leading national favorite; to endorse a platform already written by leaders responding to national and group pressures; and to stage a rally for the benefit of the national television audience. Delegates and " leaders " in national conventions, like presidential electors, will have become rubber stamps.

VI

Conservatives, who deplore the social trends leading us away from the local and the personal and toward the centralized and the impersonal, will hesitate to accept these conclusions, and if they accept them they will want to do something to halt the trends. Twentieth-century " liberals ", less concerned with personal liberty and with more faith in mass democracy, will welcome these trends. Pragmatists will accept the trends, realize that nothing can be done basically to change them, and attempt to find solutions to the specific problems they raise. For these trends raise many specific problems in government and politics. I shall suggest merely a few of these.

For one thing, since the forces of national mass democracy are affecting the presidency much more and at a faster pace than they are affecting the Congress, we are now more and

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more faced with a widening gap between the President and Congress, between presidential politics and congressional politics, between presidential Republicans and congressional Republicans, between presidential Democrats and congressional Democrats. The implications of this for a frightening prolongation and intensification of the stalemate between the legislative and executive branches and for continued inability to enact needed legislation are obvious. What can be done about this is another story, and a complicated one. Primarily we must rely on the substantive realignment of parties now gradually taking place, on progressive Republicans in the prairie states and in the Northwest becoming Democrats, and on the conservatives in the South becoming Republicans. Premature attempts to hasten this trend by centralized national party machinery over congressional nominations and elections might actually retard the trend and aggravate the situation.

For another thing, are we not in danger of prematurely killing the chances of genuinely first-class national leaders and depriving ourselves of their services by over-reacting nationally to parochial situations in individual and often provincial states? Why should international-minded Wendell Willkie have been broken on a single throw of loaded dice in an isolationist state like Wisconsin? Why should a Stevenson or a Kefauver be " made " or " lost " by the results of a primary in a state as atypical as Florida, where the political divisions normal to most states mean so little that its two United States Senators, representing the overwhelming middle-class consensus of its *rentier* classes, tourists, and comfortable civic-club and chamber-of-commerce communities, are returned to Washington with no opposition? (Fortunately for the survival of both Stevenson and Kefauver, in the 1956 Florida primary they ran neck-and-neck among the small number of voters who bothered to vote.)

Of most immediate concern, it seems to me, is the rescuing of our politicians from the intolerable wear and tear on their bodies and nervous systems which the requirements of mass democracy increasingly are imposing upon them. This is coming to be a question of their sheer physical survival, and as a nation we are running greater and greater risks in allowing our parties to be led during an entire election year—

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during the long months of pre-convention campaigning and then during the three months of the campaign itself—by harassed and exhausted leaders with little time to analyze for themselves the enormous problems with which they must cope.

How can our presidential candidates be rescued from the increasing brutalities and tortures of the system? Mass democracy will have to find ways to use pervasively and effectively the mass media of communication—television, radio and motion pictures. These mass media are partly responsible for the fact that a candidate for president must now become a national celebrity in order to get a nomination. These mass media now make it possible for the candidate to reach the voters without going directly to them in person. Yet up to now the uses of these mass media have not been within adequate reach of the candidates, so they have enormously expanded their personal contacts and appearances, expanded them to the near-breaking point. This constitutes a cruel and preposterous paradox.

To meet the expanded costs of the pre-convention contests and the campaign itself, the federal government may have to step in to underwrite the expenses of radio and television campaigning and of a reasonable amount of newspaper and magazine advertising. Earlier in our history, governments did not even defray the expenses of preparing the ballots. These expenses and some other election costs were borne by the candidates and the parties. Now all of these things are regarded as the legitimate government costs of an election and are borne by the local and state governments. However, the costs of campaigning are as necessary as the costs of the election itself, and the public may have to come to accept public financing of reasonable campaign costs as legitimate, just as legitimate as the public financing of ballots, voting machines, polling places, and election clerks.

After this hurdle has been cleared, there will be all sorts of specific and technical difficulties. How are the bona fide candidates to be distinguished from the frivolous ones? Is a candidate who does not file in any of the state presidential primaries to be considered a candidate? Is the candidate who files in the state primaries to be considered a federal or

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a state candidate, and if he is to be considered a federal candidate for purposes of certain campaign costs, in how many states must he file? These are just a few of the questions that will arise.

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the presidential election was subjected to the ways of modern mass democracy. We have not yet solved many of the problems involved in this transformation, particularly those involving campaign finances and adequate use of radio and television time. During the past three decades, the presidential nominating process likewise has been subjected to the ways of mass democracy. This constitutes a more decisive break with the past, for it involves a revolutionary transformation of the nominating conventions, a substitution of mass choices for the deliberations and decisions of political leaders, the subversion of the only effective institution that has stood between the presidency and mass pressures. This revolution is already pretty much of an accomplished fact, although that fact has hardly come to be recognized. It is high time that we recognize it; more, that we begin to tackle the problems which have been raised by this revolution.

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THE CREATION OF THE EUROPEAN PAYMENTS UNION

AN EXAMPLE IN INTERNATIONAL COMPROMISE

Historical Significance of the E.U.P. Negotiations

WORLD War I and the Great Depression left a long trail of unsolved problems, of which the dislocation of internatonal trade and commerce was among the most serious. The inter-war period saw a transition from relatively free and multilateral trade to a system of bilateralism characterized by quantitative restrictions and discrimination. Gold, short-term capital, and long-term investment, which had served to facilitate the flow of trade, ceased to do so or were generally unavailable. Bilateralism, therefore, although it reached its greatest proportions after the Second World War, had its roots in the inter-war period.

Most Western European countries, as well as the United States, were aware that bilateralism was undesirable in so far as it was uneconomical and the chief symptom of greatly contracted and artificially channeled trade. It was clear, however, that the restoration of multilateralism required more than good intentions; it required an organization capable of coping with the problems responsible for bilateralism in the first place. The European Payments Union was conceived as such an organization. Before it began to function, however, it was necessary to overcome a number of serious obstacles.

Probably nothing demonstrates the heterogeneity of national aims and the diversity of national interests better than an effort to organize an international body designed to take the place of unilateral or bilateral practices. Sometimes the difficulty lies with customs and traditions; but frequently conflicts arise from problems which are deeply woven into the political and social fabrics of the nations involved. To the historian, the negotiations which precede the formal establishment of international organizations are likely to be of first importance, for they often bring to the surface some of the forces which give to each period its peculiar shape and pattern. To the student of international affairs, the negoti-

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ations are especially useful by clearly demonstrating the multiplicity of ideologies in post-war Western Europe and the impact of these ideologies on international economic relations.

American Initiative

Since post-war European economic coöperation was closely allied to American assistance, it is not surprising that the United States contributed in large measure to the initiative that led to the establishment of the European Payments Union. The urgent need for a new approach was brought into sharp focus by Paul Hoffman, E.C.A.[1] Administrator, in an address before the O.E.E.C.[2] Council in Paris on October 31, 1949, in which he strongly hinted the end of United States economic assistance unless the Marshall Plan countries agreed on a program of economic "integration". Integration proved too strong a term, but the confusion which attached itself to Hoffman's speech was clarified when he later explained that he merely meant the abolition of trade barriers based on a system of multilateral payments within the O.E.E.C. area.

In his speech before the O.E.E.C. Council, Hoffman stated the principles upon which the United States expected Western European economic policy to be based. These were presented as not merely an ideal, but a necessity, and stressed the following conditions: the formation of a single large nonrestrictive market, capable of large-scale, low-cost production; a substantial measure of coördination of national fiscal and monetary policies; the prevention of inflation; the use of "necessary exchange rate adjustments, subject to the general supervision of the International Monetary Fund"; the prevention of seriously conflicting commercial policies; and the encouragement of economic arrangements among groups of two or more of the smaller nations, providing that these contribute to the integration of the whole area.[3]

It was in this speech that Hoffman frequently used the

1 Economic Cooperation Administration, Washington, D.C.

2 Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris.

3 *New York Times*, November 1, 1949.

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word " integration ". This, according to the press on both sides of the Atlantic, puzzled European statesmen. The confusion apparently arose over the E.C.A. Administrator's failure to separate two aims: the short-run objective of abolishing quantitative restrictions, that is, a return to the 1921 status; and the more distant aim of abolishing all trade barriers by creating a single European market.

On December 16, 1949, the United States formally declared its position in respect to European economic coöperation, in the form of an E.C.A. proposal for a European Payments Union.[4] This plan stressed two points: complete transferability of O.E.E.C.-area currencies used for current transactions; and the elimination of all quantitative restrictions on imports.[5] It also called for the ultimate restoration of multilateralism which indicated that the E.C.A. gave its European payments plan only temporary backing.

Each member country was given a line of credit, which consisted of a definite amount of credit it would receive from, or be obligated to grant to, the Payments Union. All transactions of the member countries were to be carried on through the use of a common unit of account, and countries whose O.E.E.C.-area imports exceeded their exports to that area could finance the difference through the use of credit granted by the Union and through partial gold payments to the Union. Countries whose exports exceeded their imports in the O.E.E.C. area would receive their surplus in part by gold payments from the Union and in part by extending credit to the Union. In case the Union's payments of gold exceeded its receipts, a fund of dollars contributed by the United States was to finance the difference.

Transferability of currencies and the abolition of quantitative restrictions on imports apparently called for some kind of coördination among the European economies in the opinion of E.C.A. officials, for their plan provided for a supervisory board with E.C.A. representation " to maintain a kind of surveillance over the internal financial policies of the mem-

[4] *New York Times*, January 9, 1950. This early draft has not been made public by the E.C.A.

[5] This excluded tariffs, which were treated separately by the General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs, but included bilateral trade agreements.

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ber countries. . . ." This idea was eventually abandoned by the E.C.A. since most European countries were reluctant to grant strong discretionary powers to a body such as the E.P.U., especially if the United States were to share in it.

The E.C.A. plan was a definite departure from traditional American policy which had always stressed complete multilateralism in respect to payments and trade. This was the first time that an official agency of the United States supported economic regionalism. Opposition arose which charged that the proposal would shelter weak and overvalued currencies by protecting them from the competition of certain strong currencies, such as the dollar. A Senate committee which studied the plan concluded, however, that it would put E.C.A. dollar aid to much better use without increasing the amounts involved.[6]

American opinion was by no means without differences in respect to the E.P.U., but whatever basic differences existed between the E.C.A. and the other members of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems[7] were accentuated by the E.C.A.'s failure to consult with its colleagues on the N.A.C. until agreement had been reached. Although E.C.A. officials pointed out that they foresaw no conflict within the N.A.C., serious doubts soon arose. The N.A.C. opposition to the E.C.A.-sponsored E.P.U. was based on two separate principles. The Agriculture Department, supported in its views by the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce, feared that the E.P.U., based on dollar discrimination, would have serious effects on the exports of American farm products. The other opposition came from the International Monetary Fund, whose case was sponsored in the N.A.C. by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. The E.P.U., in order to prevent a member from acquiring an excessive deficit, would, it was held, intervene by advising the country in question to alter its monetary policy, including

[6] Joint Congressional Committe on Foreign Economic Cooperation, *The Proposed European Payments Union*, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document No. 114 (Washington, 1950).

[7] The N.A.C. consisted of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Commerce, the Chairmen of the Federal Reserve Board and the Export-Import Bank, and the E.C.A. Administrator.

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the rate of exchange. These were clearly functions of the I.M.F., and a question of jurisdiction arose. The N.A.C., in its semi-annual report to the President, stressed the need for reconciling the E.P.U. with the I.M.F.

The N.A.C. division was apparently not based on technical grounds. No one seemed to doubt the E.P.U.'s ability to advance the cause of multilateralism within its region. The United States had traditionally been committed to an international, multilateral approach, whereas the E.C.A. attempted to reach its objectives, at least temporarily, through regionalism. These two separate approaches had to be reconciled before an effective United States policy toward Western Europe could evolve. From the standpoint of the E.C.A.'s bargaining position in Europe, the unification of official American policy was of the first importance.

Fortunately, the E.C.A. was able to convince its colleagues in the N.A.C. that unless European trade was freed from its innumerable restrictions, discrimination against imports from the dollar area would most likely be greater than under the E.P.U. plan; and that, United States foreign policy being given, dollar aid would be less under the E.P.U. than without it. It was reported that when Mr. Hoffman arrived in Paris on January 25, 1950, to meet with the Ministerial Steering Committee of the O.E.E.C. for the purpose of reaching agreement on the E.P.U., he had already made peace with the other members of the N.A.C.[8]

The European Response

In response to American pressure for greater European economic coöperation, the governing Council of the O.E.E.C. submitted a Resolution on November 2, 1949, recommending to its members a sharp reduction in restrictions (excluding tariffs) on imports from the O.E.E.C. area, as well as greater transferability of O.E.E.C. currencies.[9]

Although this Resolution fell short of the E.C.A. plan, the British responded cautiously; they supported the concept of closer coöperation, but made it clear that their Empire com-

[8] *New York Times*, January 26, 1950.

[9] Economic Cooperation Administration, *O.E.E.C. Council Decision of November 2, 1949* (Washington, 1949).

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mitments and sterling-area responsibilities made it impractical to integrate the British economy with that of Western Europe.

Before much more progress was made in establishing closer economic coöperation in Western Europe as a whole, steps were taken by the French and British governments for the creation of smaller "blocs". Previous to Mr. Hoffman's speech, the French government had planned an economic bloc that would tie her, and possibly Italy, to the Benelux countries. In the light of American pressure for closer economic ties in Europe, the issue received new stimulus, and on December 9, 1949 representatives from France, Italy and the Benelux countries reached a tentative agreement on definite steps to be taken by "Finebel".[10]

The underlying principle of the Finebel Agreement was that interconvertibility of currencies could be maintained by proper exchange rate adjustment. Provisions were made for conservative credit margins, but members were to rely largely on coördinating their internal monetary policies for avoiding gold movements. Since it was thought that this latter point could not apply to all or even a majority of the O.E.E.C. countries, the scheme was of necessity limited.

The agreement was handicapped by two problems that arose in the beginning. One was the inclusion of Germany, favored by the E.C.A. and the Netherlands, but opposed by France and Italy. The other was a Benelux proposal to lower tariffs as well as quantitative restrictions, opposed by the French and Italians.

The British responded to the French move for Finebel with a plan of their own in December 1949. By the end of January 1950, Britain signed an agreement with Sweden, Norway and Denmark, commonly referred to as "Uniscan".[11] In all four countries the emphasis was on full employment; and, in each, planning played an important rôle. It was agreed that each country would hold the others' currency without limit, and that sterling would be used in transactions with the other countries, providing this did not lead

[10] An abbreviation for France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.

[11] An abbreviation for United Kingdom and Scandinavia.

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to a loss of gold or dollars. It was also agreed that controls on current account should be relaxed and that this should apply to capital movements whenever possible.

Neither Finebel nor Uniscan found much support in the United States, and other plans for Western European coöperation, by the O.E.E.C. Secretariat, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark, were submitted to the O.E.E.C. Council for consideration. The Western European countries were still far from agreed as to how the need for economic coöperation could be translated into an effective program of action. The chief areas of disagreement were reflected in the recommendations contained in the Finebel and Uniscan plans. France, Italy and Belgium were for various reasons opposed to joining an organization which would force them to extend large amounts of credits to the other members, and tended to rely upon "coordinated monetary policies" for restoring equilibrium in the balance of payments. The British and the Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, had full-employment commitments at home and were reluctant to coördinate their economic policies with governments which did not have similar commitments. They proposed, instead, large credit quotas for maintaining balance-of-payments equilibrium.

It became increasingly clear that agreement on the form and shape economic coöperation was to take in the O.E.E.C. area had to await reconciliation and compromise on a number of vitally important issues. Knowledge of these issues is, therefore, necessary for an understanding of the negotiations and the final compromise.

The Problem of Two Ideologies

It is perhaps fitting that, in a discussion of obstacles, the question of conflicting ideologies be taken up first, because it is there that tradition and deep-rooted beliefs make compromise difficult—often unnecessarily delaying agreement. From the beginning, economic coöperation was confronted with the problem of reconciling the champions of free enterprise—notably Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and West Germany—with the exponents of government planning—Britain, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The former were unwilling to surrender sovereignty if it meant tying their economies

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to nations which placed full employment and social benefits ahead of internal and external financial and monetary balance. The planned economies, on the other hand, were reluctant to substitute a balanced budget for full employment. As Harold Wilson, president of the British Board of Trade, pointed out, "Controls of exchanges and investment are permanent features of British Labor Government policy." [12]

A country faced with an adverse balance of payments can pursue only six courses: draw on gold reserves; obtain more credit; reduce its credit commitments to its debtors; devalue; deflate; and restrict imports. In the case of Britain, with her sterling-area commitments and her position in the international economy, it was held that there was little freedom of action in the first four of these. It was asserted that the emphasis was placed by the Continental Powers on forcing the debtors to get out of debt. If this was to be done, however, by reducing demand for imports through deflation rather than import restrictions, then Britain's aim of full employment would have to be scrapped. This was especially true, it was held, since, in a scheme that linked more than a dozen economies, the pace of deflation would be determined by those countries where such a policy was accepted as a matter of course. It was pointed out that Belgium, which had 15 per cent unemployment, was opposed to granting a debtor nation an automatic right to impose restrictions, the alternative being deflation.

It is not difficult to appreciate Britain's concern. If the balance-of-payments problem was to be solved in the O.E.E.C. area, then it was obvious that the countries concerned could not all pursue independent economic policies; for the action of one country was closely interrelated with the actions of all others and could cause serious repercussions among them. To bring about some significant degree of coördination among the various member nations required either the willingness of all members to pursue a balanced-budget economy, or government policies in regard to employment, investment, external trade, etc., pursued by the member nations with some degree of harmony. The first of these was the underlying philosophy of the Finebel nations; the second, of the Uniscan. The latter were afraid to subject their

[12] *New York Times*, January 30, 1950.

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more or less planned economies to the free-market forces of the former without the adoption of proper safeguards.

The Sterling-Area Problem

The British were equally concerned over the possible adverse effect the E.P.U. might have on the sterling-area system. Great Britain is the center of an intricate system of economic relationships, known as the sterling area. Although she is geographically part of Western Europe, she is, from an economic viewpoint, only partially linked to that area. In 1949, only 23 per cent of England's trade was with the O.E.E.C. countries; 41 per cent with the sterling area, and over 25 per cent with the Western Hemisphere.

It is likely that the extent to which a Western European country will think in terms of economic "links" with other countries in that area depends on her political and economic orientation with other areas. England was essentially turned outward. She was naturally concerned about the effects European coöperation would have on her dollar and gold earnings, as well as on her rôle of banker for the sterling area.

The British held that, in view of the world use of sterling, its multilateral facilities should be not only maintained, but increased. They assumed that any system which subjects sterling to a Western European mechanism functioning according to automatic principles would restrict the use of sterling, with the result of reducing world trade, and would ultimately produce a movement away from, rather than toward, world-wide convertibility. They explained this by pointing out that the existence of a European payments union would make countries reluctant to increase their sterling balances, since they would most likely prefer to clear through the Union, where the choice of currencies would give them access to gold and dollar earnings.

The sterling problem was by all standards a major issue, not only during the E.P.U. negotiations, but in the whole network of Anglo-American relations. In the words of one author one may perhaps find the clue to the depth of the conflict centered on sterling.

> Many influential people in Britain were desirous of enlarging the transferable account group to include most, if not all, of the countries of Western Europe, and perhaps the

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rest of the non-dollar world. In this way, sterling would have provided a means of multilateral settlements for all or most of the non-dollar countries of the world.[13]

The results of such a development would be quite clear: the emergence of three great trading blocs—the dollar, sterling, and ruble areas. American policy, both past and present, was fully committed to the ultimate restoration of complete multilateralism, at least outside of the ruble world. Before progress could be made toward a payments union, the British position had to be reconciled with that of the O.E.E.C. experts and the E.C.A.

The Problem of Management

The European nations, with the exception of Belgium, either were explicitly opposed to giving the E.P.U. management strong discretionary powers or were mute on the subject. The British again took a very determined stand in opposition to the E.C.A., which proposed that an eminent European statesman of cabinet rank be appointed to head the Council, and that he be given sufficient power to "expedite matters".[14] The E.C.A. position was consistent with a policy of achieving closer coördination among the European economies, while the position of the British was that the time was not ripe for centralized rulings on issues regarding which the members were committed by their electorates to pursue widely divergent policies. The British felt that a body which, in the last analysis, was neither responsible nor representative should not be given powers that might have the most serious social repercussions. It was further pointed out that England had no powers over the internal economic policies of the Dominions and could not speak for them.

It is remarkable that in spite of such seeming difficulties enough compromise could be achieved to result in agreement among the various European nations on these issues — and others still to be described — only a few months after the O.E.E.C. Council adjourned in disillusionment on February 2, 1950.

[13] R. F. Mikesell, *The Foreign Exchanges in the Postwar World* (New York, 1954), p. 251.

[14] *New York Times*, December 25, 1949.

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Credit Policy Problems

The rôle given to gold became a central issue during the negotiations, and here again England and the E.C.A. did not see eye to eye. But on this issue it was Belgium who assumed leadership in opposing the British position. The British, after accepting the E.P.U. in principle, favored *generous* credit margins and *minimum* gold obligations. Should a country's debts exceed a specified limit, they argued, trade discrimination rather than gold losses should be employed to turn the tide. The Belgians, on the other hand, had hopes for large gold earnings from the Union, and opposed the British " easy gold policy " on the ground that unrequited exports would have an inflationary effect on Belgium's economy. It should be borne in mind that Belgium was an important creditor vis-à-vis Western Europe during this period.

The British, it appears, were also opposed to a time limit on credit. They argued that time limits on the use of credit extended by the E.P.U. would prove impractical since such debts could be repaid only with an increase in exports, which most likely would not coincide with preëstablished time limits. The central issues in respect to the use of gold and credit were: the question whether the E.P.U. should be based on a regional gold standard designed to play an important rôle in maintaining balance-of-payments equilibrium, or whether gold should play a less important part; and the problem of unrequited exports causing inflation. On the first point the Americans and British differed; on the second, the British and Belgians. The British, as was shown above, were committed to a policy of full employment rather than monetary equilibrium and, consequently, wanted to assign to gold a fairly weak rôle. On the other hand, " the N.A.C. had made it clear that it regarded gold and dollar settlements as the test that will determine whether the system is directed towards or away from general convertibility of currencies." [15] It is probable that the E.C.A. did not take an equally strong position on gold, since it was reported that before this N.A.C. pronouncement, the United States and British positions on gold were " entirely compatible ". [16]

15 *New York Times,* January 30, 1950.

16 *The Times* (London), January 31, 1950.

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The Use of Quantitative Restrictions

Since the purpose of the European Payments Union was to remove the network of bilateralism in Western Europe, the position taken as to when restrictions might be imposed and when they might not was of primary importance. In the *Second Report,* the O.E.E.C. experts agreed that if a member were to experience an " unacceptable " drain on its gold or dollar reserves as a result of a serious debtor position vis-à-vis the other members, it should be authorized to impose " temporary, *multilaterally* applied restrictions affecting current payments ". This should be permitted while remedial measures were being applied. At the same time, if a creditor's quota to the E.P.U. was exhausted so that the E.P.U. had to settle fully in gold, the other members should be authorized to restrict imports from that member " to safeguard the resources of the E.P.U. " [17]

The experts apparently felt that a safety valve had to be provided. A similar provision had been included in the I.M.F. Agreement under the Scarce Currency Clause. It should be noted that the experts spoke of " multilaterally applied restrictions ". This concept was, at one point of the negotiations, rejected by the Norwegians, who proposed, with British support, that each member should have the right to discriminate against a specific country which was the cause of a loss of gold.

Another point that required compromise was at what time restrictions should begin. The British felt that these should start as soon as the first gold payment was made, whereas the E.C.A. and most European countries favored a time lapse between the first gold payment and the imposition of restrictions.

Compromise and Agreement

More than five months had elapsed from the time Hoffman submitted the E.C.A. proposal for a European Payments Union to the O.E.E.C. Council in December 1949 and England's acceptance of full membership in the E.P.U. in May 1950. Numerous plans had been submitted by some of the O.E.E.C. countries and the O.E.E.C. Secretariat during this period, but all of these proved unacceptable either to Britain, the

[17] O.E.E.C., *Second Report,* Chapter XXIII.

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E.C.A. or the O.E.E.C. Council, until rather unexpectedly in May 1950, England announced her intention to join the union on terms acceptable to everyone.

The negotiations fall logically into two periods: the first commencing with the E.C.A. proposal on December 16, 1949, and the second with an announcement by Sir Stafford Cripps on January 25, 1950 that Britain would be unable to join a union acceptable to the United States. Since dollar aid was still vitally important to the Western European countries at that time, official American views could, of course, not be ignored. During the first part of the negotiations the British accepted in principle the idea of a payments union based on complete convertibility of member currencies for current transactions in the O.E.E.C. area. During the second part of the negotiations, until final agreement was reached, they rejected this principle and argued that the pound sterling could not be reduced to equality with the less important currencies of the O.E.E.C. area. In other words, they rejected the concept of a payments union which would clear all member balances on current account freely and without restrictions.

This reversal in Britain's policy was largely the result of her opposition to demands made by the E.C.A. and certain Western European countries, notably France and Belgium, that the Union be given power to exert pressure on its members to coördinate their internal economic policies as a means of restoring balance-of-payments equilibrium.

The British had come forth with a plan shortly after the O.E.E.C. Council had asked its members to submit proposals for a payments union in December 1949. This plan contained, on a regional scale, certain aspects of the Keynes Plan for the International Monetary Fund. Its chief feature was the extension of large credit quotas to the debtor countries by the Union to cover all reasonable fluctuations and such contingencies as might arise. The plan proposed a currency pool in which accounts were to be kept for all members in a common unit of account. All balances not cleared through ordinary trade were to be cleared multilaterally through the Union. Gold was to play a minor rôle, coming into use only when the credit quotas were exhausted. It was not to be used for restoring balance-of-payments equilibrium, for

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which purpose discrimination against countries which did not take adequate measures for avoiding extreme surplus positions was to be used.

The British were strongly opposed to giving the Union any real power over the internal affairs of its members and, apparently unwilling to surrender any sovereignty whatsoever, insisted on unanimity in the vote of the Managing Board of the Union.

The chief principles contained in the British plan were held by the Danish and Dutch governments which in separate proposals made very similar recommendations.

The British proposal met with opposition in a number of countries and the Belgians insisted that they could not join a payments union which would force the creditor countries to grant the large credits asked by the British. They favored large gold payments for settling deficits and proposed a union which would have the power to coördinate the internal economic policies of its members as a means of avoiding excessive payments disequilibria. The various proposals submitted to the O.E.E.C. Council were studied by a committee of nine experts and representatives from the E.C.A. This committee was asked by the Council to draft a proposal for a European payments union which would be acceptable to the member nations as well as to the United States government.

The Committee of Nine drafted a proposal which gave the Union more power than the British were ready to grant. The Managing Board of the Union was given the power to take definite steps for discouraging the member nations from accumulating excessive creditor or debtor positions. Especially unsatisfactory to the British was the suggestion that the decisions of the Board were to be based on a vote of less than unanimity, since this would deprive the members of any possible veto power. The proposal of the Committee of Nine was backed by the O.E.E.C. Secretariat, which submitted its own plan for a payments union. The Secretariat plan emphasized the need for a relatively strong union which would be given the power to use certain pressures that could be brought to bear on members which in the opinion of the Managing Board had deviated too much from equilibrium.[18]

At this point of the negotiations two very definite factions

[18] *New York Times*, January 5, 1950.

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emerged. The E.C.A. and some of the Continental Powers stood for a relatively strong union and moderate credit arrangements tied to fairly substantial gold payments. Britain and the Scandinavian countries rejected the principle of a powerful union and insisted on large credit quotas.

In spite of these differences, the Committee on Intra-European Payments was instructed by the O.E.E.C. Council to work out the necessary machinery on the basis of which the principles embodied in the proposal of the Committee of Nine might be put into effect. Hoffman, whose optimism at this stage of the negotiations was premature, predicted complete success during the early months of 1950. He appeared before a House group and asked that a part of Marshall Plan aid should be freed to form the basis of a dollar pool for the impending Union.

Hoffman's faith in an early solution, reported in the press during the first part of January, had turned into disillusionment by the end of the month. A new memorandum by Sir Stafford Cripps on January 25, 1950 was responsible for the change. Cripps suggested that Britain might not be able to join a European payments union acceptable to the United States. He insisted on long-term credit, large quotas, discrimination when necessary, a weak managing board, and noninterference with the sterling area. He made it quite clear that Britain wanted a union which would neither affect her planned economy nor interfere with the sterling-area system. He was backed by Norway, Sweden and Denmark, which were interested either in retaining their controls and policies of discrimination, or in avoiding gold payments and a "hard currency" system.

The rather sudden reversal of Britain's attitude toward a payments union based on multilateral clearing and capable of dealing with problems of balance-of-payments disequilibrium was really no mystery at all. Britain had expected that the O.E.E.C. countries would be able to agree on a rather weak union which would serve as a reservoir for United States economic aid. She had rejected the idea of a strong union on two grounds. If she joined a union which did full clearing of member deficits and surpluses, it was unlikely, she feared, that any member nation would hold sterling against British deficits. This was a sensitive point, and touched upon the issue of sterling prestige. Equally unac-

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ceptable to her was a union which had sufficient power to interfere with her system of planned controls and her policy of full employment. The kind of union Cripps had proposed, however, found little support among the more powerful European nations and in American official quarters.

Considering the lack of agreement on the various issues described above, it is remarkable that the E.P.U. eventually emerged as a relatively sound and strong organization. Not all countries, of course, were equally concerned. Most of the O.E.E.C. countries looked at the issues as largely a fight between the United States and Britain, and felt that they were bound to benefit one way or another. Actually, there were three sides, not two: the United States, fighting hard to bring about as much "integration" as possible; Britain, defending her position as the world's largest trading center, and reluctant to join any European scheme for fear that such a move would reduce her power and relative independence in the world; and finally Belgium, which championed the cause of "free enterprise" and feared the impact of unbalanced budgets and full-employment plans in certain other countries on her economy. In the final analysis, therefore, two major obstacles had to be overcome before agreement could be found. Exponents of free enterprise and of planned economies had to be convinced that their policies at home would not be jeopardized by the Union. And Britain had to be convinced that the pound would not lose its world prestige and not be weakened by her joining the other European countries in a payments union.

The final compromise demonstrates how seemingly great obstacles in the field of international relations can be overcome through negotiations and reasonable concessions.[19] Britain's fears over possible threats to her sterling-area position were allayed with surprising ease. The E.C.A. came forth with the suggestion that sterling and E.P.U. units of account should be completely interchangeable. A surplus country which had claims on the E.P.U. could change such claims into sterling with British approval. Although it was unlikely that this would occur very frequently, this sugges-

[19] The author received much valuable information through personal discussions with Professor Robert Triffin of Yale University, who represented the E.C.A. during the negotiations, and from unpublished material covering the negotiations.

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tion put sterling on a par with E.P.U. units of account. This was, of course, recognized as window dressing but the United States gave Britain an additional incentive for accepting this proposal.

England had expressed fear of losing gold as a result of including in the E.P.U. clearings sterling balances held by members of the Union. Professor Triffin pointed out to the British that their current surplus in O.E.E.C. Europe was $600 million. In addition, holders of sterling were in surplus with the E.P.U., and even if they were in deficit with the E.P.U., it was most unlikely that it would be reflected in a loss of gold for Britain. The United States, however, in order to alleviate Britain's concern, undertook to cover any gold losses due to the convertibility of sterling balances held by a member at that time.

It is difficult to ascertain exactly what was behind England's acceptance of the E.C.A. suggestion in regard to the sterling issue but several factors stand out at present. After March, England shifted from a debtor to a creditor position. At the same time, the British view on the E.P.U. was not a unified one. The Bank of England held out for a strong currency system and other groups in England also favored the resumption of strong currency measures. The *Manchester Guardian,* on March 23, 1950, assumed that the real issue was " how far we [British] are prepared to let trade competition have more force than is left to it by all the devices of exchange control, quotas, and bilateral agreements; it is whether we are prepared to let comparative costs and prices play more than their present part in determining the distribution of Europe's trade." The *Guardian* felt that it was not all " fear of competition ". The complex problems of the sterling arrangements were recognized, but it was emphasized that England must not pursue a " soft currency " policy.

There were also other reasons for making the pound a harder currency. It was doubtful that European central bankers would be willing to entrust to England the task of holding foreign exchange reserves unless she proved her ability to stand up against gold. This was a good argument against a soft-currency policy.[20]

The second major objection of the British to the O.E.E.C.

[20] *New York Times,* March 24, 1950.

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proposals for a payments union centered on the question of power of the Managing Board of the Union. The British wanted a weak board whose decisions would depend on a unanimity vote, leaving to each nation the power of veto. This, it was seen, was rejected by the E.C.A. and a number of European nations, creating another deadlock in the negotiations. The solution to this problem was found during a series of conferences, with both the British and the E.C.A. emerging satisfied that they did not sacrifice basic principles. The compromise plan provided for a board whose decision would be taken on a majority vote, and this left the members without a veto power on the Board. National sovereignty was protected, however, by the provision that the Board's decisions could not be in conflict with O.E.E.C. Council policy, which was arrived at by the principle of unanimity. Although the likely effectiveness of this compromise was questioned in some quarters on the ground that the power of the Board was a mere matter of formality since each nation could apply the veto power through the Council, M. Robert Marjolin, the former Secretary General of the O.E.E.C., found this arrangement most successful after four years of operations.

> It is easier to set out the legal position than to attempt to explain how we succeed in reaching unanimous decisions in the Council on controversial points, for the remarkable fact is that we have never yet failed to reach such a decision in the Council, and to reach it at the time required.
>
> The truth is that the process of taking decisions in an international body of this kind is one which is compounded in various degrees of compromise, diplomacy, guile, and pure stubbornness. Decisions regarding the Union are rarely, if ever, taken by the Council except on the recommendation of the Managing Board of the Union. Recommendations by the Board, which are made by a majority of its members, are considered by at least two other bodies of the O.E.E.C. before they reach the level of the Council; these are the Joint Trade and Payments Committee, of which all countries are members, and the Executive Committee to which only a limited number of members belong. In both these bodies, therefore, there are possibilities for compromise and negotiation, and it is frequently the case that agreement is reached before the matter even reaches the Council . . . .
>
> I would add that, in my view, the rule of unanimity has

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> been a good and useful one. It is reasonable, as in the Managing Board, to permit an international body to take decisions of a purely minor or procedural character by majority vote if unanimity cannot be reached, but if an international organization is to be a corporate entity and eventually to have a corporate point of view, this can only be achieved by the process of discussion, argument and compromise which an endeavor to reach agreement unanimously necessarily involves.[21]

On May 19, 1950, the British submitted a compromise scheme, accepting the principles of full multilateral clearing of member balances under the E.P.U., as well as the E.C.A. proposal that sterling held by member nations should be freely convertible within the O.E.E.C. area. This was a major concession, and the battle for the E.P.U. seemed finally to have come to a successful conclusion.

The acceptance of full membership by the British was an important step forward because the time had now come for testing certain ideas, the failure of which would have been blamed on Britain's absence as a member of the scheme. Now weaknesses could be judged and, if possible, remedied in an atmosphere of common agreement on basic questions.[22]

Although the E.P.U. was now nearing general acceptance, one major obstacle still had to be overcome. The Belgians refused to agree to the British compromise scheme on the ground that gold payments were too low and credit quotas too large. They feared that the E.P.U. under these conditions would constitute a threat to Belgium's economy by exposing it to inflation.[23] The Belgians felt that since their foreign trade with the O.E.E.C. countries constituted a large proportion of their national income, a credit quota based on a formula such as proposed by the British would leave them wide open to inflation and thereby compromise their progress toward nondiscrimination and currency convertibility. "The Belgian Cabinet decided at first to reject the agreement, but the deadlock was broken by a series of concessions

21 Extracts from a letter from M. Robert Marjolin to the present writer, dated February 3, 1954, Paris.

22 *The Economist*, June 3, 1950, pp. 1231-1233; June 17, 1950, pp. 1343-1347, pp. 1400-1403; and A. O. Hirschman, "The European Payments Union", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, February 1951, pp. 51-53.

23 *The Economist*, June 24, 1950, pp. 1400-1403.

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to Belgium which considerably reduced its credit commitments."[24] One of the concessions granted Belgium was a provision that debtors would have to repay their outstanding debts to her within two years unless bilateral special agreements between Belgium and her debtors provided for other methods of repayment. This, of course, made the scheme less "soft", since E.P.U. credits would have to be used for this purpose—except when Belgium herself entered into special bilateral agreements concerning such debts. This provision was later extended to all member countries.

In addition, Belgium was assigned a smaller than normal quota, and in order to improve her position further, the E.C.A. agreed to grant her directly non-conditional dollar aid.

Britain, which had presented the most serious obstacles during the negotiations, actually had little to lose by joining the Union. The pound was fairly weak in 1950 and Britain's position as a world banker was seriously threatened. Since the proposed E.P.U. was based on dollar aid which benefited Britain as well as the other members of the O.E.E.C., and since, if necessary, restrictions could always be reinstated as an alternative to deflation under the provisions of the E.P.U. charter, Britain stood to lose little by joining the E.P.U. On the other hand, increasing the area of convertibility of the pound was likely to strengthen that currency as a prerequisite for an even wider sterling area in the future. It is difficult to imagine that British statesmen were not thinking in those terms, especially in the face of events since the signing of the E.P.U. Agreement.

The United States, ambitious in the beginning, finally accepted European coöperation on the best terms available. An analysis of the operations of the Union during its first four years of existence has indicated, however, that the final compromise resulted in a fairly effective and workable scheme.[25]

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[24] Hirschman, *loc. cit.*

[25] Based on the conclusions drawn by the author in his unpublished doctoral dissertation.

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BURMESE NEUTRALISM *

"BOTH of our nations adopted in their early years an independent foreign policy, designed to maintain the friendship of all nations and to avoid big-power alliances. You are aware that this policy of ours is not without its critics. Nor, for that matter, was yours." [1] Thus U Nu, Prime Minister of Burma, referred to the Burmese policy of neutralism in his address to the United States Senate during his first good-will tour of 1955. Through the nine years since independence, the idea of neutralism has developed under him as the basic plank in Burma's foreign policy. In practice it has had a positive side to it—as well as the idea of non-involvement—and it differs from Indian neutralism, as it does from the Swiss or the Yugoslavian. If it is sometimes misunderstood abroad, and irritating from so weak a nation, it is accepted at home in Burma and has been aggressively promoted by Burma's mild-spoken Buddhist leader.

It has not always been well received here. The rash of high-level statements on neutralism in this country during the summer of 1956 shows a confusion of policy on the subject, which seems to boil down to the degree of criticism the neutral countries should receive. When President Eisenhower spoke with eloquent understanding for the neutral nations at a press conference in June, he was quickly corrected by Secretary of State Dulles, and the two positions were "clarified" by Vice President Nixon. Herbert Hoover, at the Convention in the Cow Palace in San Francisco, topped the discussion with his blast at communism, socialism and neutralism as the three great "evil ideas".[2] Burma, being both socialist and neutralist, would qualify on two counts.

Burmese leaders have long believed what Eisenhower said

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1 *Congressional Record*, vol. 101, No. 111, p. 8188, June 30, 1955.

2 *New York Times*, August 22, 1956.

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—that if a truly neutral country is the victim of aggression, world public opinion is "outraged", whereas if the country is a member of a Power bloc, opinion is that "they asked for it."[3] The President's remarks were corrected the following day by Mr. Dulles, who said that neutralism may have been valid in the past but today could only be classed as "immoral" and "obsolete".[4] Mr. Nixon, attempting to draw a compromise between the two, explained that Americans, who once were neutral, are convinced from their own experience that there is "far more to be gained by standing together with free nations than by remaining aloof." The policy of friendly neutralism, he said in Manila, is a "fearful risk".[5]

Through the summer of 1956, as reports of Chinese Communist invasions of Burmese territory piled up, it appeared that Burma had risked too much. At the beginning of September it was estimated that some 5,200 Chinese troops had crossed the border and were destroying boundary posts and building permanent installations with every indication of having come to stay.[6] The Burmese government reacted with extreme caution, relying on diplomatic negotiations in Peking and Rangoon and moral pressures from friendly nations to bring about a settlement. News of the Chinese incursions came to the public only through reports in the independent English-language Rangoon *Nation,* and public opinion even within the country was only slightly aroused.

In the midst of the border negotiations the Burmese leadership shifted temporarily from U Nu, who has led Burma since independence, to U Ba Swe, but, rumors to the contrary, the change in leadership left Burma as firmly committed to neutralism as before. U Ba Swe, prime minister from June 1956 to March 1957, has been U Nu's close associate in the independence movement ever since undergraduate days and has worked with him on all government policies in the past nine years. As veteran president of the Burmese

[3] *New York Times,* June 7, 1956.

[4] *New York Times,* June 8, 1956.

[5] *New York Times,* July 5, 1956.

[6] *The Nation* (Rangoon), August 26, 1956.

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Socialist party at 43, " Kyagyi " (Big Tiger) Ba Swe is a man of great organizing ability and leadership and is outspoken (occasionally to the point of being " impossibly undiplomatic "). While he lived up to popular expectations as prime minister in his ruthless efforts to suppress the internal rebels—far less conciliatory than U Nu, he called for a " people's war " and a fight to the finish against the rebels—his foreign policy was no different from U Nu's. When U Nu resigned in U Ba Swe's favor it was to take up the task of purging and strengthening the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, the government coalition party, of which he is president. It was a difficult task and much needed, as activities of corrupt and powerful local leaders were undermining the party's popular support and threatened to destroy it. The fact that he returned to the prime ministership three months before the end of his original one year's leave of absence seems to mean that he was satisfied with his efforts and that the party had returned to reasonably good health.

U Ba Swe handled the Chinese problem exactly as U Nu could have been expected to, and in fact U Nu, in his private capacity as Burma's leading citizen, continued to head the Burmese negotiation efforts in Rangoon and in Peking, where he led a delegation of Shan and Kachin State officials for informal meetings with Chou En-lai. Publicly, despite newspaper pressures for full information, U Ba Swe confirmed only a fraction of the border crossings, the earliest ones in the Wild Wa State, and urged the public to exercise " restraint " while the negotiations were in progress. To reporters pressing him to admit the Chinese threat, he answered very much in the spirit of his predecessor:

> . . . it behooves a small country to lessen tension. Our foreign policy is based on the necessity to reduce tensions and avoid causes of tensions which are inherent in military alliances like SEATO. So long as we do these, and so long as we take adequate measures against internal enemies—fifth columnists and traitors—we have no reasons to fear external aggression.[7]

Two years earlier U Nu told the Commanding Officers of his Army:

[7] *The Nation* (Rangoon), September 5, 1956.

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> As you all know, our Union is a small country . . . with the internal situation unsettled, economy unstable and military strength poor. Therefore I cannot say that World War cannot break out by such a tiny mite of a country remaining neutral, but I can say this much, however small a country may be, its alignment with any power bloc will more or less help to increase world tensions.[8]

Actually, in the border conflict with China, Burma's risk of neutralism seems to have paid off. In November U Nu returned from Peking with a tentative agreement which, for the first time since the British occupation of Upper Burma in 1885, defined the Sino-Burmese border in its entirety. On November 10, U Nu announced that, except for the return of the Namwan Leased Territory, 100 square miles of land administered by the British and the Burmese since 1897, and a 500-square-mile tract of land along the Kachin State border, China accepted the border claimed by Burma from Tibet in the north to Laos in the southeast.[9] This agreement, the subject of further negotiations in December and April, is expected to be ratified at the next session of the Burmese Parliament. It is more generous on China's part than anyone would have been willing to predict—and an indication of the real possibilities that a policy of unswerving neutralism may hold.

In a discussion of neutralism it can certainly be asked at the outset what difference it makes in a world of Major Power cleavages that Burma chooses to be neutral. If Burma's 19 million stand apart from alliance, it is not the same as India's 350 million or Indonesia's 75 million. Small as she is, however, Burma has sources of strength which have given her considerable position in world affairs. Together with Thailand, Burma is the rice bowl of Asia with large surpluses for export, and she is potentially wealthy in petroleum, teak, tin and rubber. In the United Nations Burma's vote counts in the Cold War struggle, particularly on matters of colonialism and self-government. (And she will probably come to count even more with the addition of the twenty-one new member states, the majority of which must be classed either as "neutrals" or in the communist bloc.)

[8] U Nu, "War and Its Consequences", *Burma Weekly Bulletin*, vol. 3, No. 25, September 22, 1954, p. 188.

[9] *Burma Weekly Bulletin*, vol. 5, No. 32, November 15, 1956, pp. 255, 260.

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Perhaps in all, Burma's greatest asset is her leadership. U Nu has emerged, especially since Bandung, as one of the recognized spokesmen for Asia and his words have carried a growing influence. He has been classed by Guy Wint of the *Manchester Guardian* as one of the four great leaders of Asia, the peer of Mao in China and Nehru and Vinoba Bhave in India.[10] A deeply religious Buddhist whose political prominence has come basically unsought through his devotion to his country and its independence, he has been described as "a man of high ideals, great charm of manner, unquestioned integrity, and lacking in political ambition."[11] The Swiss theologian, Emil Brunner, has called U Nu the unique combination of statesman and Buddhist saint[12]—to which Burmese have added "astute politician". In the years he has held office his deep sincerity, integrity and warmth have captured the imagination and respect of the people of his country, and beyond.

U Ba Swe and the other top leaders are also exceptionally able and, like U Nu, are heavily burdened with responsibility. (It is one of the liabilities of Burma's recent colonial past that experienced and responsible politicians are so few in number.) Almost all of them are junior to Nu's 50 years and date their association with him from the University student strike of 1936.

The country which these men are leading has an unenviably vulnerable position, sitting geographically within the spheres of influence of the two contending Power blocs. To the north is the colossus of Communist China—and the ideological influence of the Soviet Union. To the east and west lie Thailand and Pakistan committed to the Western bloc. And in Burma's past is the British tradition which has shaped her economic, political and cultural structure. If she associates herself with the Western Powers, or remains neutral, Burma is a barrier to the southward spread of Communist domination. Overrun by China, the country would provide a southern outlet and access to the Indian Ocean for Communist power and doctrine. U Nu said on one occasion:

10 Guy Wint, *Spotlight on Asia* (Harmondsworth, 1955), p. 177.

11 J. S. Furnivall, quoted in Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *Left Wing in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1951), p. 253.

12 Emil Brunner, conversation in Tokyo, September 1954.

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> Take a glance at our geographic position. . . . We are hemmed in like a tender gourd among the cactus. We cannot move an inch. If we act irresponsibly . . . and thrust the Union of Burma into the arms of one bloc, the other bloc will not be contented to look on with folded arms. Oh, no! [13]

There have been times in the past when American observers questioned whether U Nu was not in fact "irresponsibly" thrusting Burma into Communist hands. The timing and tone of his statements and communiqués from Moscow in October and November 1955, just before the second Geneva Conference, sat badly with the West. "Soviet leaders", Welles Hangen wrote from Moscow in a special article for the *New York Times*, "could hardly have found a more perfect guest. From the moment of his arrival the Burmese leader has lavished praise on his hosts whom he likened to 'long lost relatives.'" [14] U Nu joined host Bulganin in a communiqué condemning the development of Power blocs in international affairs and urging neutralism as a positive way toward the establishment of international peace. Together they urged peaceful coexistence, anti-colonialism, disarmament and the seating of Communist China in the United Nations.[15] Shortly thereafter, in the first weeks of December, the Burmese government entertained Bulganin and Khrushchev as state guests with a widely publicized, full-scale triumphant good-will tour of the country.

Was this neutralism? There seemed reason to question it and to classify Burma as a "neutral" with fellow-traveler leanings. Almost immediately on the departure of the Russians, however, the Burmese government invited the man who could be taken to symbolize colonial rule, the last Colonial Governor of Burma, to visit the country as a state guest. In January the Prime Minister of Burma accompanied Sir Hubert and Lady Rance on a tour similar to the Russians', and the President of Burma, Dr. Ba U, conferred on Sir Hubert the title of *Agga Maha Thray Sithu* (Grand

[13] U Nu, "Korea", speech delivered in Parliament on September 5, 1950, reprinted in *From Peace to Stability*, Government of Burma Ministry of Information (Rangoon, 1951), p. 102.

[14] *New York Times*, November 4, 1955.

[15] *New York Times*, November 4, 1955 and October 23, 1955.

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Commander of the Order of the Union of Burma). At the same time Earl Mountbatten, last Viceroy of India, and Lord Ogmore, former Laborite Colonial Undersecretary, were decorated, Mountbatten receiving Burma's highest award, *Agga Maha Thiri Thu Dhamma* (Grand Commander of the Order of Thudhamma).[16] No such decorations had gone to the Russians.

In the crucial weeks of November and December 1956 the quality of Burmese neutralism met its severest test with Suez and Hungary. The attack by Israel, a country which the Burmese admire, and the intervention of the British, whom the Burmese greatly respect, brought immediate Burmese response. Along with the Soviet Union, the United States and all the independent states of Africa, Asia and the Americas, the Burmese delegation in the United Nations denounced the use of force and aggression and joined in demanding unconditional withdrawal. This is no more than could have been expected from a small, newly independent ex-colonial country. Burma backed up her position by offering troops, which she could scarcely spare from a still unstable home situation, to serve with the United Nations Emergency Force.

On the Hungarian issue the Burmese officials emerged as leading spokesmen for the Asian states, clearly independent of India's position and, for a period, opposed to it. On November 2, U Ba Swe, representing the Burmese Socialist party at the Asian Socialist Conference in Bombay, denounced the Russian intervention in Hungary in the strongest terms. For a great Power to station its troops in a small country against its consent, to shoot its people and impose a puppet régime, he said, is " the most despicable form of colonialism. " [17] At the Asian Prime Ministers' Conference in New Delhi the following week, U Ba Swe is reported to have been responsible for the resolution condemning the Russian actions in Hungary along with the aggression of the Western Powers in Suez.[18] Upon his return to Rangoon U Ba Swe

[16] *Burma Weekly Bulletin,* vol. 4, No. 41, January 12, 1956, p. 322. See also *Time* magazine, vol. LXVII, No. 4, January 23, 1956, p. 29.

[17] *New York Times,* November 7, 1956.

[18] *Burma Weekly Bulletin,* vol. 5, No. 32, November 15, 1956, pp. 254, 256.

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said that in making these charges he was speaking both as president of the Asian Socialist Conference and as prime minister of Burma.[19]

Later, in the United Nations itself, Burma stood firmly for the Cuban resolution which charged the Russians with genocide in Hungary. Ambassador Pe Kin said: "We do this not because we gain anything; not because it serves our self-interest; not because we want to embarrass any power. We do this to keep our self-respect. . . . There—speaking of Hungary—but for the Grace of God go we!"[20] Aggression, wherever it occurs, has regularly brought this response from Burma. But beyond making public protests and supporting United Nations action Burma has also regularly refused to commit herself.

If Western governments are disappointed that Burma refuses to ally herself with them, as Pakistan and Thailand have been willing to do, especially when she seems clearly well disposed in that direction, it is worth recalling that many reasons in the past have inclined Burma to neutralism. Neutrality is deep-seated among the Burmese people, for whom political and military ties have left a residue of misfortune. Despite the important contributions of British colonial rule—and the Burmese do not discount or undervalue these—there was more than a century when the important posts in government and in the professions went mainly to aliens, British and Indian. The Governor was British and a large portion of the administrative services were in British and Indian hands, with examinations for the top civil service posts long held exclusively in London.

Burma's economy, especially the agricultural land (much of it developed under British rule), tended to be in the hands of Indian Chettyar money-lenders. To this should be added the intense suffering of the Burmese under the Japanese occupation during the war. Aside from the severity of Japanese law enforcement, the shortage of imports created severe difficulties, which the Burmese people have not forgotten. (On the whole, though, the Japanese have been welcomed back into Burmese society and commerce.) The destruction

[19] *The Nation* (Rangoon), November 20, 1956.

[20] *Burma Weekly Bulletin*, vol. 5, No. 40, January 10, 1957, p. 325.

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that went with occupation and liberation in a war which was no concern of theirs left the Burmese fearful of alliances.

The Burmese have been separated, traditionally, even from the other peoples of Asia. Cut off from India, China and Thailand by rough mountainous terrain and dense jungles, they looked in the past to their capital—Pagan, Ava, Mandalay, and recently Rangoon—and were basically unaffected by the major political movements of their neighbors. The topography of the country and its isolation from trade routes tended to make the people look inward rather than outward and have made for "an extraordinarily self-complacent and parochial form of nationalism" in Burma.[21] Prior to the war no overland roads connected Burma with any of her neighbors and even today, except by sea and air, international travel is extremely difficult. While Rangoon is now on the direct air route from Hongkong to Calcutta and has become, since April 1956, the southern terminal of a Chinese Communist airline from Kunming, shipping still tends to by-pass Burma enroute from India to Singapore. Relatively few Burmese travel abroad, and when they do they seem to return. Burma has what must be an unusual record: of the hundreds of Burmese state scholars who have been sent abroad for specialized training since independence, by 1956, only two had failed to return.

The special geographical problem which makes neutralism particularly desirable for Burma is the 1,500-mile Sino-Burmese border. Since 1886 and the end of the last Anglo-Burmese War some 40,000 square miles of the Kachin, Shan and Wa States along the Chinese border have been under continuing dispute and have stood as a ready cause for trouble if Burma acted against the interests of a Chinese government on the mainland—any Chinese government. Not surprisingly, Burma was the first non-communist nation to recognize the Communist government in Peking. This was on December 18, 1948.

Maintaining a neutral position has required of the Burmese government almost as much explaining at home as abroad and U Nu has had to allay suspicions in both directions. Within the country, opposition groups, using "No

21 Thompson and Adloff, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

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Entangling Alliances" as their slogan, regularly criticize each new venture in the foreign field as a departure from neutralism. Even prior to independence, after the announcement of the Nu-Attlee Agreement in 1947, the country's Communist leaders denounced the government for allowing the peaceful withdrawal of the British and compensating investors for the property it took over. Thakin Soe took the Red Banner Communists into active revolt almost at once, followed in March 1948 by Than Tun and the White Banner Communists and in June by a Left-wing segment of the People's Volunteer Organization (veterans of the independence struggle). To this day there is a strong Left-wing opposition in Parliament—mainly MP's of the National Unity Front party—charging the government with committing Burma to the West.

At the same time the government has been under pressure from a conservative opposition which has charged it with being pro-communist. Often Left- and Right-wing oppositions combine to criticize the government for failure to stay independent in foreign affairs. When U Nu was defending government policies before Parliament in 1950, he talked about the crosscurrents of public opinion in which his government stood:

> Among our countrymen there are those who think as highly of the Anglo-Americans as our Russophiles think of Soviet Russia. In fact, although the Russophiles make themselves more conspicuous because they are more loud-mouthed I can assure them that the strength of the Anglo-Americans is of no mean order. They are quite strong, be it noted. Be it also noted that the admirers of the Anglo-Americans can be as effective as the Russophiles. In a situation like this, having good regard to the countries around us, and taking everything into consideration we, instead of acting irresponsibly, have decided on this policy of non-partisanship.[22]

If anything, U Nu understated the difficulties under which his government has had to operate. The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, while representative of Burmese nationalism of all political shades, was heavily weighted to the Left, with the Communist and Socialist parties originally the strongest elements. U Nu, himself a member of no

[22] U Nu, "Korea", *loc. cit.*

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party, had the extremely difficult job of trying to hold the splintering groups together. He believed—as he does today—that the government should be open to all of Burma's political parties and that the threat of civil war had to be met by conciliation of the extremists. It was in this spirit on May 25, 1948 that he offered the "Programme of Leftist Unity", the first statement of his government's policy.

This statement of fifteen points which he classed as the government's "maximum and minimum" objectives was his desperate and unsuccessful effort to bring the Communists back into the government. Two of the points dealt with foreign policy. Point one of the program, phrased to appeal to the far Left, set the objective of securing for Burma "political and economic relations with the Soviet Union and the democratic countries of Eastern Europe in the same manner as we are now having with Britain and the United States."[23] Point five guaranteed that the government would refuse any foreign aid which would "compromise the political, economic and strategic independence of Burma."[24] Point fifteen called for the formation of a study group to propagate Marxist doctrine.

When U Nu announced this program, the British Labor government was prepared to write Burma off to the Communists. It was probably the one instance in which U Nu was altogether too conciliatory. Had the Communists accepted his offer, very probably they would have gained control of the government. As it was, they forced the government to fight them.

Though the fifteenth point, referring to the Marxist study group, was forgotten as quickly as possible, the Burmese government has stood by the foreign policy pledges of its program. Relations with the United States and Britain have remained excellent. The Burmese hold the British in the highest esteem and even strong nationalists, like President Dr. (Sir) Ba U, take pride in their British ranks and titles. With the communist bloc Burma has worked hard to develop political relations and trade, even though with China this

[23] U Nu, "The Programme", statement made on May 25, 1948, reprinted in *Towards Peace and Democracy*, Government of Burma Ministry of Information (Rangoon, 1949), p. 92.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

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has not been particularly to her benefit. Major trade agreements with the communist countries have developed only since 1955 but already compete with the established trade with India, Indonesia and the West.

On her pledge to avoid the entanglements of foreign aid Burma has compromised only twice. Plunged immediately into civil war, the government could not have survived without arms aid and in the 1948-50 period it received, without strings of any kind, essential shipments from Britain and India. In 1949 U Nu publicly acknowledged this:

> Frankly speaking, we have been now able to equip our fighting forces with the necessary arms through the good offices of the British Labour Government which has very kindly met our requirements in spite of their own urgent defense problem. For this friendly act, I wish to place on record the Union Government's heart-felt gratitude to the British Labour Government.[25]

The heavy costs of putting down the insurgents and the loss of income from rice and teak exports, which were sharply cut down by the warfare, left Burma in desperate financial need. By 1950 only foreign economic aid could save the Burmese economy and give the country's leaders a chance to start their program of industrial development and economic reform. It is probably a major reason for the government's success that even with the insurgents still in the outskirts of the capital, these men had the courage to go ahead with their program, giving the people real evidence of what would be done. For this U Nu asked assistance from Britain and the United States. Britain, through the Colombo nations of Asia, made available on March 24, 1950 a loan of £6 million, and the United States in September agreed to provide continuing Point Four aid through the Economic Cooperation Administration.

On July 19, 1950 at a public meeting on Martyrs' Day (the anniversary of the assassination of Burma's national hero, Aung San) U Nu defended his acceptance of Western aid. "The reason we have sought foreign aid is that we are badly in need of it." Burma, he said, will accept aid from "any country without discrimination."

[25] U Nu, "Review of the General Situation", speech delivered in Parliament, February 1, 1949, reprinted in *Towards Peace and Democracy*, p. 177.

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> . . . it is not the path of wisdom to consider the source from which the aid is forthcoming, whether it be from Russia or Britain or the United States. Such considerations based on the names of the aid-giving countries are not conducive to the country's welfare. This is what I call the method of "longing for the aunt at the expense of one's mother." [26]

In the same year Burma had to decide what neutralism meant when it came to aggression in Korea. In response to the United Nations request, Burma went on record supporting collective action. When the Prime Minister came before Parliament to ask his country's whole-hearted support for the UN decision, he pitched his plea to the precedent the UN was setting on behalf of a small nation in distress. "If aggression occurs elsewhere, there too the United Nations must step in. They simply can't get out of this responsibility. This is the great hope, the only hope for small nations like us." [27]

Simultaneously with giving support, the government of Burma tried to protect its neutralism in its answer to the United Nations appeal. "The Government of the Union of Burma desire to make it clear that their support of the Security Council's decision in regard to Korea does not in any way affect their existing foreign policy which is to maintain friendly relations with all countries." [28] Later in the year, though Burma felt unable to spare men for the fighting, she sent 400 tons of rice to Korea, valued at $49,943. Offsetting what was beginning to be a record of pro-Western decisions, Burma protested the crossing of the 38th Parallel, voted with the Soviet bloc in the United Nations to oppose the aggressor label for Communist China and spoke repeatedly in favor of seating Peking.

When, three years later, Burma appealed to the UN for assistance, U Nu felt that his country's case received shabby treatment. For some time it had been beyond the capacity of the Burmese government to deal with the situation of the alien Kuomintang troops, which held sway, in the northeastern part of the country. In 1950 General Li Mi, a Chinese Nationalist, retreated into Burma from Yunnan with an

[26] U Nu, "Our Policy and Programme", Martyrs' Day Address delivered July 19, 1950, reprinted in *From Peace to Stability*, p. 91.

[27] U Nu, "Korea", *loc. cit.*, p. 100. [28] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

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army estimated at 1,500. This army, which had presumably intended to re-invade the mainland, established itself more or less permanently and refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Burmese government. Its presence became a matter of grave concern because, in addition to being an invasion of Burmese soil, it provided the Chinese Communists a ready-made excuse to cross the border.

Diplomatic negotiations from 1950 to 1953 through the good offices of the United States were complicated by the lack of recognition between Formosa and Burma and brought no relief. To the contrary, Li Mi's forces increased to an estimated 12,000, well equipped with modern automatic weapons, some of them manufactured after World War II. Concern with the problem grew throughout Burma, and the obvious failure of the negotiations, combined with the widely held conviction that the Kuomintang forces were being armed with at least the tacit approval of the United States, forced the government to bring the subject before the United Nations in March 1953.

Almost concurrently the Burmese government requested the United States to cancel its aid program, which in a three-year period had poured into Burma $20 million and some two hundred specialists. In doing this it was acting from the pressure of public opinion, from moral logic, and from pride. It was almost impossible to separate the KMT problem and American aid, especially as charges were circulated (later disproved) that the bodies of Americans had been found after a raid on a KMT position. When a problem involved a possible threat from China—as the KMT did—both the government and the people took high alarm. (In 1955, one Burmese, who insisted he was not making charges, asked why it was that the Americans had chosen the Kengtung area where the KMT was strongest as their first area of anti-malaria control.)

The government made it clear, however, that it did not accuse the United States government. U Ba Swe, then minister of defense, said he blamed the "China Lobby" in the United States, and this, he said, "is not a State Department." [29] Sao Hkun Hkio, foreign minister, on making the formal request to end the program, said that the assistance

[29] *New York Times*, March 12, 1953.

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had been greatly appreciated and that no reflection was intended on the existing programs or activities of the ECA personnel.[30] Further, though the agreement was officially canceled, the technical aid, which was vitally needed, was extended into 1954 through a terminal agreement to ensure that neither the United States nor Burma suffered financial loss. Since 1954 non-governmental employees of the ECA have continued their services to Burma under direct contract to the Burmese government. Also, in September 1953, as a small return of United States generosity, the Burmese government presented the American Red Cross with $10,000 for New England tornado relief.

The implication is clear. Immediately after the aid program was canceled the *New Times of Burma* said: "Burma will welcome American assistance in the future, but . . . there should be no mixing up of their aid programmes with plans now on the drawing boards of the Formosa Government." [31]

The United Nations appeal and the canceling of United States aid served a good purpose. Through the good offices of Thailand and a shocked United States, the Chinese Nationalist government and the KMT forces agreed to a voluntary repatriation of the Chinese troops to Formosa, and by the middle of 1955, the 12,000 troops were reduced to 3,000. Today these troops are estimated at less than 1,500 and maintain themselves precariously on the Burma-Laos border. The experience with the United Nations, however, left bad feelings with Burma. Where the UN had acted immediately on behalf of Korea, it would do no more in this case than to urge its members to withhold aid from the "outlaw forces" in Burma. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, U Nu said of the UN:

> We found the United Nations, which acted with such speed and energy in Korea, unwilling even to bring in a verdict of "aggression" against the Kuomintang regime. It seemed to us that the United Nations had more than one yard-stick for measuring aggression. In our view aggression is aggression regardless of the source from which it comes.[32]

30 *New York Times,* March 28, 1953.

31 *The New Times of Burma,* March 31, 1953. Quoted in Tibor Mende, *Southeast Asia Between Two Worlds* (New York, 1955), p. 154.

32 *Burma Weekly Bulletin,* vol. 4, No. 6, May 12, 1955, p. 37.

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Despite this disappointment, or perhaps because of it, Burma's commitment to neutrality continued strong. In September 1954 U Nu took proud count of its results. Burma had good relations with almost every country—Nationalist China would be the clearest exception — and was playing her "little part in the establishment of friendly relations between countries and in the promotion of mutually advantageous activities." [33] In the case of Laos and Cambodia, Burma was one of the first to grant recognition, on August 11, 1954, to indicate support for the independence of former colonies (and also perhaps to set a limit on communist expansion). At this time U Nu said:

> To tell the truth, we have our own human weaknesses, our own fears, our desire to swim with the tide and our anxiety for self-preservation. . . . But the greatest consideration that has influenced me and my colleagues is our unshakable belief that war, instead of solving the problems faced by the peoples of any region: East, West or neutral, will only complicate matters.[34]

At the Bandung Conference of Asian and African Nations in April 1955 U Nu reached a world audience with his message of Burmese neutralism and had the chance to act the rôle of mediator at which he excels. U Nu arranged for interviews with Chou En-lai, whose invitation Burma sponsored, and arranged many of the meetings between Chou and non-Communist delegates who were seeing him for the first time. In his formal address he said that Burma put her reliance upon the five principles of international relations first advanced by Chou and Nehru a year earlier—respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state, equality and mutual benefit. "The sum of these principles adds up to our concept of coexistence." [35] To backstop these principles, Burma, he said, would continue to reject military alliances and would rely on the UN, despite recent disappointments, for protection from aggressors. (Membership in the UN and its specialized agencies has claimed from Burma

[33] U Nu, "War and Its Consequences", *loc. cit.*

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] *Burma Weekly Bulletin*, vol. 4, No. 6, May 12, 1955, p. 36.

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some of her finest representatives, men ill-spared from home, and in 1955 and 1956 Burma took on the added responsibility of membership on the Trusteeship Council.)

In all of Burma's international agreements provisions have been made to protect her neutrality. Even in the complex procedure of breaking from the British Empire and Commonwealth, the agreements binding upon Burma were carefully limited. For example, the Freeman-Let Ya Annex to the Nu-Attlee Agreement of 1947, which set up a British military mission in Burma and gave the United Kingdom the exclusive right to equip the Burmese armed forces, guaranteed Burma's rights to cancel on a year's notice.[36] In 1953 Burma exercised this right, apparently in the interests of greater flexibility and a more clearly independent position. This followed closely on the visit to Yugoslavia of U Kyaw Nyein, minister of industries and sometime acting foreign minister, and the return visit of a military mission from Yugoslavia to Burma.

Burma's economic commitments have likewise all been carefully hedged with guarantees of neutrality, either within the agreements or in the notes annexed to them. For example, at the start of the Technical Cooperation Agreement with the United States, Foreign Minister Sao Hkun Hkio wrote a formal reminder to Ambassador Key that the United States should expect nothing for its aid, that Burma did not make political alliances and that her policy was to stay on good terms with all countries, and especially with those " which seek our friendship and cooperation. " [37] Throughout the span of the American aid program the government let it be known repeatedly that it stood ready to accept aid from China or Russia on the same terms.

The American aid program remains unique in Burma's foreign dealings. In 1954 the Burmese government announced it would no longer accept free gifts from foreign governments and that it intended to carry out its economic development programs either through repayable loans or

[36] Department of Information and Broadcasting, *Burma's Fight for Freedom: Independence Commemoration* (Rangoon, 1940). See also British CMD 7240 for Nu-Attlee Agreement and Annexes.

[37] *Burma,* vol. 1, No. 2, January 1951, Government of Burma Ministry of Information, p. 90.

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through the barter of Burmese produce. The recent promised "gifts" from the Soviet Union of a Technological Institute, hospital, theatre and "cultural and sports ensemble" for Rangoon (including stadium, exhibition hall and hotel), which the Burmese government has accepted, are to be repaid with "appropriate quantities of rice as a gift to the people of the Soviet Union." [38]

This pattern of reciprocal gifts has been much followed in the past two years. With huge rice surpluses and little else, Burma tried unsuccessfully to insist upon a price for her rice above the world level, and was left with a rapidly growing foreign trade deficit. In desperation, between November 1954 and December 1955, Burma entered into barter agreements with ten countries (eight in the communist bloc and Yugoslavia and Israel) to exchange Burmese rice for industrial goods and succeeded in eliminating her rice surplus.

Today, though, as the world demand for rice is increasing, and Burma has become more reasonable about her rice prices, she is faced with a three-quarter-million-ton shortage to meet her commitments for cash sales in 1956-57. And even more humiliating, Burmese rice acquired by barter has been sold by China to Indonesia under the Burmese price. The industrial goods which Burma received in exchange, too, have fallen far short of expectation both in quantity and quality, and it looks as though the advantages have gone to the foreign countries, not Burma. Burma estimates her loss between 10 and 30 per cent on all barter agreements to date.

The most unfortunate feature of the barter arrangement is that Burma may become economically dependent on the communist countries. The barter agreements all run for between three and five years and, as industrial machinery comes in, the communist countries will be the logical suppliers for spare parts and replacement items for an even longer time.

Into this situation the United States, in 1956, returned to offer technical assistance, this time in ways which permitted Burma to pay for the services. Early in 1956 the United States purchased 10,000 tons of Burmese rice, which were used along with American surplus rice for famine relief in

[38] *The Nation* (Rangoon), April 2, 1956. See also *ibid.*, January 8 and March 2, 1957.

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East Pakistan. The $1 million accruing to Burma has become a fund for technical assistance from the United States. The United States has also sold $20 million worth of surplus agricultural commodities to Burma and is accepting Burmese currency in payment—also to be used for American projects in Burma. Most recently, the United States has granted Burma a 40-year $25 million loan, which will help to offset the Communists' advantage. Even so, these programs are dwarfed by the Burmo-Soviet agreement whereby Russia is taking 400,000 tons of Burmese rice annually for four years in exchange for industrial goods.[39]

The closest ties which Burma has made with any countries to date have been treaties of friendship. These treaties carry no commitment to joint action but merely guarantee that the two nations will live in peace, promoting mutually advantageous programs. Disputes are to be settled through diplomatic channels or, failing this, the adoption of "any other procedures in accordance with the rules and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."[40] So far Burma has concluded four such treaties—with Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Thailand—and would like to make as many others as possible.

Burma has given a particularly warm reception to the many leaders of foreign Powers who have passed through Rangoon on recent tours. An exception was Vice President Nixon who arrived in 1953 at the height of the Kuomintang troubles and was met with cold formality and anti-American demonstrations. Undoubtedly the greatest warmth has been reserved for visitors from countries which share Burma's international outlook. Nehru has been a regular and a popular visitor. Khrushchev and Bulganin, publicly espousing neutralism, anti-colonialism and disarmament, received flattering attention.

Surprisingly, the most elaborate demonstration of admiration and welcome was given to Marshal Tito, who visited Rangoon in January 1955. Tito was the first European head of state to come to Burma and the reception for him was overwhelming. The Rangoon newspapers carried stories,

39 *The Nation* (Rangoon), April 2, 1956.

40 *Burma*, vol. 3, No. 1, October 1952, p. 52.

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exaggerated at the very least, that Yugoslav arms had saved the Burmese government at the height of the insurrection, and during his stay, which coincided with Burmese Independence Day, the main streets of Rangoon were decorated with signs of "Long Live President Tito! Long Live President Ba U!" The government took Tito on a tour of the country and presented him with Burma's highest decoration and an honorary LL.D. from the University of Rangoon.

The Burmese had a special tie with Tito because he had successfully withdrawn his country from the Soviet sphere without giving up its independent socialist orientation. Out of this visit came the exchange which has become the standard operating procedure for Burmese foreign programs. Burma accepted Yugoslavia's offer to equip a brigade in the Burmese Army and made an equivalent gift of rice in return.[41] (On U Nu's return visit in June he was awarded an honorary LL.D. from the University of Belgrade—the only university degree he now holds, as he returned his other degrees to the University of Rangoon after independence and has refused other honors.)

Though less spectacular, the relations between Burma and Israel have also been close. Burma, which did not approve the establishment of Israel, has developed a deep regard for her because of Israel's independence from Power blocs and her bold socialist experimentation. Out of respect for Arab sensitivities (Nasser has been a welcomed guest in Rangoon), Burma did not insist on inviting Israel to Bandung. However, at Bandung, U Nu fought hard against the inclusion of support for the "Arab peoples of Palestine", yielding to the majority only to ensure unanimity in the resolutions. Later, when Prime Minister Nu was planning his first goodwill tour, he by-passed Egypt when it was found that by visiting Israel first he would make himself *persona non grata* with the Egyptians. (U Nu diplomatically announced that his time had run short and that his next trip to the Middle East would include a visit to Prime Minister Nasser.) And even as Burma criticized Israel for her attack on Egypt, the announcement was made in Rangoon of a Burma-Israel "joint venture" in which wheat for Israel would be grown in the Shan States of Burma.

[41] *Burma Weekly Bulletin*, vol. 3, No. 40, January 12, 1955, p. 310.

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U Nu's good-will tours to foreign capitals, which started with a visit to Peking in December 1954, were undertaken as soon as conditions in Burma permitted him to travel. At each stop-over in the 1954 and 1955 tours he tried to establish two points—Burma's friendship and support for the country he was visiting and her conviction that current international problems could be resolved without war. At the capitals for East and West U Nu boldly and politely commended one to the other. In Peking, for example, speaking before an audience of more than a thousand, which included Chou En-lai, Chu Teh and Liu Shao-chi, U Nu said:

> If I am to speak my own mind I feel that most of the tensions in East Asia will be relaxed if an understanding can be brought about between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America. And I also feel that it will not be very difficult to bring about this understanding as it is usually supposed. . . .
>
> Speaking as a people, the Americans are generous and brave. In the sphere of scientific knowledge, the Americans have developed to such an extent that they can make this world a happy and prosperous place to live in. The Chinese people are also very generous and brave. . . . Therefore, I want to take this opportunity of assuring my esteemed friend Prime Minister Chou En-lai that I will exert my utmost to bring about an understanding between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America.[42]

Six months later, speaking in New York, U Nu asked Americans to take a fresh look at the Chinese Communists. (In Congress he had been more circumspect.)

> When I was in China six months ago, I spoke to the Chinese of your good traits. Now that I am in the United States, let me speak to you of some of the good traits of the Chinese.
>
> While I was in China, I met Mao Tse-tung and all officials of the new Government down to a certain level. I came back impressed with their honesty, sincerity and dedication to the cause and welfare of their people and their good will towards the American people. . . . I came back to Burma convinced that the people and the present Government of China need and want peace. . . .[43]

[42] *Burma Weekly Bulletin,* vol. 3, No. 37, December 15, 1954, pp. 284-288. See also *An Asian Speaks,* Embassy of Burma (Washington, D. C., 1955), p. 50.

[43] *An Asian Speaks,* p. 23.

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Lest his American audience write off his message as naïve, U Nu reminded his listeners of what Burma staked on this optimistic outlook.

> You are far away from China; we are next door. Therefore we have much more to lose in the event that I am wrong in my estimate of Chinese sentiment. It is in this full realization that I say I sincerely believe that the present Government of China truly wants peace.[44]

When foreign governmental representatives have visited Rangoon U Nu has regularly taken the opportunity for joint statements of coöperation and peaceful relations. This has often come easier with Communist than with non-Communist visitors, for officially at least the communist countries are not members of regional alliances. As a result, the press communiqués put out by U Nu with Bulganin and with Chou En-lai denouncing armaments, Power blocs and atomic energy for military purposes, and supporting the admission of Communist China into the United Nations, are much more outspoken and specific than the rather vague statements with the United States, or even Thailand, on world peace, justice and freedom.

It would certainly seem, though, that the statements of the Burmese with the Communists, while sincere on the part of the Burmese, have come not in response to pressures by the Communists but as a restatement of long-held views of the Burmese.

It is probably to be expected that U Nu's wide-roving international gestures have left him open to misrepresentation. He can be accused of spreading himself too thin in too many directions. His government appears to support Peking, Moscow, Washington, London against the interests of the opponents of each. Burmese neutralism seems to lean left and then right, to "swim with the tide", as he himself put it, out of an anxiety to preserve Burmese independence. It is open to charges of sheer opportunism. But over the nine years since independence, neutralism is a principle that has been consistently applied. And when it is looked at in the light of the special problems Burma has had to face as a small, newly independent country in a vulnerable location, it stands up, certainly, as a reasonable and sound policy.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

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Good relations and trade with Russia and China exist along with lasting ties to the West. India and Pakistan, bitterly divided over Kashmir and the rôle of regional defense organizations, are equally bound to Burma by treaties of friendship and growing economic ties. Japan, Burma's recent invader, is collaborating in the rebuilding of Burma's economy and the development of her resources. Thailand, Burma's traditional enemy and today a SEATO member, is currently classed as one of Burma's closest associates, bound by a treaty of friendship, and it is one of U Nu's proud claims that the two historic enemies of Southeast Asia can now count on one another for their mutual betterment.

Misgivings about Burma in this country grow out of her refusal to join SEATO—though Burma's own struggle with Communist insurgents has been vigorous and successful—and the utter independence of the Burmese government from the United States position on such problems as relations with Communist China. Burma's relations with China and Russia have been disturbingly cordial, but recent events have again shown her willing to stand out against Communist aggression. As U Nu has often pointed out, the Communists form one of the two blocs which Burma will not join. The 1954 " Joint Statement " of the Socialist parties of Indonesia, Burma and India (and the Socialist party is the backbone of the government coalition) rejected both capitalism and " Cominform Communism ", saying that the Cominformists " are essentially merely the vanguards, observers and informers of Soviet Russia. " [45]

Committed to neutralism, Burma has attained today a stature in world affairs probably considerably greater than if she were allied either to East or to West. To date it can be said that neutralism has served Burma well, as in her dispute with China, and that it is enabling her to be effective as a leader among the uncommitted nations of Africa and Asia.

JOHN SEABURY THOMSON

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45 Foreign Affairs Committee of the Burma Socialist Party, *Socialism* (Rangoon, 1954), p. i.

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REVIEWS

The Lion and the Throne: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634). By CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN. Boston and Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, 1957.—xiii, 652 pp. $6.00.

Edward Coke lived eighty-two years under five monarchs and during many stirring events. Young King Edward died when he was a baby and Bloody Mary while he was a boy. He went up to Cambridge and then to the Inns of Court during the reign of Elizabeth and served the Queen as solicitor general, attorney general and Speaker of the Commons. Scotch James made him Chief Justice but the King and his judge, the Throne and the lion, soon began to battle over royal prerogative and the laws of England. Dismissed from office Coke carried on the warfare into the reign of Charles I and had a share in wresting the Petition of Right from that king. Coke's writings are revered on both sides of the Atlantic and he himself has become a legend. Yet his biography has seldom been attempted. The curious contrasts provided by the story of his aggressive royal service in one reign, and his pugnacious defense of popular rights in two others, make rapid analysis of his achievements difficult. He left no mass of personalia which quickly illumines his odd great character. His life and work centered in the law, itself a subject not readily susceptible to easy treatment.

Mrs. Bowen claims to have discovered no new material. Nor does she profess any novel theory about the hard prosecutor and the just judge. She attempts, she says, only to persuade the reading public to interest in the "great lord Coke" by evocation of a past age and the description of an extraordinary man's activities in it. In this modestly stated but by no means simple ambition she has entirely succeeded. Her story leads the reader with deceptive and beguiling ease through a maze of historical events and places and the crowd of personages involved in its complexities. She has accumulated and assimilated a vast number of details from a mass of printed material much of which is formidable in character. She has scrupulously documented her statements and her quotations. She has shrunk from no significant fact nor put forward any imaginary reconstructions based on false assumptions nor committed any of those other crimes for which the academic scribbler so often justly accuses the best-selling author. Readers seeking relaxation only should be grate-

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ful. Would-be authors of research monographs or biographies focused upon a single issue or upon a complex of issues and based upon massive scholarly labors may well pause and learn something from Mrs. Bowen's book about the arts of exposition and of narrative. She deserves as large an audience as her book will reach and she merits the praise of scholars for her achievement.

This book is designed to be read by persons unfamiliar with the period and the subject. Though Coke is famous his achievements have never been well known except in the most general of terms. Mrs. Bowen has therefore settled down to set the scene for his life. She had studied to good effect the maps she says hang on her walls. She has looked wherever possible at places where Coke lived and worked. She has sought descriptions of persons, emblems—the Pegasus that swung over Inner Temple—portraits and sculptured remains. She evokes the colors, sounds and pageants of the period. This technique is not a new discovery but it is often neglected. The place, the face, the big-boned handsomeness of Coke, for example, the clatter of Westminster Hall—these add immensely to our acceptance of the person and the times.

Nor does Mrs. Bowen allow characters to appear unexplained. A line, a phrase or a sentence identifies the persons that appear. Ceremony and procedure are described, the matter and form of education, as well as the habits of the lawyers and the Parliament men. Technical terms are briefly translated. The language of the period creeps in by phrase or sentence and seldom in vast documentary excerpts imposed upon the page. She is always aware of what will interest and what will confuse. She continually seeks to make a way plain through a strange country and a past time. This is a story, and regrets that description and color push out more detailed analysis and estimates of political intrigues are out of place in consideration of the book and its purpose.

The opening pages set the scene in London with its "well conditioned" River Thames, its steepleless St. Paul's, its lively parliament. Then Coke's youth, education and early life are described. The drama of his career under Elizabeth is emphasized. Perhaps the best parts of this half are those about the life of the student of law and about the courts he frequented. It would be hard to find any better account to put into the hands of the student. Many professionals do not give such easy evidence of knowing as much about the procedure. On the other hand, the growing struggle with the Stuarts at first over matters of law, but then carried on in the House of Commons, is also told with great spirit and accuracy. The claim to control

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even parliament when "against common right and reason" in Bonham's case was to have far-reaching effects in America. Mrs. Bowen's account of the case is simple, just and exciting. So is her story of the Petition of Right. She concludes with a brief chapter upon Coke's writings, selecting the phrase, the parable, the comment with unerring skill. Indeed she may persuade some to read these now neglected books.

Every specialist will want more on some aspect of Coke's manifold achievements and less on some part of the Elizabethan or Jacobean scene with which they may be familiar. But as a whole it would be hard to find a better narrative of Coke's long career or a more readily understandable social history for the period of which his achievement is so important a part. "I'll begin with a noble record", said Coke in speaking to the last Parliament he attended upon the liberties of Englishmen, "it cheers me to think of it, it is worthy to be written in letters of gold", and so he recited the old famous phrases of the charter and the law along with the other leaders—Seldon, Digges and Rudyard. The final history of parliaments and laws is not written but it is good sometimes to step back into the story of these days recalled gratefully by so many generations of English-speaking peoples.

CAROLINE ROBBINS

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787. By ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 1956.—x, 245 pp. $4.00.

A revision of three lectures given in 1952, this book and the author's previously published lectures *How Human Rights Got into the Constitution* (Boston, 1952) should be taken together as a unified treatment of the provisions in the original Constitution (as distinguished from the first ten Amendments, commonly called the Bill of Rights) which are designed to protect "human rights" (as distinguished from "political rights" and "property rights"). The earlier volume dealt with habeas corpus (Art. I, sec. 9). The present discusses freedom of debate in Congress (Art. I, sec. 6), not to be confused with the wider freedom of speech accorded by the First Amendment; the prohibition of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws (Art. I, secs. 9 and 10); and a third topic, freedom of movement, which is not expressly guaranteed in the Constitution.

In connection with the last-named topic, a judicious appraisal of passport and visa policy is given. It is tragic that the benefits to the public from travel by Americans should be curtailed "just

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when the ocean is more easily and rapidly crossed than ever before and at the very time when the lives of all Americans are much more seriously affected than in the past by what is done and thought outside our frontiers." Moreover, citizens should not be prevented from doing as they please so long as they violate no law enacted by Congress. "Yet the passport policy of the State Department is based on the diametrically opposite principle that the citizen is not to decide whether his journey is desirable —instead, officials will make the decision for him" (pp. 196,197). With respect to visas for foreign visitors, Professor Chafee makes three excellent suggestions. (1) The requirements imposed for admitting permanent immigrants should not apply to temporary visitors. For the latter the sole test might well be whether the applicant is coming to the United States for the purpose of engaging in activities which will endanger the public safety. "Proof that he has arranged to give lectures or attend conferences here, under the sponsorship of a reputable university or scientific organization, etc., ought to go a long way to satisfy this test." (2) Visas should be granted by a single office in Washington. "Centralized handling might develop a consistent policy toward eminent foreign visitors instead of the present scattered decisions by scores of consuls. . . . Sometimes they receive a leading scholar in his own country in the way a policeman would question a criminal." (3) Long delays in deciding on applications cause more harm and ill-will abroad than actual rejections. Though the first two proposals (which would require legislation by Congress) would also contribute to eliminating delay, the procedure could to a considerable extent be expedited administratively, without new law. (pp. 200-204)

The two earlier topics evoke a fascinating pageant from English history and depict the struggle of the people's representatives against the arbitrary power of the Crown. Peter Wentworth, King James tearing out the page of the Commons *Journal* which asserted the privileges of the House, the imprisonment of the five knights and the Petition of Right, the speaker Sir John Finch being held in his chair by two members after the king had ordered an adjournment, Charles I entering the house in search of the five members whom he wished to arrest, and other colorful events and characters are brought before the reader.

From these a realization emerges that "The boughs of the Tree of Liberty may be swayed this way and that by recent gales, but their strength to withstand the wind comes from 'the depth and toughness of their roots in the past'" (pp. 2-3).

EDWARD DUMBAULD

UNIONTOWN, PA.

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Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties. By JAMES MORTON SMITH. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, in Co-operation with the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1956.—xv, 464 pp. $5.00.

The Alien and Sedition laws have been notorious in American history since their enactment by the United States Congress in 1798. Over forty years ago Frank Maloy Anderson published a comprehensive article on them. Of course a number of historians have considered them since, but until 1950 there had been no full-scale study of them. Then in 1951 John C. Miller wrote his *Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Laws;* and now the present work has appeared. James Morton Smith has provided us with the first full-scale study which goes deeply into the sources. So complete is the work that it is doubtful that the ground will again have to be reploughed.

Certainly from this study certain points in dispute have been cleared up and the intended restrictive nature of the legislation has been emphasized. No one can read this book without finding considerable support for the belief that the high Federalists intended to outlaw or silence the Jeffersonian opposition. Under the Sedition Act, or under prior indictments under the common law, there were seventeen cases instituted against Jeffersonian editors and newspapers. All five of the major Jeffersonian newspapers, those of regional and national circulation, came under indictment by the time of the opening of the presidential campaign of 1800. In addition, those of local and state circulation likewise came under indictment. The federal judges empaneled juries composed of leading Federalists and convictions followed in most instances. One member of Congress, Representative Matthew Lyon of Vermont, was indicted, convicted and jailed. Not even in the case of the campaign of 1864 for the presidency has a comparable attitude of suppression accompanied a national election. All of these points are brought out by the author with admirable detail.

What did the Federalists aim at? Here they were somewhat divided. But again the author points out that, with the exception of certain technical opposition by John Marshall, all Federalists supported the legislation for one reason or another. Some of Hamilton's biographies have claimed he did not support the legislation, but the author clearly demonstrates that Hamilton did. President John Adams probably aimed at less than the elimination of criticism. But certainly he was confused as to the extent to which criticism might be permitted. Finally, the extreme Federalists had a larger aim: that of eliminating national political opposition.

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Necessarily the Sedition Act did not stand alone. There were also several measures providing for registration of aliens, deportation of aliens, and other regulation of alien critics. Likewise, the period of years required for naturalization was extended. All of this legislation came about during the crisis following the XYZ Affair and the resulting quasi war with France, which was the first foreign affairs crisis of the new republic of the United States.

The appearance of James Morton Smith's *Freedom's Fetters* at this time is a reminder that the problem of security *vs.* liberty is not a new one of the period of the present cold war. It is also true that there are many lessons for the present time in this work, and in the detailed picture which the author brings out. Consequently, while it might seem that American historians have long neglected a careful examination of this important series of legislation, the Alien and Sedition laws, the appearance of the work today is indeed timely.

MANNING J. DAUER

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Mr. Justice. Edited by ALLISON DUNHAM and PHILIP B. KURLAND. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1956.—xi, 241 pp. $3.75.

Chief Justice John Marshall: A Reappraisal. Edited by W. MELVILLE JONES. Published for College of William and Mary by Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1956.—xviii, 195 pp. $3.00.

There is no necessary paradox in saying that eulogy has a valuably relevant place in social science literature. To praise posthumously, even while slighting the evil that men do, need not nullify a work of scholarly research or careful observation. Indeed, such praise has frequently been informative of itself, both of author and subject; Marshall's *Washington*, Beveridge's *Marshall*, and Bowers' *Beveridge* come immediately to mind. Both books under review here fall into the category of eulogy, yet both have sections adding in some manner to our perception of American constitutional development.

The Jones collection of nine papers (presented at the College of William and Mary's Marshall Bicentennial Program) is the lesser of the two, both in format and substance. The book's overriding difficulty is its tone of hurried superficiality. All the papers share this fault, but in varying degrees; and in the least afflicted of them are some discussions of considerable value. I think the best essay is that by Julius Goebel, Jr., on "The Com-

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mon Law and the Constitution". Here, in 22 small pages, he investigates the political problems of receiving the common law in the new constitution and the judicial contortions resulting from the Court's denial of its existence at the federal level. Goebel concludes by showing how the Court under Marshall in effect fashioned such a body of law, as a "cumulative effect of deciding cases in terms of principles, of relying on English case law, and of applying to their own decisions the rule of *stare decisis*."

A "balancing of the roles played by Marshall himself and by the Court over which he presided" is the contribution of Donald G. Morgan, in "Marshall, the Marshall Court, and the Constitution". Using an interesting technique of dividing Marshall's incumbency into periods based on the tenure of his associate justices, Morgan is able to plot changes in constitutional interpretation (particularly in the areas of state powers and judicial-legislative relations) which correlate to some degree with the increasing Republicanism of the high bench.

With the nine studies making up the Dunham-Kurland anthology, the editors hope to rescue the Supreme Court from "the limbo of impersonality". Despite the multiplicity of authors, all the essays emphasize in one way or another the personal contributions of the judge as derived from his personal environment and development. Four of the Justices (Holmes, Stone, Brandeis and Rutledge) are analyzed by former law clerks (Francis Biddle, Allison Dunham, Paul Freund and John P. Stevens); the rest by past or future authors of full-length studies of their men (W. W. Crosskey on Marshall, Charles Fairman on Bradley, J. F. Paschal on Sutherland, M. J. Pusey on Hughes, and C. B. Swisher on Taney).

In such a collection, the reader generally expects a mixed qualitative bag—and *Mr. Justice* is no exception. I liked Biddle's and Pusey's contributions least—the first because legitimate reminiscence of Holmes gives way to a discursive and uncritical defense, the second because Hughes's not inconsiderable talents and achievements are fulsomely overblown in pedestrian style. A first-place tie goes to Crosskey and Freund. Both authors have managed to write excitingly and to provide new insights and interpretations in the context of careful scholarship—never an easy task and all the more difficult for subjects who have been studied at length by others.

Students of constitutional history are familiar with Crosskey's revisionist and highly controversial interpretation of our early period. In his essay, Marshall emerges a hero, but a tragic hero, whose lot it was to fight a continuous rear-guard action in de-

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fense of a remnant of Federalist principles, only to go down to defeat before the Jacksonian holocaust. Drawing on his immense researches, Crosskey describes Marshall case after Marshall case as a compromise with and retreat from Federalist principles, rather than as a confirmation of them. For example, grounding *McCulloch v. Maryland* in the fiscal powers of Congress was a major concession to the Republicans. Had the case been decided along Federalist lines, it would have rested on the Preamble as a grant of legislative power, supported by a properly read Commerce Clause giving Congress power over *all* commercial regulation, foreign and domestic. Pressure from Republican brethren formed the opinion, Marshall having to acquiesce in the Jeffersonian views of the nonsubstantive nature of the Preamble and the Commerce Clause as dichotomizing domestic economic activity. *Gibbons v. Ogden* did not rest upon the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce only, but "that commerce which concerns more states than one"—that is, commerce of interest or importance to more than one state whether the particular commerce was interstate or not. The "unwarranted" interstate view was read into the *Gibbons* case by Taney, says Crosskey, in order to bolster Taney's view of state police power. There are other examples in this very plausible and convincing repainting of Marshall's greatness (he is still, for Crosskey, "the great Chief Justice"); reading this essay may well induce the view that Marshall was not exaggerating, from the point of view of his own governmental theories, when at the end of his life he despaired of the future of the union.

For Freund, Brandeis' career was marked by the tradition of "seeking and striving"—a fusion of the civilizations of Isaiah and Pericles. Running through his opinions are evidences of this twin urge, in his massive factual analyses, in his understanding of the labyrinthine complexities of corporate law and related judicial procedures, in his insistence upon government's right to experiment, in his defense of civil liberty, and in his lifelong struggle for a valid adjustment of the federal system. Each of these illustrative facets of Brandeis' heritage receives sympathetic treatment; but his own intellectual humility and fallible humanness remain.

These books deal with individuals; but understanding the Supreme Court requires institutional study as well. For the social scientist, however, the intimate relations between man and office need not be belabored.

MERTON L. REICHLER

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

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The Militant South, 1800-1861. By JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN. Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1956.—xi, 317 pp. $5.00.

Probably no other section of the earth has been so often put under the microscope as has the South. Like his predecessors in this pastime, Professor Franklin has a thesis to establish but it has not affected his vision. He has not, like the sentry in the Gallic war, reported as seen what he has not seen. Moreover, although he has apparently viewed without sympathy, he has reported without passion. He has written an account that is admirably temperate and restrained.

Before coming to particulars, the reviewer wishes to offer two observations on the book as a whole. The first is that the word "militant" is of so elastic a nature that it can easily be stretched out of all meaning. This appears to have been done here. As evidences of a militant spirit in the Old South the author names such diverse things as individual brawling, mob violence, dueling, military education, slave patrols, filibustering expeditions to Cuba, expansion into Texas, and approval of the war against Mexico. At the risk of approaching a pun, the reviewer protests that this is decidedly too much grist for any militancy. For the common spirit which underlay all these manifestations, the author finds an origin in a superiority complex engendered by the presence of slavery and again in the feeling of insecurity caused by slave revolts and Indian menace. The reviewer is far from denying that there was militancy in the old South but he insists that a study of it should more carefully assess its manifestations and more clearly designate its cause.

In the second place, the reviewer doubts if the militancy the author has found in the South can properly be called Southern. Had he trained his microscope as relentlessly on, say, the Northwest of this period, he would have found there much the same spirit manifesting itself as in the South and in much the same ways. Certainly the Northwest had its braggarts and bullies as Martin Chuzzlewit found to his astonishment. There was mob violence as at Nauvoo and Indian apprehension as revealed in the ridiculous preparations for the tragic Black Hawk war. There was expansion into Iowa and Minnesota and readiness for war against Canada. All these things, visible even to the naked eye, suggest that the militancy Professor Franklin has found was not so much Southern as American. It may indeed have been merely human.

Coming to particulars, it is difficult to see that the author's theory of militancy in the Texas migration has any more valid-

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ity than the ancient and discredited doctrine that it was a plot of the slaveowners. Surely for the rank and file of migrants the overwhelming motive was land hunger. Proximity supplied the opportunity. It is conceivable that patriotism rather than innate jingoism inspired the Southern participation in the inglorious war with Mexico. There was certainly militancy in the Southern migration to Kansas but it has been whispered that Ossawatomie Brown was not altogether an exemplar of peace on earth, good will to men—or even to women and children.

Nevertheless it must be said that the author has done an outstanding thing in that he has written a definite book on a thoroughly nebulous subject and has pin-pointed highly elusive phenomena. This, even in the unlikely event that the objections of the reviewer have validity, is certainly a notable achievement.

R. S. COTTERILL

TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA

Citadel: The Story of the U. S. Senate. By WILLIAM S. WHITE. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1957.—xi, 274 pp. $3.75; $2.75 Text Edition.

To interpret responsibly an institution so subtly complex, so frustratingly yet engagingly human as the Senate of the United States requires intimate association, perceptiveness and much reflection. These assets William S. White, the distinguished chief Congressional correspondent for the *New York Times,* has in full measure. He also brings to this book a declared but restrained admiration, a deep but not uncritical affection for what he calls "the Institution"—sentiments perhaps equally necessary to understanding a body so little changed over the years and one whose formal features almost compel it to engage in practices and to espouse values subtly at variance with strong currents in contemporary society. For the thesis of this book is that the Senate in origin and in operation challenges and "heavily qualifies" the majoritarian doctrine by institutionalizing the "moral-Constitutional" proposition that "the democratic ideal is not all majority," and hence has an existence unique and apart among the elements of our governmental system.

To the lay citizen he argues for the net value, not the perfection, of the Institution. "It is not," he concedes, "in all times and circumstances, incorruptible. And it is not, at any time, incapable of disservice to the country and grave error." To his Senatorial readers, of whom there should be many, he issues the warning that a body so constituted "in a way is on a long probation" which it cannot hope to survive if it does not control

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the irresponsibility—" wrong and folly against its own being and its own psyche "—of the investigatory power with its " extra-Constitutional punishment . . . of individual persons over whom it has no fit mandate to sit in judgment "; the Institution and the values it serves when at its best cannot much longer tolerate " the clear and frequent abuse of Senatorial immunity from action for libel or slander for what is said in committees or on the floor."

A work of insight and analysis rather than of formal description, *Citadel* is at its best when it depicts and sometimes merely adumbrates the informal structure of influence and leadership in the Institution, the unwritten codes of its existence, the processes of its changing moods, and the components of its separate and unique existence. Inevitably there are limitations in this sort of treatment. One may argue that at times Mr. White is so caught up in his vision of the Institution as a separate community with its own philosophy that he overstates his case. His being a close-up view, it tends to neglect the Senate as part of a whole moving system of government whose other elements affect its functioning though they do not destroy its distinctiveness. For example, his thesis on why not very many Senators become president—that " the habit of mind and action of the Senate " disqualifies a man for winning nomination or election or for being a successful president—undoubtedly has merit, but there would seem to be less subtle and more substantial explanations. Similarly, one may question the impression he leaves that in all Washington only the Senate is a place of compromise, that it is alone in being " not really a very partisan place " in the sense of " bitter and unending friction between two *parties*," or that the qualities of a good senator are unique and not in considerable measure those of most men who are successful in responsible political positions.

Despite reservations such as these, the insights in *Citadel* are almost unfailingly suggestive, they have the right " feel ", and their general tone will be highly persuasive for all but the most ardent advocates of " party responsibility " and copybook democracy. The latter will reject the essential conservatism of the book. They are likely to be unpersuaded by its confident assertion that the Senate's " habit of mind and action . . . has on the whole steadily kept alive certain traditions that may be nearly as important as defeating the Depression and not infinitely less important than winning the war." They will be a good deal less tolerant than is the author of the fact that from the middle of Franklin Roosevelt's second term through the Truman Administration, excepting only the most critical period after Pearl

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Harbor, "the Institution successfully interposed itself against the operation of apparent popular will and of unquestioned Presidential will." They will dissent from his view that what is "clearly good in the committee system well outweighs all that is bad to very bad," and they are likely not to be satisfied with the assertion that "where a powerful majority *really wants* a bill it will find a means to have its way, cloture or no cloture."

However controversial his valuations, Mr. White has written the most perceptive account of the Senate that has appeared in many a decade. Even those who disagree with him will be obliged to reckon with his insightful analysis if their own assessments and prescriptions are to be rooted in reality.

DAVID B. TRUMAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Carl Becker: On History & the Climate of Opinion. By CHARLOTTE WATKINS SMITH. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1956.—xiii, 225 pp. $3.75.

Carl Becker thought that one could not come to know the past unless one began by knowing something about knowing. The essence of his own approach to historical knowledge—relativism—was, as he put it, "that old views are always being displaced by new views, that the facts which historians include or omit, the interconnections between the facts given which they stress, depend in no small part upon the 'approach' which seems to them a meaningful one, and that the approach which at any time will seem significant to the historian depends in no small part upon the social situation in which he finds himself—in short, upon the preconceptions and value judgments, the *Weltanschauung,* of the age in which he lives."

The profound and provocative ideas of Carl Becker have already been analyzed: briefly by Guy Stanton Ford and Louis Gottschalk; at somewhat greater length by George H. Sabine and Leo Gershoy in their respective and altogether excellent introductions to two of Becker's later books, *Freedom and Responsibility in the American Way of Life* (1945) and *Progress and Power* (reprint, 1949). Charlotte Watkins Smith's, however, is the first attempt, apart from two unpublished Master's theses, to make a full-size appraisal of Becker's contribution. Originally written as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago, her study undertakes, in its two central chapters, to present and to evaluate Becker's historical relativism. Persuaded that "what Becker was, what he did, and what he thought about all manner of things were somehow all of a piece," Mrs. Smith has ampli-

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fied her portrait of Becker in four additional chapters dealing with his life, the art and the practice of his writing, and his rôle as "Mr. Everybody's Historian".

In some respects Mrs. Smith's portrait is a disappointing one. Her evaluation of Becker's relativism is limited largely to an attempt at defining Becker's sense of the uses of the past, and the definition proceeds not so much by explaining what that sense was as by indicating what it was not. In rescuing Becker from unfavorable comparison with "historians" of Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (a comparison of ten pages which, the author admits, "may seem capricious") and with Charles A. Beard (who is substantially misrepresented), Mrs. Smith is using a variant of the "guilty by association" technique. Becker, to his everlasting praise and good fortune, is dissociated from both Big Brother and slightly less big Beard and is therefore not guilty. Mrs. Smith ought to have concluded this phase of her discussion by explaining or clarifying the positive elements in what Becker thought to be the proper uses of the past. The few pages which Mrs. Smith devotes to a critique of Becker's relativism as an approach to historical knowledge could have been made more convincing: by giving the problem, which is after all central, far lengthier treatment; by adducing proof from Becker's own words, which become all too few at this point; by defining thought and language more closely; by avoiding all too simple an equation of skepticism and Becker's relativism; and by sustaining more substantially the assertion that Becker's philosophy did not sanction his values, an assertion which seems to pass over his very deep sense that values could be their own philosophy.

There are many important questions which Mrs. Smith would have done well either to raise or to answer systematically. How far, for example, does Becker's analysis of the nature of historical knowledge compare with that of other outstanding analysts of this problem—men such as Dewey, M. R. Cohen, Croce, Collingwood, Cassirer, Troeltsch and Dilthey? How far were the histories Becker wrote a fulfillment of his relativist philosophy? How far were they valid by the standards of the "scientific" or "orthodox" school? How far and why was Becker's system affirmed by his contemporaries? How far and why was it rejected by them? To go relativist on Becker: what historical and personal factors account for the rise of American relativism in general and Becker's approach in particular? The study as a whole, it must be said, suffers from too little a survey of "the climate of opinion" of so serious a subject: the rather meager bibliography confirms what is clear from the text, that Mrs. Smith

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could have improved her work by taking a wider and deeper view of her central problem.

Several elements of the study are, however, both valuable and competently handled. Mrs. Smith has made extensive use of the Becker papers that are on deposit at the library of Cornell University. The account of Becker's life, with which the book begins, gives revealing insights into the personal agonizing that underlay his historical reappraisal. The next chapter is an effective presentation of the details of his thought. Of interest, too, are the chapters on the art and practice of Becker's writing. His great talent, as Mrs. Smith well shows, was the product of his insistence on expressing the individuality of his ideas and the unremitting and painstaking effort he put into that expression. Becker's advice was: "Have something of your own to say, and then say it in your own way." Very important is the final chapter, "Mr. Everybody's Historian", which explores Becker's interpretation of the past and his concern with putting the past to the service of Everyman's present. There could be no doubt from Becker's writings that both his interpretation and his concern centered on what he deemed to be the paramount question of modern times: whether or not the liberal democratic ideal could survive.

A. S. EISENSTADT

BROOKLYN COLLEGE

The Evolution of Wage Structure. By LLOYD G. REYNOLDS and CYNTHIA H. TAFT. New Haven, Yale University Press, London, Oxford University Press, 1956.—xii, 398 pp. $5.00.

The authors attempt to point the way to a reconstruction of classical and neoclassical wage theory. They hold the view, which is shared by many labor economists and specialists, that the "body of wage theory which satisfied many economists before 1930 has been outdated by institutional changes and accumulation of knowledge", and that "no equally coherent and accepted body of principles has yet arisen in its place." They have accordingly endeavored to provide a theoretical framework to bridge the gap between the established theory and the results of recent theoretical and empirical research. As the title of their book suggests, the authors are primarily interested in wage "structure", as opposed to the behavior of the general wage level or the determination of particular wage rates. The focal point of the study is thus neither the more familiar problem (to this day and age) of stabilizing wages as part of the general problem of economic stabilization, nor that of analyzing individual wage negotiations, but rather an intermediate type of problem

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better known to classical and neoclassical economists—the long-run behavior and significance of wage differentials.

In analyzing the forces which guide the evolution of wage structures, the authors have singled out as the two major protagonists the "individual responses" of unorganized workers and employers in the labor market, on the one hand, and "organizational behavior", i.e., the activities of trade unions, employers' associations, and the various levels of national and local governments, on the other. The question posed is whether the wage structure which would otherwise result from individual responses can be modified substantially by organizational behavior, and, if so, what the significance of this will be for any particular economy. In pursuance of this central theme, the authors have studied the impact of organizational behavior on wage structure both in this country and abroad. Part I of their book describes the influence of collective bargaining on wage structure in four major industries of the United States, and concludes with a chapter on the impact of American trade unionism as a whole. Part II is a study of national wage structure in the United States and in four other countries, with a final chapter setting forth a generalized theory of the evolution of national wage structures in liberal capitalist economies.

The book may be considered from two points of view, institutional and analytical. The chapters on American industries contain much interesting institutional material on collective bargaining, as well as on wage structure. The industries chosen for study—railroad transportation, iron and steel, cotton textiles, and pulp and paper (the two chapters on the pulp and paper industry were written by Robert M. MacDonald)—are of particular interest because of the range of economic and organizational situations they encompass. Similarly, the chapters on national wage structure delineate the wage-determining mechanism in each of the countries studied in addition to describing the behavior of wage differentials. Interest in these chapters is also enhanced by the variety of situations depicted, ranging from the highly centralized and controlled methods of wage determination in France and Sweden, to the semi-controlled but less "tidy" arrangements in Great Britain, to the market-oriented and relatively unregulated wage bargaining in Canada and the United States. The book thus provides a useful survey of collective bargaining methods and other wage-determining devices in the United States and in other countries, and is a distinctive contribution to the available literature in this area.

On the analytical side, the method followed is to compare the wage structure which reflects the influence of organizational be-

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havior with the structure that develops in imperfect nonunion labor markets. The question is then raised as to which of these lies closer to the equilibrium wage structure that would be found in a perfectly competitive labor market. This procedure is followed for each of the "major dimensions" of wage structure—personal, interplant, geographical, occupational and inter-industry wage differentials—and conclusions are drawn as to whether the influence of organizational behavior has been "beneficial" or "undesirable". Generally speaking, any tendency toward a narrowing of differentials is taken to be beneficial, although it is recognized that in certain instances the narrowing could go too far. The final stage of the analysis sets forth the thesis that national wage structures tend to evolve according to a well-defined growth pattern. It is argued that the determining factors in the broadening or narrowing of differentials, apart from the pressures of organizational behavior, are (a) the progress of industrialization and secular changes in the money wage level (both of which make for a shrinkage of differentials) and (b) cyclical fluctuations in aggregate demand (producing an alternating dilation and contraction of the wage structure).

In applying their method to the available data, the authors have arrived at a number of provocative conclusions. For the period studied (roughly 1939 to 1955), they find no evidence that organizational behavior has tended to "distort" wage structures; on the contrary, it would appear that collective bargaining and government regulation of wages, subject to certain qualifications, tend to conform to market requirements rather than to come into conflict with them. Moreover, it is asserted that market tendencies toward equilibrium are sufficiently powerful to overcome the effectiveness of wage regulation if any conflict should arise. These conclusions are offered with complete awareness and acknowledgment of the limitations of the data. They are nevertheless argued with much conviction, and perhaps imply a greater degree of finality than was intended. As the authors propose at one point, they would best be regarded as hypotheses to be tested as additional evidence accumulates.

The analytical method proposed by the authors raises objections of a more serious kind. If one is to attach so much importance to the "beneficial" or "undesirable" effects of organizational behavior, considerable more clarification is necessary as to what the effects are, and what standards are used to judge them. The use of the hypothetical equilibrium of the perfectly competitive labor market as a norm is acceptable in principle, but difficult to apply with objective precision in this situation. There also remains the problem of designing suitable measure-

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ments for the impact of the forces that are described. In spite of these difficulties, however, the book proposes a number of fruitful lines of inquiry, and these will undoubtedly stimulate the interest of researchers for a long time to come.

AARON W. WARNER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Germany in the Twentieth Century: A Political and Cultural History of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. By EDMOND VERMEIL. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. –288 pp. $5.50.

Germany's key rôle in the twentieth-century game of power politics has already led to a number of searching analyses. Edmond Vermeil, Honorary Professor at the Sorbonne and the Institute of Political Studies, and a leading French expert on Germany, here focuses his attention on two significant periods of history, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. (In the two-volume French original, *L'Allemagne Contemporaine*, one volume spans the Empire years 1890-1918.)

The first section of the book is devoted to rather brief but incisive surveys of political, economic, military, diplomatic and cultural developments during the Weimar Republic (1918-1933). The author carefully selected those features or events, such as the fragile government coalitions, the organization of cartels, the era of secret rearmament from 1930 to 1933, the rôle of Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann and the contributions of neo-nationalists to political theory, which reinforce his thesis that Hitler's accession to power was but a logical outcome of a historical continuity in Germany, especially that stemming from the Weimar era.

One may criticize an occasional lack of balance and objectivity in this dissection of the Weimar Republic. To cite but two examples: Stresemann is characterized here as the leader of an aggressive foreign policy to restore the authority of the Reich and to achieve full sovereignty. There is no citation of the concurrently initiated policy of fulfillment of the Versailles Treaty for the purpose of maintaining a modicum of peace in Europe. The heading of another chapter, "Pessimism in the Weimar Republic—the Intellectual and Moral Crisis", describes a mood which prevailed then to some extent, but the author does not give credit to one of the most dynamic cultural movements in the era after World War I. He fails to equate the bourgeois neo-nationalism of Oswald Spengler and Moeller van den Bruck with the classical humanism of the historian Friedrich Meinecke or the revolutionary fervor of the Bauhaus architects.

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The second section of the volume describes the foundations of National Socialism and the period of the Third Reich. Once again the author deals with the somewhat familiar material from a topical point of view: the ideological basis and the development of the Nazi movement, Hitler's accession to power and the organization of the totalitarian state, the economic and financial bases of the system, and Nazi foreign policy. Vermeil brilliantly develops his thesis that National Socialism is more closely linked to the Weimar régime than is generally supposed, by amply illustrating, for instance, the influential army and industrialist support given the Nazis before 1933, and the neo-imperialist, geopolitical and racial doctrines which had their antecedents in the Republican era. However, one may take exception to the statement that the rise of Nazism can also be attributed to "inveterate habits and tendencies imprinted upon the national temperament over the generations" (p. 266); for, did not the Weimar era, on the contrary, reveal an exceptionally diverse pluralism, and the tentative gropings for a democratic faith?

But, despite certain criticisms of interpretation and emphasis, the signal contribution of Vermeil's volume is the measure of perspective gained by dealing with two consecutive historical periods which, it is claimed, telescoped into one another and led to the disaster of the Second World War.

GERARD BRAUNTHAL

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Germany's Eastern Neighbours: Problems Relating to the Oder-Neisse Line and the Czech Frontier Regions. By ELIZABETH WISKEMANN. New York, London, Toronto, Oxford University Press, under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956.—x, 309 pp. $4.80.

Miss Wiskemann's latest effort in the realm of Slavic-German problems offers what one has grown accustomed to expect of her, a competent, workmanlike job, full of useful data, neatly organized and presented with a high degree of detachment.

Yet the task she has undertaken here is truly Herculean. It consists of no less than giving a comprehensive account of the expulsion of Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia and of the territorial changes effected after World War II, including the historical antecedents, the emotional motivations, the diplomatic byplay, the manner of execution, and finally the political, social and economic impact on the countries involved. To handle as vast and intricate an assignment as this flawlessly within the scope of a single, readable volume would be a tour de force which Miss Wiskemann did not quite manage to bring off.

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She herself acknowledges the difficulty of the endeavor and invites indulgence in judging especially the sections dealing with social and economic affairs.

On the whole, the first two thirds of the book (up to page 209) are far superior to the rest. Here Miss Wiskemann is for the most part on familiar ground. She brushes over the historic setting of the problem up to World War II, discusses the salient features of German occupation policy in Poland and Czechoslovakia, goes over the genesis of Czech plans for expelling Germans and the diplomatic "birth of the Oder-Neisse line". She also describes the procedures and the hardships attendant upon the expulsion and resettlement of Germans in turn, the absorption of expellees in the West German economy, their social and political organization and their aspirations. If there are faults to be found in this portion they are relatively minor.

Some familiar phases of the background might have been omitted or abbreviated. Similarly some aspects of the expulsion and resettlement seem to be treated in excessively fine detail. To be sure this adds color to the book but it does not commensurately enhance comprehension of the total picture. Finally one might quarrel with the author's generally optimistic estimate of the political aspirations, the irrendentism if you like, of the expellees. The last point, of course, is strictly a matter of interpretation on which a variety of views with more or less equal claim to validity could be held.

The latter chapters cover agricultural and industrial repercussions in Poland and Czechoslovakia and the status of the Germans remaining in these countries. There is also a very brief chapter (five pages) on East Prussia under Russian rule.

The shortcomings of these chapters are more serious. In the early post-war period when the expulsion of Germans was actually taking place, the important relationships between national passions and the Communist drive for power in Poland and Czechoslovakia are inadequately appraised. Little mention is made of the social mobility induced by large-scale population movement, of the impact of the depletion of skilled manpower on the structure of the Czechoslovak economy in particular (the Sudeten areas after all housed a significant portion of the country's export consumer industries), of the effects of expropriation of German property on nationalization (nationalization in Poland and Czechoslovakia was effected more swiftly and on a larger scale than elsewhere in the Soviet orbit). In Poland the psychological reactions to population and territorial changes and especially the attitude of important social groups, for example, the Catholic Church, toward the "Western Frontier" receive insufficient attention as does the whole question of organizing

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and administering the "recovered territories". The total economic picture of the post-1948 period (with the exception of Czechoslovak agriculture) is both overly sketchy and optimistic. In part this may be due to paucity of source material, in part to faulty interpretation.

A singular, though not altogether ununderstandable, omission is the evolution of relations between East Germany on the one hand and Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other hand. The fate of the Oder-Neisse line in Polish–East German negotiations, economic contacts, and attempts of political and cultural *rapprochement* are of paramount international significance.

In the Conclusion (three pages) Miss Wiskemann poses two questions: which, if any, frontier adjustment should be made and what form of international coöperation could be devised to smooth over antagonisms and solve social questions? Her answer to the first question is negative, and while this seems on balance a sound estimate it is certain to invite sharp criticism from the Germans. Her suggestions for solving the second, more fundamental, question do not do justice to the complexity of the issues. "Levelling up" of living standards in Poland and Czechoslovakia, cited as one of the essentials, is hardly the answer. It betrays a materialistic bias which for better or worse does not loom as large in the human equation as many present-day social and political analysts would have it.

PAUL E. ZINNER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

German Exile Politics: The Social Democratic Executive Committee in the Nazi Era. By LEWIS J. EDINGER. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1956.—xiii, 329 pp. $4.25.

Dr. Edinger has undertaken the difficult task of presenting the first comprehensive study of the activities of the German Social-Democratic party in exile. As he points out in his introduction, the tragic and oftentimes frustrating history of exiles has yet to be written in almost each individual case. There are no studies on such noteworthy emigrations as the Russian after 1917, the Italian after 1923, or the Spanish after 1939. Of these emigrations, at least that of the German socialists after 1933 has now found its chronicler.

The results of his study are interesting but they do leave the reader with an acute sense of frustration. If there is so little that makes fascinating reading in this book, it is most certainly *not* the fault of Dr. Edinger. He has labored with great inten-

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sity and dedication. He has most carefully examined all the relevant documents and other materials. He has utilized his personal contacts with a good number of the leaders of the *S.P.D.* in exile. Above all, he is at the same time understanding and yet critical in his excellent analysis. Yet all of these virtues and efforts cannot make the story a very dramatic one.

This is due to the fact that the *S.P.D.* in exile lacked the vitality, the organization, and the direction of a formidable opposition movement. The author, in fact, is the least likely to be under any misapprehension on this score. (*Cf.* p. 256.) The very nature of the *S.P.D.* during the Weimar Republic, if not long before, made it almost impossible to assume the rôle of a truly revolutionary group. After all, with few exceptions, the leaders of the *S.P.D.* in exile were also those who had largely led the party before 1933. A party so dedicated to the principles of gradualism and parliamentarism could hardly be expected to turn suddenly into a truly revolutionary organization ready to fight a prolonged and merciless war against one of the most ruthless and effective police machines.

The emphasis in Dr. Edinger's book is therefore rightly laid upon ideological conflicts within the party in exile and with other Marxian groups. One of the most interesting chapters deals with the relations of the exiled *S.P.D.* and *K.P.D.* (Communist party of Germany). The author also provides a very interesting account of the divisions within the *S.P.D* executive committee in Prague. It seems significant that the younger men who joined it either could not assert themselves against the moderate majority (Erich Rinner, for instance) or fell in with that majority (as did Erich Ollenhauer). Probably the most interesting and original contributions of Edinger's book deal with such socialist splinter groups as the Miles organization.

Perhaps the author could have added a splash of color and a dash of verve had he referred in detail to the German Social-Democrats in the underground movement, such as Wilhelm Leuschner who was executed in connection with the 1944 *Putsch*. Dr. Edinger might also have added a passage on the Social-Democrats of the Saarland, notably Max Braun. But apart from these few additions, the book presents as complete and thorough a study as one could wish to have. A very full bibliography adds to its scholarly virtues. One can only hope that the author will continue in his important examination of luckless movements of exile groups in the century of unending mass migrations.

F. GUNTHER EYCK

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

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Italian Foreign Policy under Mussolini. By LUIGI VILLARI. New York, The Devin-Adair Company, 1956.—xii, 396 pp. $6.00.

Dr. Villari's book is presented "as a serious contribution to the task of correcting the record of an important sector of contemporary history." According to the publisher's Preface, "no other country or leader has been more unfairly treated in the books written, read, or both, in Britain, France and the United States than Italy and Mussolini, especially in relation to foreign policy." These books "have reflected the views and biases of leftwing radicals, pro-French and pro-British liberals, and imperialistic British conservatives"; that is, it would seem, nearly everyone. It is argued, on better ground, that Soviet representatives "completely 'sold' the liberals, particularly the French and British, on the notion that the only threat to democracy, liberty and peace came from the totalitarianism of the Right—Fascism and Nazism. . . . Liberals in the United States were deeply affected by this propaganda. . . . Communists and fellow-travellers throughout the western world eagerly poured fuel on the flames." It would be idle to deny that this somber picture contains a substantial element of truth.

Luigi Villari is introduced as "the best equipped scholar living to undertake the task of correcting the historical record," and, while "there is no pretense on the part of the publisher that Dr. Villari's book is completely objective history," it is believed unlikely that "the Italian version will ever again be presented in a single volume with such adequacy, honesty and authority." Unfortunately the expectations raised by this generous statement remain unfulfilled.

Born in 1876 Luigi Villari, whose mother was English, spent most of his life in the Italian foreign service, traveled extensively abroad, and became a prolific writer. In spite of his wide experience of the world, his philosophy of Italian foreign policy may be fairly accurately summarized by the familiar Fascist slogan: *Mussolini ha sempre ragione*—Mussolini is always right. In his book Villari gives an adequate, albeit unexciting, account of the formal history of Italian foreign relations—ministerial visits, conferences, notes, agreements, treaties and wars—but his interpretation of these events never deviates from the trite Fascist pattern. The Western Powers—France, the United States, and above all England—are responsible for the failure of the Duce's wise and far-sighted policies, and it was the hostility of the Western democracies that drove a reluctant Mussolini into an alliance with Hitler. Villari is critical of Roosevelt and

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Churchill but Anthony Eden is his particular *bête noire,* indeed his whipping boy. Many of Villari's strictures are not supported by evidence, some are definitely wrong, and he draws but sparingly on the vast literature dealing with Fascist foreign relations.

In the closing chapter of what is a disappointing book Villari brings out a bit of information which is of real interest. Early in 1943 General Franco warned the British government against the imminence of the Soviet menace. In his reply (February 25, 1943) Churchill expressed the "diametrically opposed" view. "Do you really believe that a single nation is strong enough to dominate Europe after this war?" he wrote. "And that it will be actually Russia. . . ? I venture to prophesy that after the war England will be the greatest military power in Europe. I am sure that England's influence will be stronger in Europe than it has ever been before, since the days of the fall of Napoleon." According to Villari, the Franco-Churchill correspondence appears in the Italian and the German, but not in the English version of von Papen's memoirs.

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Russia Leaves the War. Vol. I of *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920.* By GEORGE F. KENNAN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956.—xiii, 544 pp. $7.50.

This work of historical reconstruction and criticism possesses great power, subtlety, integrity and charm. It has already, of course, received a degree of recognition indicating that it will be the classic work in its field. One of the finest qualities of Ambassador Kennan's account is its charitable spirit. While the author finds much to criticize or to deplore and frequently gives expression to wry irony regarding the follies and frailties of statesmen, he is never harsh, intolerant or dogmatic. In this respect, as in others, Mr. Kennan has set a splendid example.

The book provides much evidence that historical narrative is a useful method of studying politics. In some ways, this is a diplomat's diplomatic history. Probably only a man of Kennan's experience could have been so sensitive to the problems of organization in the conduct of foreign relations. Perhaps one could go further and say that only an official with experience in Russia during World War II could have so effectively portrayed the confusions that plagued the American Embassy in Russia during World War I. Of course, no amount of experience would have been of any avail to the author had he not possessed the literary gift which enabled him to bring to vivid life such unusual per-

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sonalities as John Reed, William Boyce Thompson, Edgar Sisson and Raymond Robins. The plight of Ambassador Francis, forced largely against his will and often against his better but usually mediocre judgment to deal, both with the Bolsheviks and with his own government, through Robins, the imperious and evangelistic Red Cross representative, and, to a lesser degree, through the inquisitive and impatient Petrograd official of the Office of Public Information, Sisson, furnishes Ambassador Kennan with abundant opportunity for criticism of what he apparently regards as a deeply rooted American sloppiness in the organization of foreign relations.

Much more fundamental, perhaps, is Mr. Kennan's criticism of the assumptions on which President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing based their policy toward the newly established Bolshevik régime. In the framework of this criticism, mostly implicit but often expressed, Lansing stands up better than Wilson. Kennan feels that Lansing had a clearer conception than Wilson of the ideological elements in Soviet policy. He presents a wealth of detail showing Wilson's inability, or unwillingness, to recognize the undemocratic essence of Soviet doctrine. However, he gives the impression that both men, as well as most of the other political leaders in America and Britain and France, were so blinded by hatred of Germany that they neglected important aspects of the problems with which they were called upon to deal. On the other hand, perhaps a trifle inconsistently at times, Mr. Kennan praises both men for some of their actions, particularly for resisting, at least in the few months dealt with in this volume, the incipient pressures in Japan, Britain and France for military intervention in Russia. It will be extremely interesting to follow this theme in Ambassador Kennan's next volume. Will he conclude that intervention was a tragic error, useful in the end only to the Kremlin?

Mr. Kennan obviously does not believe that American policy could have won the coöperation of the Soviet leaders. He is at pains to demolish what he regards as the harmful myth, disseminated by Robins, that Allied aid might have kept the Russians in the war against Germany. On the other hand, a good deal of the material in this book might make some readers feel that, given the suspicious Bolshevik mentality, a clearer, firmer, more honest and less contemptuous attitude on the part of the Western Powers might perhaps have somewhat reduced the friction between the two sides. At times such an interpretation is perhaps faintly implied, or so it seemed to me. It is fairly clear that Mr. Kennan believes it was a mistake to couch Western criticism of Sovietism so largely in terms of economics. He expresses sympa-

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thy for the attitude of Arthur Bullard, who urged that nonrecognition of the Bolshevik régime be combined with social liberalism and a firm defense of constitutional principles against Soviet absolutism.

It is difficult to find fault with such an excellent study. Perhaps it is somewhat too detailed, considering the shortness of the period covered. I found a few instances of duplication. While the writing is superb, the composition might have been tightened somewhat. There is, perhaps, somewhat too great a tendency to implied analogies between different periods. Perhaps, also, the author places too much emphasis upon individual personalities, and not enough upon basic social forces. But one finishes this volume impatient to read the next. Great as its author's services were in the field of diplomacy, one suspects that their significance will be equaled by his achievements in letters and scholarship.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN

YALE UNIVERSITY

Target: The World. Communist Propaganda Activities in 1955. Edited by EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1956.—xxiv, 362 pp. $5.00.

This volume follows by a year the pioneering job of editing research on world-wide Communist propaganda mainly done by governmental workers that F. Bowen Evans did in *World Communist Propaganda Activities.* The present book offers a more complete record of Communist propaganda activities for 1955 than did its predecessor for 1954. It is also more analytical than the earlier work which admittedly was descriptive. In general, the volume follows the same chapter plan—examining the highlights, themes and volume of propaganda during one year, the wide variety of communications media used, the rôle of international front organizations, and the propaganda activities in the four major geographic areas: the Far East, Latin America, Western Europe, the Near East and South Asia and Africa.

A reading of the text, which is punctuated with vivid illustrations, results in an impressive and analytical picture of the awesome weapon of Communist propaganda that is being continuously and tirelessly hurled against the West. The reader also gains a realization of the great efforts which must be forthcoming from our own government to construct a counter-organization in the daily battle for the hearts, minds and stomachs of the world. Although devoted to a passing year's propaganda activities, the book, then, is by no means one of passing interest.

This being the case, it is unfortunate that the editor's extended

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preface, in so many ways helpful, should, in so many ways, also, be unsatisfactory. Here are some of the critical comments that this reviewer jotted down:

1. While it is mentioned that communism in power demands total control over the actions and minds of all, there is no suggestion of the difficulty that the leaders have experienced in establishing such a program, or of the significance of this to freedom. This is particularly strange in a preface written in the spring of 1956 after some years of intellectual ferment in Russia following Stalin's death.

2. After emphasizing "the irony and incongruity" of the hold that Communist propaganda has over "middle-class intellectuals who seek greater freedom in the name of a movement dedicated to the world-wide annihilation of liberty", the editor says that this book will focus on one important part of the answer, namely the rôle of propaganda. One can agree that "a full explanation" of why this state of affairs exists "is beyond the scope of this book." Surely, however, a few sentences summarizing the many factors (frustrations, desire for speedy technological developments in certain areas, etc.) contributing to an understanding of the irony and incongruity would be appropriate.

3. The editor repeatedly stresses the anomaly of a country like the United States, known for its commercial public relations and advertising all over the globe, which for many reasons has not developed to its capacity, and used extensively, international propaganda. But our government and the country have by no means been as woefully ignorant of the techniques of propaganda, or as slow to use it or approve of its use, as is implied here.

4. The editor must believe that certain values are at stake in the propaganda conflict. "Liberty" is mentioned periodically, for example. It would seem that a clear summary statement calling attention to the nature of these Western values would have been helpful, especially from the editor who in the past had a long and distinguished career in teaching political philosophy. For, at bottom, it is a devotion to these values that distinguishes our "social scientist" specialists in communications (repeatedly referred to by the editor) from those on the other side whose development of science and techniques is, as William Benton has shown, vast, continuous and profound.

On page four of the text in a discussion of early Chinese communism, it is stated that "original gains of the movement in China were negated by the stinging 1927 defeat of Mao Tse-tung by Chiang Kai-shek." The facts are that in 1927 the leader of the Chinese Communists was Chen Tu-hsiu, who was the scape-

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goat for the Stalinist Comintern's disastrous policy which he reluctantly carried out. Li Li-san might be described as the leader for the two or three years following Chen's purge in August 1927. At any rate it was *after* the failure of 1927 that Mao began to make his way to the top. His name first appeared as a *member* of the Party Politburo in January 1934. It is reasonable to assume that Mao has yet to receive a "stinging defeat" by Chiang Kai-shek.

Despite these marginal remarks the book has great value. And the editor deserves to share fully in the laurels although he modestly notes that the "anonymous government social scientists and research workers deserve the credit."

CARROLL HAWKINS

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Soviet Russian Nationalism. By FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN. New York, Oxford University Press, 1956.—xi, 330 pp. $7.00.

If there is one topic from which "old Russia hands" have shied away because of its unique complexities, it is the rise of "Soviet Russian" nationalism: a phenomenon identical with neither old-style Russian nationalism nor the earlier version of Soviet patriotism. On the basis of extensive research as well as personal observations, Professor Frederick C. Barghoorn has ventured to deal with this problem in its several difficult dimensions: the relations of Russian and non-Russian nationalisms within the Soviet Union; the relations of Soviet Russian nationalism and Bolshevik internationalism; and the relative rôle of Russian and Bolshevik components in the present mystique of "Sovietism".

The study is a competent, conscientious, dispassionate attempt to present the available evidence; the author will be the first to agree that further work in this field remains to be done. Some sections, such as the discussion of the "dynamics of sovietization", the post-war campaign against Western influences, the wartime utilization of national themes, the manipulation of national sentiment by the Bolshevik leadership, are highly satisfactory. Professor Barghoorn introduces a useful hierarchy of allegiances expected by Moscow: first, patriotic loyalty to the Soviet state; second, cultural nationalism within it; and, third, international Communist "solidarity". He correctly stresses the Soviet failure to spell out some of the implications—and even the extent—of the awkward readmission of Russian nationalism "through the back door". An essay on the "traditional and revolutionary" (i.e., persisting Russian *vs.* novel Soviet) factors, while inevitably controversial, is stimulating and well balanced.

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In general, the author's sobriety and good sense are amply apparent from his analysis. He does not exaggerate the scope of the national problem: "As a rule, people in the same social group have basically similar value and attitude patterns regardless of nationality." However, though less important than other areas of grievances, national consciousness among non-Russians in the USSR "gives a special twist to social and political attitudes."

The emphatic conclusion which the author reaches amounts to this: "The 'internationalist' and 'socialist' Soviet Union is a much more nationalistic state, with far more ethnocentric attitudes, than was imperial Russia." At the same time, he warns that this does not mean that "the mass of the Soviet population is necessarily more patriotic or more hostile to foreigners." Writing, it is true, before the major gyrations of 1956, Dr. Barghoorn sees no basically new departure in the policy of Stalin's successors.

Perhaps additional categories might usefully have been introduced. "Sovietization" and "Soviet Russification" are meaningfully distinct; likewise, Soviet promotion of administrative and political centralism is not necessarily identical with the growth of specifically Russian nationalism, connected though these processes have been. On some occasions, the author speaks of Soviet policy in this field as "expediential concessions" to national sentiment, marking departures from Marxist blueprints. More generally he regards "ideological and power factors" as responsible for the present policy. Most important among the factors to which he ascribes the national recrudescence is the "system of rationalizations of the political order which has taken shape in the Soviet Union since 1917." It is regrettable that Professor Barghoorn has not spelled out this interesting view in greater detail. He rejects, soundly and convincingly, both the view that Soviet Russian nationalism is merely an extension of old-style Russian attitudes, and the hypothesis that it is but a cloak for "Marxism in action". Instead, he finds it to be a unique ideology of the new "totalitarian ruling class". Unfortunately, this analysis fails to tell us whether the revival of Russian nationalism, from the 1930's on, was a calculated risk or an irrational development forced on the leadership, a synthetic or an organic trend. But Professor Barghoorn's failure to provide the answer is a measure of the complexities of the problem, rather than a reflection on his thoughtful and sensible study.

ALEXANDER DALLIN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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The Founding of the French Socialist Party (1893-1905). By AARON NOLAND. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956. —viii, 233 pp. $4.50.

The organization of labor for political action and the mustering of much of labor's power under the banner of Marxian socialism have been extremely important aspects of Western Europe's political life in the last three quarters of a century. They go far toward explaining the partial class character of political parties, the innumerable splinters within labor, the nature of Left-wing political platforms, and the legislative achievements of Socialist parties.

Literature concerning the history of French labor and of its political manifestations is extremely rich. Not only have French scholars like Emile Levasseur, Georges Weill, Paul Louis and Alexandre Zevaès devoted their talents to this subject, but so too have several Americans, like Louis Levine (Lorwin), David Saposs, Harold Weinstein and Val Lorwin. Now Aaron Noland, Assistant Professor at the City College of New York, adds his name to this galaxy.

As the title of his book indicates, Professor Noland concentrates his attention upon the formal coming together of the two main divisions among the Marxists—the reformists and the revolutionaries—to form the *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (S.F.I.O) in 1905. In a short introduction he traces the revival of French socialism from the doldrums into which it had fallen after the Commune of 1871 and in a second chapter, entitled "Parliamentary Socialism", shows how a *rapprochement* between divergent groups was getting under way that augured well, in his view, for the creation of a unified party. Such a development was delayed, however, by splits among Socialists over the policy which they should pursue in the Dreyfus case and subsequently over the stand which they should take regarding the participation of Socialists in bourgeois cabinets—an issue which came to a head when Millerand joined the Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry. In spite of many differences Socialists did come together to form a single Socialist party in 1905, but, rather contrary to the impression given by the author, this "union" was at best a feeble one. It was a working agreement based on compromises which failed to settle the basic question of how best to further the interests of labor. That the Socialist party should have produced the splinter Communist group at the Congress of Tour in 1920 was not at all astounding.

For the most part Professor Noland, like most writers on French socialism, has limited his investigation to the diffusion

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of Marxist ideas in France, to ideologies among Socialist leaders, and to political maneuverings at the parliamentary level. He makes little or no pretense of trying to get at the "grass roots" of Socialist political strength, of attempting to analyze the socio-economic class structure of the rank and file of French Socialists, or of essaying an excursion into the political geography of the party. Although a wider view of French socialism than the one taken here might have been desirable, it is not the critics' duty to wish for a different volume than the one in hand. Students of French history are Professor Noland's debtors for a study the like of which has not been available in English.

SHEPARD B. CLOUGH

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Israel and the United Nations. Report of a Study Group set up by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. New York, Manhattan Publishing Company, 1956.—322 pp. $3.00.

This is one of the highly valuable studies we owe to the pioneer project of the Carnegie Endowment to gather authoritative statements on international organization and, especially, the United Nations in more than a score of judiciously selected countries. The draft for the present Report was prepared by a group of Israeli scholars under the chairmanship of Professor Nathan Feinberg and then commented upon by eighty personalities "representative of all shades of public opinion in Israel" and, in their personal capacities, by some officials of the Foreign Ministry and the U.N. Delegation of Israel; those comments were thereupon incorporated by the same group into the final text. Hence, the book expresses the national attitude of Israel as a whole. With a few notable exceptions, it covers the period up to March 31, 1954, but the careful reader will find that it throws light also on the events of the last months of 1956 and beyond.

Here, then, is a state that came into being under the aegis of the United Nations. The myth of its birth—that emotion-laden evaluation of a state's creation which is apt to influence so much its policies and attitudes—shows a blending of appreciation for General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) with pride in their own exploits at the early stage. The thesis that the U.N. "created" Israel is rejected. "That was to be the work of the Jews who were, in a sense, the partners of the U.N. in implementing its decision." Yet, "non-Jewish opinion [as expressed in Res. 181 (II)] may have been in advance of Jewish opinion itself in its

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readiness to envisage a solution of the Palestine problem based on the principle of partition." (!) The part played by the U.N. and Mr. Bunche in bringing about the armistices in 1949 is considered "a triumph". Some groups, especially the then small *Herut* party, counseled against Israel's joining the U.N. The government's pro-U.N. policy has been criticized, for example, by *Herut,* out of skepticism of the organization's chances in a world dominated by power politics and for jeopardizing the small country's position of non-involvement in the struggle of the giants. Other sectors, in turn, have criticized the U.N. and member states for neglecting the moral values to which Zionism must unalterably adhere.

Israel's relations with the Arab states have, it is felt, "in practice, for good or ill, been conducted [by the rest of the world] as though they lay within the exclusive domain of the U.N." (p. 66). But when the Arab states attacked the emerging republic, and the Security Council failed to declare them aggressors and to order their forces to withdraw, this caused "exasperation and disappointment" and has, in the eyes of the Report, permanently damaged the popular reputation of the U.N. in Israel (pp. 219-22; see also pp. 86-87). With regard to the General Assembly's original recommendation to establish an international régime for Jerusalem, public opinion in Israel has been profoundly influenced by the inability of the U.N. to provide protection for the city. By the end of 1949, only a Communist organ fully supported the principle of territorial internationalization. Concerning the Palestine refugees, their plight is acknowledged but public opinion generally approves the government's position in the U.N. that they must be resettled rather than repatriated; this consensus does not extend, for example, to the government's administration of the abandoned property of the refugees (p. 155).

With respect to the two basic conflicts within the U.N.—the East-West split, and the "colonial issue"—the Report shows the delicacy of the position of a small state. Israel has taken very seriously the U.N. deliberations on human rights. An excellent analysis of U.N. technical assistance activities concludes with high praise for them, just as the book shows high praise for the specialized agencies.

This carefully-weighing but frank discussion can be said to show the following picture. Israel is thankfully conscious of the rôle of the U.N. in creating her statehood. Also, "Israel has obtained undoubted and important benefits from her membership in the U.N. in the social field and to a lesser extent in the political field." But she has frequently been disappointed and

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at times stunned by what she considered vacillating or unjust U.N. decisions. Her public opinion has come to consider it unable to solve Israel-Arab problems. Nor does it "rate highly in Israel's security calculations." There has been widespread feeling in the country that the attitudes of U.N. supervisory organs have sometimes bordered on "pseudo-objectivity", and Israel's ostracism by the Arab states causes "indignation". It is shocking to the man in the street that those states, fellow U.N. members, should have succeeded in excluding Israel from regional coöperation in the Middle East, thus creating "a ghetto-wall" around her. Sobered from exaggerated expectations, Israel is on the whole definitely, though not uncritically, pro-United Nations. Over the years, her attention has been focused on the Powers and their policies, rather than on the U.N. But lasting peace with the Arab states would be "to the eternal credit of the U.N."

The book is of particular interest to the American reader. It shows the immediacy of the effects of U.N. action (and inaction) on the affairs and, indeed, the existence of a small state; and this is but one, though particularly dramatic, illustration of the reality and responsibilities of the United Nations.

JOHN H. E. FRIED

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

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The diplomatic career of Jay Pierrepont Moffat fell in the momentous quarter-century between the last stages of the First World War and the first phases of the Second. At his death in 1943 at the age of forty-six, Moffat was United States Ambassador at Ottawa. *The Moffat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919-1943* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956; ix, 408 pp. $7.50), edited by Nancy Harvison Hooker with a foreword by Sumner Welles, is a sample of his voluminous diaries. Appointed in 1937 to be Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, he is most informative on *Anschluss,* the fall of Czechoslovakia, and the outbreak of war in 1939. His diary entries are not brilliant or especially exciting on the transcendent events he watched from his privileged place. They have, however, the important quality of sincerity, and always sophistication without pretense. Moffat, above all, had the sure touch of the professional. For example, he wrote perceivingly during the Munich episode: "Ever since the beginning of the crisis the British have been maneuvering to get us to give advice or to express ourselves, in particular as opposed to general terms, with the sole view of throwing responsibility on us in case their ultimate decision is an unpopular one." The book offers sidelights, not highlights, of history. If there is a single, significant theme it is the helplessness of diplomats in dealing with Hitler. In the last days before war came Moffat says that he had "the feeling of sitting in a house where somebody is dying upstairs. There is little to do and yet the suspense continues unabated." When Moffat first joined the Department of State, he notes, it "was still like a club: the outsider was regarded with a faint air of suspicion. . . ." Moffat quickly became a respected member. It is difficult to say from these selections whether the impression of unbroken harmony between himself and his superiors reflects unusual public dedication or unusually skillful editing.—HENRY F. GRAFF, Columbia University.

The most recent study of the governorship in the American state governments—*The Office of Governor in the United States,* by Coleman B. Ransone, Jr. (University, University of Alabama Press, 1956; xiv, 417 pp. $6.00)—is presented in three parts: Part one—"The Character of Gubernatorial Politics"—provides a useful exposition of certain leading characteristics of state party systems, particularly as they revolve around the office and person of the governor. The author classifies these party systems into

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three broad types (the one-party states; the normally Democratic or Republican states; the "two-party" states), and appraises the impact of each upon the governorship. Part two—"The Executive Function"—constitutes the main core of the volume, accounting for more than half its pages and ranging in subject matter from the governor as policy-maker to his need for a staff. Part three—"The Governor and Democratic Control"—is a one-chapter conclusion and synthesis entitled "The Quest for Accountability". The materials upon which the volume is based were mainly derived from interviews conducted by the author in twenty-five states—largely with governors, gubernatorial staff members, legislators, party officials, and newspapermen. There is consequently much information that has the freshness and authenticity of direct exposure to gubernatorial practices, opportunities and dilemmas. But the method of research and the handling of the materials it yielded reveal sharp limitations. There is a lack of focus, an absence of unifying themes or hypotheses, a somewhat disjointed structure which retards sustained analysis and reduces the cumulative significance of the discussion. No type-situations are presented in depth; instead, the revealing differences between governorships are lost in general characterizations intended to embrace the whole range of variations among many governorships. The several models of exposition and analysis provided by the studies of the presidency—by Corwin, Rossiter, Herring, Laski, Koenig, for example—are neglected, and the pioneer work on the modern governorship by Leslie Lipson is ignored. These are shortcomings not adequately balanced by the substantial body of new data provided by the author.—WALLACE S. SAYRE, Columbia University.

In a study of socialist achievement—*The Labour Government and British Industry, 1945-1951* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1956; viii, 196 pp. $3.00)—A. A. Rogow, with the assistance of Peter Shore, examines the effectiveness of the Labor government in pursuing its objectives. He finds that labor paid little attention to the machinery of planning and to the development of effective control over business. The necessities of postwar reconstruction and later of rearmament forced the expedient use of the wartime techniques which did not always further Labor's objectives, and even helped to build up and consolidate business opposition. The quantity of economic intelligence was not sufficient to make planning very effective and Labor relied primarily upon trade associations and business-in-government to administer industrial controls. Such administration tended to maintain the older business pattern with all its inefficiency, cartel agreements and shared markets that hampered increased pro-

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ductivity and industrial development. Self-regulation through the trade associations became, for the business leaders, a means of preventing further enlargement of government control. With expert staffs, large funds and a unified voice, industry associations greatly enhanced the effectiveness of opposition to Labor policy. In the dispute over the nationalization of steel Rogow finds the associations particularly effective. To make clear the inadequacy of Labor's planning and the weakness of governmental control over monopolistic features of industry is a valuable contribution, but it is hardly to demonstrate that the substance of Labor's objectives was not at least proximately realized. Rogow confuses the technique by which Labor hoped to attain its goals and the goals themselves. Because government planning and nationalization in practice were so far short of Labor's original program, he believes there was no shift in the morals and values of British society to selfless (?) "ethics generated at lower social levels" and no spiritual satisfaction for the rank-and-file party member (pp. 185-87). He slights the material changes that Labor did achieve. The implications of wider educational opportunity, improved housing, and more equitable distribution of income and other economic and social improvements are profound. To help give the workers realizable aspirations for material security that will be retained and stubbornly defended as property rights is no small or simple achievement of a political party. Could it not be the case that the Labor leaders found that a sufficiently increased concern for individual rights and enjoyments and human dignity could be secured from the business community largely through taxation, subsidies and customary controls? In practice Labor appears to have decided that nationalization of industry and central planning are not the only means to the fuller, richer life they seek for the British.—JAMES W. KUHN, Columbia University.

International Law Opinions—Vols. I and II: *Peace;* Vol. III: *War and Neutrality*—selected and annotated by Lord McNair (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1956; xxvi, 380; viii, 415; viii, 436 pp. $35.00), is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the development of international law and its place in British foreign policy. The practice of states, as reflected in official documents, has long been regarded as an important source of the law of nations. The United States Department of State, however, has remained alone among the foreign offices of the world in making available to the public, in the form of the well-known *Digests of International Law* edited by Wharton, Moore and Hackworth, extensive collections of documentary materials from its archives bearing on international law. In

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other countries, attempts to publish similar collections have been made from time to time under private auspices. In Great Britain, Professor H. A. Smith commenced in 1932 the publication of a selection of documents from the British archives and other materials under the title *Great Britain and the Law of Nations,* but apparently gave up the project after the appearance of a second volume in 1935. The two volumes edited by Smith covered only a small part of the subject matter of international law. In 1938, there appeared *The Law of Treaties: British Practice and Opinions,* by Arnold Duncan McNair. This volume, which consisted largely of Reports of the Law Officers of the Crown supplemented by restrained comment and references to judicial decisions and other sources, was prepared on the initiative of the Department of Public Law and Jurisprudence of Columbia University and published under the auspices of the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences. It was to be the first of a series of studies portraying through documentary material the positions and views of a number of European governments on the law of treaties. The coming of the war and the subsequent shift of interest in American academic circles from law to politics put an end to the project. The set here noted is the result of an independent and highly successful effort by Lord McNair—who in the meantime had served with distinction as President of the International Court of Justice—to extend to the whole field of international law the method he had previously applied to the law of treaties. The three volumes already published are to be supplemented by a revised edition of *The Law of Treaties.* As in the earlier publication, the author refrains from pursuing each diplomatic controversy to its conclusion and warns the reader that "it cannot be assumed that the action taken by a Government follows the legal advice given to it." This is a collection of legal opinions rather than of diplomatic notes. Furthermore, most of the documents presented are from the "open period" of the Foreign Office archives—that is, the period before 1903. Lord McNair's work, therefore, cannot be regarded as the British equivalent of the American *Digests of International Law.* Nevertheless, it is bound to be of tremendous value not only to the practitioners and historians of international law, but also to all those who would understand the rôle of law in international affairs.—OLIVER J. LISSITZYN, Columbia University.

It is hard to see how historians of politics have been able to get a total picture of their subject with the gaping void now admirably filled by Ernest Barker's *From Alexander to Constantine: Passages and Documents Illustrating the History of Social and Political Ideas, 336 B.C.–A.D. 337,* translated with Introductions, Notes, and Essays (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press,

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New York, Oxford University Press, 1956; xxv, 505 pp. 50*s*., $8.00). The effective antecedents of European political theory and organization are not the high speculations of the first philosophers and the institutions of the classical city-states but the practices and their justifications which took shape between the fourth century B.C. and the fourth century A.D., between Alexander and the Stoics, who conceived of the world as an *oikoumene,* and Constantine, who bequeathed an officially Christian *oikoumene* to the Middle Ages. For the remote period sources are relatively limited, specific and easy to master; for the more immediate, they are diverse, dispersed and baffling. Sir Ernest's presentation of these sources is not merely another anthology of the familiar but a pioneer ingathering of materials, Greek and Latin, pagan and Christian, epigraphical and papyrological, which only a diligent lifetime of reading could assemble and only a combination of scholarship and taste could make attractive in English. His selections, Sir Ernest says, are merely steppingstones, but he has connected his steppingstones with a mortar of illuminating exposition and interpretation. The quality of the exegesis is what we should expect of the veteran master of ancient political theory; we are given not only materials generally inaccessible, but keys for opening them to use. It is hard to imagine that another writer, even with this model before him, can improve on what Sir Ernest has here given us; and it is to be hoped that the charming valedictory with which he closes his Preface is not to be taken literally.—MOSES HADAS, Columbia University.

Political Handbook of the World: Parliaments, Parties and Press as of January 1, 1957 (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957; 227 pp. $3.95) edited by Walter Mallory, now in its thirtieth year, maintains the standard set at the beginning. One of the publications of the Council on Foreign Relations, it is invaluable to anyone concerned with politics, whether international or domestic. Here are the salient facts about every country in the world—population, area, scheme of government, personnel of government, political parties and their programs. There is also a succinct discussion of major issues and the positions taken on them by the political parties. There is given too a list of the main newspapers in each country. Mr. Mallory as always does a skilful job of selection, editing and compression. To the Council on Foreign Relations and Mr. Mallory a debt of gratitude is owed by all those concerned with world affairs—scholars, editors, those engaged in business outside the borders of their own land. It would be difficult to exaggerate the usefulness of the book to all who are so concerned.—NATHANIEL PEFFER, Columbia University.

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

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